The Fountain
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

PRO DEO ET SAPIENTIA

THE FOUNTAIN: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies

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Foreword

The <u>Catholic University of Zimbabwe Growth and Development Strategic Plan 2013-2022</u> gives pride of place to research as one of the university's three key activity areas alongside teaching and service. St. John Paul 11 articulated the Catholic University's research agenda in <u>*Ex Corde Ecclesiae*</u> as follows:

A Catholic University …is immersed in human society…. It is called on to become an ever more effective instrument of cultural progress for individuals as well as for society. Included among its research activities, therefore, will be a study of **serious contemporary problems** *in areas such as the dignity of human life, the promotion of justice for all, the quality of personal and family life, the protection of nature, the search for peace and political stability, a more just sharing in the world's resources, and a new economic and political order that will better serve the human community at a national and international level. University research will seek to discover the root causes of the serious problems of our time… If need be, a Catholic University must have the courage to speak uncomfortable truths which do not please public opinion, but which are necessary to safeguard the authentic good of society* (St. John Paul 11, 2009).

The senior management team of the Catholic University of Zimbabwe (CUZ) launched its research programme at its annual strategy retreat in Bulawayo in January 2016 by formally establishing the Research Board and allocating a percentage of its annual budget to research.

It is from that programme that the current edition of the CUZ Journal, <u>The Fountain: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies</u>, emanates.

While the Journal takes a cue from St. John Paul 11's injunction for a Catholic University's research agenda as indicated above, the current edition, while interdisciplinary in coverage, addresses only a few of the many aspects of contemporary society and human life that St. John Paul 11 articulates. Subsequent editions of <u>The Fountain</u> will address equally pressing issues of contemporary society, including some which may focus on what St. John Paul 11 calls *"uncomfortable truths which do not please public opinion, but which are necessary to safeguard the authentic good of society."*

It is my pleasure to invite you to enjoy reading the current edition!

Professor Ranga Zinyemba

Vice Chancellor and Rector

Editorial

"How can a post-conflict society deal with the legacy of a recent violent past? How can a society deeply divided and traumatized, regain trust in itself and rebuild a moral system and a shared future? Can individuals, communities and societies make the choice to transform great suffering into great wisdom? Should priority be given to punishing perpetrators in order to combat the culture of impunity?" These are some of the questions that Madenga Innocent R. grapples with in his article *Transitional Justice: The Evolution of an Essential Component of Post-Conflict Peace Building Processes*. After the 2008 elections a lot of Zimbabweans were subjected to violence and torture. This left a lot of people psychologically and socially affected. Hence more still needs to be done in as far as healing of memories is concerned. Muzanago Kudzai Macmillan and Gatsi Orippah, in their article: *From Voting to Torture: Examining the Psycho-Social Effects of the 2008 Political Election Process in Zimbabwe*, make recommendations for such healing to take place. Among the recommendations is that the government of Zimbabwe should invest more in the National Healing and Reconciliation Commission and actively engage with the affected communities, survivors and victims of politically motivated violence, so as to ensure a peaceful environment in future elections. Muzango and Gatsi also recommend the enhancement of counseling services to the victims of post-election violence.

Reflecting on forced migration and the deaths of thousands of people who perish trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in search of greener pastures, Pope Francis says, "We cannot allow the Mediterranean to become a vast graveyard." (Pope Francis: Address in France on 25/11/2014).

Forced migration has become a challenge of our time hence Paul Z. Muchena in his article: *Conflict and Forced Migration: Reflections and Recommendations* analyses the causes and impact of conflict and forced migration. He also suggests strategies for preventing new displacements.

G. Chikowore, Nhavira, J.M. Chinyanganya, Manasah Sibanda and P. Chikowore make a comparative analysis of migration trends in Africa within a global context of socio-economic cultural integration in Northern and Southern Africa in Agenda 2030. The analysis is made with specific reference to socio-economic cultural integration of the Southern and Northern regions in the new millennium.

In his article entitled *Assessment Based Training: A Drive Towards Enhancement of Assessment Quality in Universities*, A. Mada argues that Universities should provide lecturers with assessment-based training to equip them with competencies and skills in assessing students.

In her article: *The Impact of Handicrafts on Economic Development: A Case Study of Bulawayo Kraal in Binga, 1990-2000*, Codelia Govha Dhodho examines how commercial basket weaving in Bulawayo Kraal Village in Binga District in Zimbabwe contributed to economic development of the community during the nineties. However, towards the end of the ninety's basket weaving of the Tonga community started facing challenges among them the fact that South Africa which used to be the main market for the Tonga baskets started promoting local handicrafts leading to a decline in demand for the Tonga Baskets.

Believe Mubonderi and Nomalanga Mpofu-Hamadziripi in their co-authored article: *Speaking the Unspeakable: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of Tabooed Language in Shona Society*, argue that the Shona society has an unwritten code of behavior which spells out what can be said or not said especially in public. In other words, there are words that are known to exist, yet they cannot and should not be said in public otherwise they cause discomfort to listeners. These are the

taboos found in the Shona culture. 'Myth is both *more* and *less* than philosophy.' It is more than philosophy because as a fantastic representation of the truth (reality), myth can give satisfactory answers (before philosophical answers are found), to the profound questions affecting humanity. However, myth is less than philosophy in the sense that it is a rudimentary way of explaining reality. In his article: *The Myth-Reality Nexus in Shona Oral Traditions in Zimbabwe, Mediating Contradictions and Sustaining Societal Values*, Aaron Rwodzi tries to analyse the role of myths among the Shona people.

Rev. Dr. Ferdinand Mubvigwi

Editor

Transitional Justice: The Evolution of an Essential Component of Post-Conflict Peace Building Processes

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Abstract

The term transitional justice has become synonymous with contemporary post-conflict peace building processes. The concept evolved from modest theoretical assumptions into distinctive models. The formal origins of the transitional justice concept can be traced to the 1990s, following the demise of the Eastern Communist bloc when nations experienced transition from autocratic to democratic rule. The roots of the concept can however be traced back to major peace settlements such as the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Paris Peace Settlement (1918) and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials after 1945. The major challenge it faced was acceptability and legitimacy; it was largely viewed as an instrument devised invariably to punish either the vanquished or the perceived perpetrators. This criticism may have informed the concept's evolution from being a vindictive 'victor's justice' seeker into defined frameworks such as criminal tribunals, commissions and courts. This paradigm shift was evidenced by the United Nations' recognition of the framework and its deployment in Yugoslavia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Sierra Leone (2002). Arguably, success story of these case studies' motivated the formation of the International Criminal Court in 2003. The paper will underscore the importance of contexts in the choice of transitional options.

Key words: conflicted, post-conflict, transitional justice, victor's justice, tribunals, courts, International Criminal Court.

1.0 Introduction

This paper seeks to explore the origins, applicability and feasibility of the concept of transitional justice in conflicted or post-conflict societies. It is imperative to trace the evolution of the transitional justice concept in order to ascertain its emerging best practices. The analysis will be premised on the motives of transitional justice, forms of justice and whose justice is to be achieved. Key examples of transitional justice processes stretching from the 1814 - 15 Vienna Congress to the advent of the International Criminal Court in 2002 will be referenced. Due attention will be given to the concept's applicability and feasibility contestations vis-à-vis the context and the global trends.

1.1 The transitional justice concept

Transitional justice is a contested concept. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) through its post-Cold War research project entitled, 'Transitional Justice' (Solomon, 1995, p. xxiii), first coined the term 'transitional justice.' Directed by USIP's Rule of Law Initiative, the

initiative had by 1995 produced a publication entitled, *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes* (Kritz 1995). The concept was viewed as 'the way in which emerging democracies or post- conflict societies deal with the legacy of past human rights abuses perpetrated or permitted by former authoritarian regimes' (Crocker, 2001, p.270). Non-violent democratisation processes in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s raised the optimism about the possibilities for conflict resolution mechanisms (McCandless, 2007, p.42). This paradigm shift in peacebuilding processes was affirmed by Boutros-Ghali (1992), the 6th United Nations Secretary-General in his *Agenda for Peace, which* advocates the engagement of a variety of activities that are associated with 'capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation' (1992).

Kritz's *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes* (1995) has been received with mixed feelings. Several reviewers accepted both the utility and the contents of the term 'transitional justice.' For instance, Piccone (1996 cited in Arthur, 2009) appreciates how Kritz addresses 'how democracies have attempted to strike a balance between redressing the abuses of the former governments and integrating victims and perpetrators in a post-conflict society.' Siegel (1998 cited in Arthur, 2009) also hails the transitional justice options availed during the cross-over from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Ash (1998 cited in Arthur, 2009) has, however challenged the idea that the contents of what Kritz presented as 'transitional justice could capture real-world complexities.' Ash argues that 'instead of 'coming to terms' with the historical complexities, (as one might expect in an effort to deal with 'the past'), Kritz presented transitional justice as deeply enmeshed with political problems that were legal-institutional and relatively short-term in nature' (cited in Arthur, 2009, pp.331-332). Using the South African Truth and Reconciliation case study, Henkeman (2013) feels that the concept of 'transitional justice offers built-in denial and therefore should be discarded.'

Nevertheless, the transitional justice concept hailed as 'the emergence of a paradigm' (Fischer, 2011, p.407) and an 'invention' (Mouralis, 2014), has increasingly gained in importance and scope as a peace building framework. It is now a systematic study which 'has influenced the legal, social and political discourse of societies undergoing fundamental change and of the international community' (Villalba, 2011, p.2). Its growing significance is a reflection of the challenges faced by peacebuilders in dealing with post-conflict complexities.

 (Zupan nate date, p.327) posits that a post-conflict society has to grapple with the following immediate challenges:

1. How can a post-conflict society deal with the legacy of a recent violent past?
2. How can a society deeply divided and traumatised, regain trust in itself and rebuild a moral system and a shared future?

These questions seek to find the methodologies to be used by conflicted societies in order to transform from cycles of violence to desired and more constructive future relationships (Lederach, 2005, p. 138). Transitional justice methodologies have to contend with the following complex questions (Solomon 1995, p. xxiii):

1. Can individuals, communities and societies make the choice to transform great suffering into great wisdom?

2. How best can a post-conflict society deal with the painful legacies of its gross human rights violations?

3. Should priority be given to punishing perpetrators in order to combat the culture of impunity?

4. Should a post-conflict society forgive and forget past human rights violations, in order to ensure peace and stability?

These questions are very difficult because no particular methodology can be prescribed to all post-conflict societies willy-nilly. Clark *et al.* (2009:381) concur that, 'transitional justice resembles the minefields it is meant to transcend.' Notwithstanding these seemingly insurmountable challenges, the concept of transitional justice has remained relevant in all post-conflict societies. The concept has grown from 'being a peripheral concern to a ubiquitous feature of societies recovering from mass conflicts or oppressive rule' (Clark 2012:1). In response to the question, *What is the idea behind transitional justice?* Herwitz (2005, pp.539-540) suggests a set of needs that a society in transition has to grapple with. These needs are:

1. to punish the human rights violators and strengthen the rule of law;
2. for restorative justice to ensure societal healing and reconciliation;
3. for transparency in order to build moral capital and support for the new regime;
4. to appease the old regime, so that transition will be smooth; and,
5. to strengthen the new regime and free it from the past.

Naturally, these needs form the most prevalent assumption in a transitional society but the dilemma is that the needs are not 'exactly consistent' (Herwitz, 2005). This assumption is motivated by the normative belief in the universal quest for justice and the causal belief which concerns the possible strategies to pursue justice and the rule of law (Mouralis, 2014, pp. 83-

84). The assumption, as noted by Lederach (2005, p.138), 'would require attention not just to proposed substantive solutions, but to the need for strategic design of change processes…'

This assumption underlines the United Nations' working definition of transitional justice as 'the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation' (Annan, 2004).

The International Centre for Transitional Justice (2008) regards transitional Justice as a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights by seeking to recognize victims and to promote opportunities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. It is imperative to note that 'transitional Justice is not a special kind of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse' (ICTJ, 2008). Suffice to say that these processes and mechanisms which include both judicial and non-judicial prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reforms, vetting and national consultations are critical in strengthening the rule of law (UN, 2014, p.5).

The processes and mechanisms, however, need a specific mandate (UN, 2014, pp.5-6) and to be tailor-made to suit the context rather than using the 'one-size-fits-all' approach (Rostow, 2013, pp.2-3). This means circumstances on the ground must determine the approach to adopt and implement. Rostow underlines that it is 'transitional' because it deals with past wrongs rather than ongoing issues. He therefore defines transitional justice as 'the provision of justice in the transition from one form of government, often perceived as illegitimate, unjust and tyrannical…to one that observes the rule of law and administers justice' He further advises that a firm foundation for the rule of law may be established if the processes are credible.

The normative framework for transitional justice is provided by the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law (UN 6.20: DDR and Transitional Justice, 2009, p.5). Hence, in recognition of these international instruments, transitional justice processes invariably comply with the right to justice, the right to truth, the right to reparations and the guarantees of non-repetition. This normative dimension is informed by the liberal thinking premised on concepts such as the rule of law, human rights and democracy (Hansen, 2010, p.58).

The UN (2014:5) has adopted four international human rights law tenets to inform transitional justice processes and the fight against impunity. These tenets listed below are linked to Herwitz's proposed needs:

1. The State obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, and to punish those found guilty;

2. The right to know the truth about past abuses and the fate of disappeared persons;

3. The right to reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international law; and

4. The State obligation to prevent, through different measures, the recurrence of such atrocities in the future.

Several definitions of transitional justice have also emerged. Herwitz (2005, p.539) refers to the concept as 'the kind of justice distinctive to nations on the rocky road from authoritarian regimes characterised by gross violations of human rights to those that are classified as liberal democracies.' This shows that the transitional justice field 'has a profound normative dimension in that it is pre-disposed to view the past as something 'bad' and the current as something 'good' (Hansen, 2010, p.58).

Roht-Arriaza (2006, p.2) also views it as a 'set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law.'

The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2009) gives a more practical purpose of the transitional justice processes. It defines the frameworks as 'the pursuit of comprehensive justice during the time of political transition…the development, analysis and practical application of a wide variety of strategies for confronting the legacy of past human rights abuses in order to create a more just and democratic future' (2009:16). Transitional justice in a post-conflict State often claim as an objective, not just the alleviation of tension but the positive 'presence' of justice (Mani, 2009 cited in Rimmer, 2010, p.123).

It can be noted from these diverse definitions that the international human rights law has strongly influenced the development of transitional justice, but, ironically, the framework has invariably prioritised violations of civil and political rights (UN, 2014, p.6). This selective approach has prompted the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to lobby for the recognition of socio-economic and cultural rights in order to properly deal with the root causes of conflict. In 2006, the OHCHR hinted that, 'transitional justice must have the

ambition to assist the transformation of the oppressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will procure an equitable future.'

In his 2010 *Guidance Note on the UN Approach to Transitional Justice,* Ban Ki-Moon the former UN Secretary-General underscored the 'centrality of victims in the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms…and to… 'strive to ensure that transitional justice processes and mechanisms take account of the root causes of conflict and repressive rule, and address violations of all rights, including social and cultural rights.' The credibility of this blueprint has however been questioned for 'not accounting for indigenous and customary mechanisms of justice that do not espouse' legalistic lens (Vieille, 2011, p.58). Sending (2009) contends that the greatest resource for sustainable peace in the long-term is rooted in the local people and the context. Mateos (no date) also concurs that 'local ownership has become probably one of the most relevant mantras in post-conflict peace building interventions in sub-Saharan Africa.'

The drive to make transitional justice a global project and to judicialise international relations has led the global community to seek truth and accountability through legal frameworks. These include the post-World War II Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Special courts for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court which has assumed universal jurisdiction. From their world survey of 192 countries, between 1979 and 2004, Sikkink and Walling (2006) reveal a significant increase in the judicialisation of world politics. The judicialisation strategies provide a marked departure from what Cobban (2007) calls "self-consciously victim-centric." This new impetus has transformed the transitional justice concept from its narrow scope of jurisprudence to political considerations of developing stable democratic institutions (Hayner, 1995, p. 225).

It is noteworthy that there are other definitions of the transitional justice concept that focus on the set of actors in the processes rather than the substance (Villalba, 2011, p.3). For instance, Arthur (2009), Bratton (2011) and Vieille (2011) define the concept as a 'field' of study.

Arthur (2009, p.324) defines the concept as a field constituted by 'an international web of individuals and institutions whose internal coherence is held together by common concepts, practical aims and distinctive claims for legitimacy' most of which are an expression of dissatisfaction with gross human rights violations.

Bratton (2011) views transitional justice as a field of study which 'emerged as an attempt to systematise knowledge and practice about protecting human rights in the context of transition from authoritarian rule.'

Vieille (2011, p.58) who questions transitional justice's 'colonisation' sincerity embraces the concept as 'a field of study that explores attempts to secure peace and justice and that encompasses the legal, moral and political dilemmas that arise in holding human rights abusers accountable at the end of conflict.'

However, Bell (2009, p.6) calls transitional justice a 'label or cloak that aims to rationalise a set of diverse bargains in relation to the past as an integrated endeavour, so as to obscure the quite different normative, moral and political implications of the bargains.' By considering the concept of transitional justice as a 'field,' Bell undermines its nature as a response to the international human rights law's call for the acknowledgement and accountability of past abuses.

In spite of the diversified definitions and controversies, the common denominator is that all transitional justice processes involve a particular set of strategies that seek to account for past human rights violations and international crimes. The concept may have assumed diverse definitions because of its evolution, growth in importance and the diverse contexts in which it is applied. Fischer (2011, p.407) describes the concept's advent as 'the emergence of a paradigm', possibly because of its influence in the processes of prosecution of human rights offenders, truth seeking/fact-finding and documentation, lustration of State officials, recognition and compensation of survivors, institutional reforms, memorialisation, healing and reconciliation.

Thus, transitional justice 'forms an absolutely essential component in every post-conflict peace building process' (Thallinger, 2007 cited in Vieille, 2011, p.59). However, the mechanism is not just a 'simple recipe for dealing with past human rights violations; rather, it is a range of options which require reflection, discussion and difficult choices' (The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2009:17). A post-conflict society's commitment to the principles of truth – seeking, accountability, reparations, institutional reforms and memorials will determine how that society can move from a past of human rights violations to a future of justice, democracy and peace. This scenario exposes the futility of Zimbabwe's blanket amnesty and amnesia approaches since independence; for, a society that chooses a blanket amnesty as its key

transitional justice model, risks negating the principles of institutional reforms and accountability (Villa-Vicencio, 2004, p.14).

Zimbabwe has since independence endured repeated cycles of violence, allegedly orchestrated by the State, but no deliberate efforts have been made to account and deal with this orgy of violence. Henkin (1995 cited in Hansen, 2010, p.55) also advises that, 'even in situations where pardon or clemency might be appropriate, there should be no compromising of the obligation to discover and acknowledge the truth.' Forcing survivors to live with 'silenced memories of horror and fear' make it hard for them 'to put the events behind them and move on' (Eppel, 2005, pp.46-47). Thus, by simply drawing a line between the bad past and the present, blanket amnesties invariably muzzle the truth of atrocities and nurtures impunity. The urgent challenge facing Zimbabwe is to come up with a transitional justice framework that enables victims, perpetrators and other stakeholders to deliberately engage each other to deal with the legacy of violence. To date, Zimbabwe's transitional justice frameworks such as the blanket national reconciliation policy imposed in 1980, the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation crafted by the Government of National Unity in 2009 and the 2013 (new) constitution's National Peace and Reconciliation Commission sadly miss key words like truth and justice (Eppel, 2013, p.214). This, 'forgive and forget' or 'healing without revealing' approach can mitigate but cannot break the cycle of violence and impunity (Eppel, 2013).

This paper argues that the ouster of President Mugabe in November 2017 provides Zimbabwe an opportunity to seek alternative transitional justice options. The new political dispensation should now seek to engage all relevant stakeholders in dealing with the country's chequered electoral history. Inclusive stakeholder participation is essential in ensuring bottom-up transitional justice models. Bottom-up models have inherent merits such as mutual local ownership and are context-based. The Mnangagwa-led government must transform its appeal for peace, love, unity and forgiveness into action. Having popularised the mantra that, 'the voice of the people is the voice of God,' President Mnangagwa is expected to show political will in ensuring non-recurrence of the country's legacy of violence. His government must not prescribe or control the transitional justice models to be adopted and his call for 'fairness and credibility' in the impending harmonised elections should be matched with meaningful electoral reforms. Zimbabwe needs reforms such as diverse media and a clear electoral roadmap.

1.2 The evolution of the transitional justice concept: theory and practice

The concept of transitional justice is both a contested and evolving process. It is thus essential to explore the evolution of the term and concept of transitional justice because it has become an indispensable toolkit in governance and reform processes in most post-conflict societies (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2010, p.9). This research embraces Roht-Arriaza's (2006, p.2) working definition of the transitional justice concept as a 'set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law.' By holistically embracing issues of justice, truth, accountability, reform, compensation, memorialisation, mercy, forgiveness and reconciliation, 'transitional justice is preoccupied not only with individuals and communities, but also with structures' (Francis, 2006, p.30).

Since conflict has from time immemorial been a fact of life, efforts to deal with its atrocious effects are therefore equally 'very old' (Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, p.2). Bass (2000) traces the history of war crimes tribunals to more than two centuries ago, while Elster (2004) traces the trials and purges to ancient Greece. Even during the Nuremburg Trials, Justice Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor made reference to the book of Genesis (Chapter 4:1-14) in the Old Testament: 'What we propose is to punish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain and have been so written in every civilized code' (Linder 2000). What this means is that, since conflict is a fact of life, transitional justice processes have been salient throughout the history of humankind. The need to heal and reconcile wounded societies requires a holistic approach (Francis 2006, p.27). Thus, in dealing with this 'very old problem' of post-conflict transitional justice, some difficult questions have always emerged (Solomon, 1995, p. xxiii; Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, p.2; Helgesen, 2008, p. iii):

1. Can individuals, communities and societies make the choice to transform great suffering into great wisdom?
2. How best can a post-conflict society deal with the painful legacies of its gross human rights violations?
3. Should priority be given to punishing perpetrators in order to combat the culture of impunity?
4. Should a post-conflict society forgive and forget past human rights violations, in order to ensure peace and stability?

These questions are not easy to answer and no particular package can be prescribed to all post-conflict societies willy-nilly. Clark et al., (2009, p.381) concur that, 'transitional justice resembles the minefields it is meant to transcend.' In spite of these seemingly insurmountable challenges, the concept of transitional justice has remained relevant in all post-conflict societies. Clark (2012, p.1) acknowledges that the transitional justice concept has grown from 'being a peripheral concern to a ubiquitous feature of societies recovering from mass conflicts or oppressive rule.'

It is worth probing why the transitional justice concept has grown so rapidly in terms of 'both policy and scholarly realms, with ever increasing variety in terms of practical processes and analytical approaches' (Clark, 2012, p.1) It is debatable whether the term transitional justice 'is just a fashionable neologism that refers to an old phenomenon' or it has transformed over time (Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, p.2).

The popularity, it can be argued, has been a result of 'very important transformation of the framework within which mass atrocities are dealt with,' in terms of balancing peace and justice (Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, p.2). It is this demand of justice paradigm that has given the transitional justice framework the 'specific meaning it nowadays has' (Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, p.2). Clark *et al.,* (2009, p.381) contend that transitional justice is a nascent peace building 'toolkit' yet a 'dynamic field in which key concepts and their bearing upon concrete conflict and post-conflict situations are constantly defined and redefined.' In fact, transitional justice has become an essential component of any liberal peace building operation (Andrieu, 2010, p.3). This confirms Lederach's claims that efforts to confront the past are now 'a permanent feature in post-conflict transitions' (1997, p.27). There is need to deal with the legacy of past human rights violations in order 'to clear the ground in the present for the building of a shared future' (Lederach, 1997, p.27). This proves Lederach's contention that conflict is normal in human relationships**,** hence the need to harness conflict opportunities and use it as an impetus for positive and constructive change.

The literature on transitional justice is also evolving significantly. Andrieu (2010, p.3) notes that from a retributive-premised approach, the current literature has become more conciliatory and restorative. Emphasis is now more focused on healing the victims, better known as survivors, in order to repair relationships, rather than on naming and shaming offenders. The literature also centres on debates such as possible solutions to specific contexts, the need to address the root causes, the role of socio-economic justice, as well as the actors and scope of the framework (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, 2014). In fact, 'the rapid development of

transitional justice studies has reached the point at which it is impossible to devise simple characteristics without the risk of simplifying the complex phenomena and processes' (David, 2012, p.762).

Contemporary efforts to reconcile deeply divided and polarised post-conflict societies, transitional justice seem to emphasise both victors' and victims' justice. Francis (2006, p.30) notes that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions which have become the transitional justice processes' 'magic word' and War Crimes Tribunals/ Special Courts have become the preferred 'toolkits' in the search for certificatory justice, truth and reconciliation. It is imperative to trace and explain the origins and development of transitional justice processes and the preferred strategies.

1.2.1 The International Military Tribunal (also known as the Nuremburg Trials)

The precise starting point of the transitional justice phenomenon is contested. In her article, *Transitional Justice Genealogy* (2003), Teitel claims the credit for coining the term 'transitional justice' in 1991. She conveniently categorises the evolution of the transitional justice concept into three overlapping phases, namely: the post-World War II era, the post-Cold War era and the contemporary period. She organises the genealogy along a schematic structure of the development of ideas associated with the three phases. Orentlicher (1991 cited in Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004) concurs that the Nuremburg Trials inspired the advocacy and scholarship in the study of international war crime tribunals and transitional justice.

Teitel (2003) traces the first phase of her transitional justice genealogy to post-World War I, but acknowledges that the phenomenon became clearer, 'as both extraordinary and international' thereafter. A review of how the victorious Allied powers dealt with the defeated Axis powers is hereby made, in order to assess the post-World War Two International Military Tribunal's influence in the evolution of transitional justice.

The International Military Tribunals are synonymous with the Nuremburg Trials of leading German and Japanese World War II perpetrators charged with violating the laws of war and of committing crimes against humanity (Littell, 1999, p.843; Linder, 2000). These trials have been hailed as the springboard for modern transitional justice processes and a watershed moment in international justice, because they initiated a 'model of accountability focusing on individual responsibility' (Andrieu, 2010, p.4). As acknowledged Tribunal's Chief Judge, Sir Godfrey Lawrence, the trials were 'unique in the annals of jurisprudence' (Linder 2000) because they were 'the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the world' (Jackson, 1945).

After the six-year Holocaust, in which millions of lives were lost, the world was faced with the challenge of how to seek justice and make sure that such similar crimes were prevented in future (Littell, 1999, p.843*)*. The then USA President, F.D. Roosevelt was the architect of the Tribunals model (Linder, 2000). Roosevelt had to contend with some American hardliners who demanded outright retributive justice (Andrieu, 2010, p.5). Aimed at 'prevention not vengeance,' this legal route eventually earned the support of the USA War Department and Allied Powers (Robert H. Jackson Centre). In his opening statement for the Nuremburg Prosecutions on November 20, 1945, Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor underlined that the trials were a correctional and not a punitive measure. He assured:

> The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so malignant, and so devastating that civilizations cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason (Robert H. Jackson Centre).

The 10-months long Nuremburg Trials were befittingly held at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, Germany. Nuremburg was the venue for Hitler's most spectacular annual rallies and the infamous Nuremburg Race Laws of September 15, 1935, which deprived the German Jews of their rights of citizenship and property rights. Moreover, the massive destruction of the City of Nuremburg also bore testimony to the World War II horrors. The symbolic link was, therefore, not merely coincidental.

The initial 22 defendants were Nazi Party officials and high-ranking military personnel, lawyers, doctors and industrialists such as Marshall Hermann Goring, Deputy Fuhrer Rudolf Hess, Hans Frank the 'Slayer of Poles', Field Marshall Wilhelm Keittel, Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments, the Nazi Party philosopher Alfred Rosenberg, and General Joachim von Ribbentrop (Linder, 2000). They were charged with perpetrating a war of aggression, violating the laws of war and of committing crimes against humanity (Littell, 1999, p.843). The adversarial system with the defence lawyers for the defendants was used. Fuhrer Adolf Hitler, the SS Chief Heinrich Himmler, and the Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels evaded trial by committing suicide. The Nuremburg Trials introduced a cinema screen in the courtroom and enabled survivors to make open testimonies.

The Trials left an indelible mark on the evolution of the transitional justice processes. The model has been criticised as 'the victor's justice' or 'disguised revenge' (Minear 1971, p.19 cited in Andrieu 2010, p.4). The Tokyo Tribunal in particular, has been criticised as a gross 'miscarriage of justice' because the victors could not account for their own actions such as the

atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Baussiouni 2004 cited in Hazan 2004, p.x). This criticism has been bolstered by the 'disappearance' of the Nuremburg Model during the Cold War era. With the advantage of hindsight, unlike the Vienna and the Versailles peace settlements of 1814-15 and 1919 respectively, the Nuremburg Trials were wary of restorative justice as well as non-recurrence of measures. Arguably, the Nuremburg Trials' quest for restorative justice motivated Willy Brandt, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1969-1974) and winner of the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize to pursue conciliatory policies, which included apologising for World War II atrocities.

1.2.1.1 The Legacy of the International Military Tribunal

The Nuremburg Tribunal, the first one of its kind, was a truly international trial. However, the legal justification for the trials and their innovations were inherently controversial. They were controversial even among those who advocated the trial of key offenders. Harlan Stone, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court initially castigated the proceedings as a 'sanctimonious fraud' and a 'high-grade lynching party' (*Nuremburg Trials* - World War II - HISTORY.com). Even the then United States Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas blamed the Allies for substituting 'power for principle' (*Nuremburg Trials* - World War II - HISTORY.com).

The emotional magnitude of the Nuremburg Trials may have eclipsed the Tokyo Trials but both were labelled 'the victor's justice' or 'disguised revenge' (Minear, 1971, p.19 cited in Andrieu, 2010, p.4). Radhabinod Pal, an Indian Judge even described the Tokyo Trials as 'little more than a sword in a judge's wig' (Brook, 2001, p.38 cited in Andrieu, 2010, p.4), perhaps because the Americans, who were never made to account for their atomic bombing of Japan's two cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ironically presided over the Tokyo transition. Thus, the 'victors' justice' phenomenon was derived from the fact that the victorious Allies were hard on the defeated Axis Powers and overlooked their own crimes. Given their vantage position, the victors could easily whitewash their misdemeanours. Teitel (2003, p.72) accuses the Allies grandstanding in order to justify their innocence and action against the aggressors. Baussiouni, 2004 cited in Hazan, 2004, x) also raps the Tokyo Tribunal, as a 'miscarriage of justice' for political expedience. Therefore, the Nuremburg Trial model could not be sustained. It 'disappeared from international practice during the Cold War' (Andrieu, 2010, p.4).

However, whatever flaws of the International Military Tribunal in general and the Nuremburg Trials in particular, the framework 'managed to produce something extraordinary' and second to none (Bass, 2000). Bass hails the Nuremburg Trials as 'legalism's greatest moment of glory.'

They had the potential to heal by establishing the truth, educating the public about the nature of the Holocaust and rebuild the future (Bass, 2000). In fact, the Nuremburg Trials have proved to be a milestone in the history of transitional justice (*Nuremburg Trials* - World War II - HISTORY.com). With the motion of 'crime against humanity,' the nullification of the 'I was following orders' defence and the criminal immunity of Heads of States, the Nuremburg Trials shaped the development of international law and justice (Earl, 2009 cited in Andrieu, 2010, p.5). Justice and peace are what Robert Jackson the Chief Prosecutor is credited for. He argued that, 'The world yields no respect for courts that are organized to convict. You don't put man on trial unless you are willing to set him free if he is not proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt' (Ehrenfreund, 2005).

It is thus noteworthy that the Nuremburg Trials also informed the controversial issues in modern transitional justice such as truth recovery, retributive and restorative justice, apology, repentance, forgiveness, remorse, reconciliation and the need to prevent armed conflicts. This reflects the victory of transitional justice within the 'scheme of international law' (Teitel, 2003, p.70). This internationalisation of the transitional justice concept was therefore an invaluable achievement for humanity.

It can be argued that the Nuremburg Trials were a 'Damascus Experience' to the transitional justice processes in that their revelations directly motivated the newly formed United Nations Organisation (1945) to convene in quick succession, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the Geneva Convention on Laws and Customs of War (1949), and to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world' (preamble). Teitel (2003, p.76) hails the Nuremburg model for defining the rule of law in universal terms. She argues that, 'The profound and permanent significance of the Nuremburg model is that by defining the rule of law in universalizing terms, it has become the standard by which all subsequent transitional justice debates are framed.'

Arguably, the Nuremburg Trials inspired further developments in the modern international human rights law and institutions. Through the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981), the Constitutive Act (2000) (which mandates the African Union to intervene in member states to protect civilians from war crimes and gross human rights violations), and the recent African Court on People's Rights (2006), the African Union is trying to sensitize African States on the urgent need to uphold and respect human freedoms and dignity (Heyns and Killander, 2006). The African court of Justice and Human Rights is intended to replace the African Court

on Human and People's rights (AFCHPR). The court is to become the main judicial organ of the African Union and predominant human rights court for the African continent (*NewsDay Zimbabwe,* 2014).

1.2.3 The invention of the term 'transitional justice'

While there seems to be a general consensus that the concept of transitional justice emerged as a separate field of scholarly inquiry at an international level in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Kritz, 1995; Teitel, 2008; Arthur, 2009; Andrieu, 2010), the precise birthday of the term is controversial. Teitel (2008, p.1) who claims to have 'coined the term transitional justice to account for the self- conscious construction of a distinctive conception of justice…' in 1991, traces the first phase of the transitional genealogy to the Nuremberg Trials. Teitel seems to be getting the benefit of doubt, as the starting point lies between the Nuremberg Tribunals (1945) and the post-Cold War in the early 1990s. Arthur (2009, p.329) hints that Teitel may credit the Nuremburg Tribunals as an important moment in the initial growth of the concept of transitional justice, even though none of the actors may have ascribed the same meaning. However, Teitel was part of the 1992 Charter 77 Foundation Conference where the phrase transitional justice was used 'sporadically' (Arthur, 2009, p.324). The Charter 77 Foundation Conference described by its organiser, journalist Alice Henkin, as the 'intellectual framework' was also attended by N.J Kritz of the United States Institute for Peace, who later popularised the term 'transitional justice' in his book *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes* (1995). Reporting on the proceedings of this conference, held under the theme, 'Justice in Times of Transition,' Mary Jo Palumbo, the *Boston Herald* journalist used the term 'transitional justice' (Arthur, 2009, p.329).

Arthur (2009, pp.324-225) regards the transitional justice concept as a product of interactions among human rights activists, lawyers, philosophers, policymakers, journalists, donors and political scientists. She explores a series of conferences convened from the late 1980's to the 1990's. These conferences which include the Aspen Institute Conference in 1988, the Charter 77 Foundation Conference of 1992 and the Institute for Democracy Conference of 1994 became the 'founding moment of the field of transitional justice' because they focused on how to deal with an abusive past and justice in times of transition. Since the transitional justice concept is knowledge-based, the participants' diverse backgrounds afforded them the opportunity to compare their experiences, and debate possible options and challenges.

Faced with this 'origin complexity,' Arthur (2009, p.327) has argued that the starting point can be the 'transmission and acceptance of the term transitional justice.' Arthur singles out Kritz, another participant in the 1992 Charter 77 Foundation Conference for making a significant contribution in this regard, through his four-volume compendium entitled: *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes* in 1995. Thereafter, the use of the term transitional justice progressively grew. Arthur is one of the authors who hail Kritz's compendium as a 'canon on transitional justice literature (2009, p.331). The subtitle, '…. *How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes* has become an instant catch phrase which makes it easy to consider transitional processes, such as prosecution and the controversies abound. Kritz has however been accused of presenting transitional justice as deeply enmeshed with political problems that were legal-institutional and relatively short-term in nature, instead of coming to terms with historical complexities (Ash, 1998 cited in Arthur, 2009, pp.331-332).

Arthur contends that the term 'transitional justice' was 'invented as a device to signal a new sort of human rights activity and as a response to concrete political dilemmas human rights activists faced in what they understood to be 'transitional' contexts' (2009, p.326). She hails this as a turning point in the shift from 'naming and shaming' to accountability for past human rights abuses at international level (2009, p.321). The notion of transitional justice crystallised due to debates on how to deal with human rights violators Teitel, 2010, p.1). In the current global phase of transitional justice, the increasing involvement of non-state actors and the turn to law to regulate violence has intensified debates regarding issues of accountability and impunity (Teitel, 2010, p.1). Even the purpose of transitional justice now goes beyond state building, to include issues of 'human peace and human security' (Teitel, 2010, p.2). The debates also tend to concur that restorative justice is more enduring than retributive justice.

1.2.4 Globalised tribunals: International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court

Notwithstanding the alleged merits, the Nuremburg Model was subdued by the Cold War and the bipolar balance of power politics which ended with the demise of Soviet Union in 1990 (Andrieu, 2010, p.5). This post-Cold War era, described by Roht-Arriaza as the 'age of human rights' (Burt, foreword in Teitel, 2010) has been hailed as the defining moment of the evolution of the transitional justice phenomenon (Kritz, 1995; Arthur, 2009; Hansen, 2010; Teitel, 2010; Hinton, 2013). The democratic transitions of most Latin American, East and Central European

nations grappling with traumatic legacies of autocratic regimes in the late 1980s can be hailed as a springboard in the development of transitional justice processes. The post-Cold War 'new world order,' witnessed the proliferation of criminal tribunals, commissions of inquiry, reparations and memorialisation efforts, and institutional reforms as fashionable practices in dealing with past human rights abuses (Arthur, 2009, p.328; Hinton, 2013, pp.87-88).

The post-Cold War era has been hailed as a milestone in the development of the transitional justice phenomenon. Teitel (2010) categorises this era as her 'phase two' of the transitional justice genealogy. With more actors, mainly from the civil society, now involved, the new transitional justice frameworks moved beyond trials and retributive justice, in favour of more comprehensive frameworks, such as truth commissions, which considered how to heal and reconcile a post-conflict society (Teitel, 2003, pp.75-77). The truth commission mechanism which was first used in Argentina in 1983, was characterised by the adoption of a broader amnesty policy and forgiveness (Teitel, 2003, pp.77-82).

The post-Cold War era also described as the 'third wave of transition' (Huntington cited in Teitel, 2003, p.75), was associated with political democratisation. The 'what is to be done?' challenge in the post-Cold War era shows a significant paradigm shift from the Nuremberg Trials' value in punishment of perpetrators, to tension between the legal demands of justice and the political need for peace (Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, pp.14-15). Uprimny and Saffon prefer to describe the post-Cold War transitions as a 'transitional justice paradigm' because the need to achieve peace and justice became evident. Thus, the demand for peace and justice is the 'need which gives specificity to the phenomenon of transitional justice' (Uprimny and Saffon, 2006, p.15).

Teitel (2003) has defined her 'phase three' of the transitional justice genealogy as the contemporary processes. This 'steady-state transitional justice,' as Teitel refers to it, is epitomised by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC symbolises the entrenchment of the Nuremburg Trials model, in that it is an international tribunal mandated to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Teitel, 2003, p.90).

1.2.4.1 International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda

The UN created International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1995 respectively, using the Nuremburg Model. These *ad hoc* tribunals also aimed to end impunity, moralise international affairs and create a link between peace and justice (Andrieu 2010, p.6). This new form of 'international judicial intervention' has been hailed as

the birth of 'a shiny new hammer in the civilised world's box of foreign policy tools' (Scheffer, 1996 cited in Andrieu 2010, p.6).

Both *ad hoc* tribunals have contributed to the advancement of international law, with regard to the definitions of rape as a crime of war, genocide and crimes against humanity (Journal of International Criminal Justice 2004 cited in Andrieu, 2010, p.5). The prosecution of Milosevic and fellow perpetrators in former Yugoslavia and Jean Kambanda, the former Rwandan Prime Minister, bear testimony to the fact that there should be no sacred cows in international law.

1.2.4.2 The International Criminal Court

The creation of the ICC in July 2002 can be hailed as a milestone achievement in the evolution of transitional justice processes. Bassiouni (1998 cited in *The Associated Press,* 2016), called it 'a triumph for all peoples of the world.' Human rights' groups celebrate the ICC 'as the best means of pursuing perpetrators of the world's worst atrocities' (Torchia, 2016). As noted in chapter 7, the creation of a regime of reparations to victims in Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the ICC has been hailed as a milestone development in transitional justice (McCarthy, 2009). It is plausible to note that, 'today more than ever, there is a huge need for universal justice' (Kaba, 2016 cited in *News24,* 2016).

The roots of the ICC can be traced directly back to the Nuremburg Tribunal. The ICC is, however, unique in that it is the first 'international judicial tribunal tasked with a global jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide committed on the territories of its member states or by individuals, or whenever asked by the UN Security Council' (Kaye, 2011, p. 121). In sum, this 124-member 'court of last resort' is entrusted with prosecuting the world's worst atrocities categorised as: 'genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes of aggression and war crimes' (Vaselinovic and Park, 2016, p.1). Africa has the largest membership of 34.

By and large, the ICC's potential to deter atrocious crimes committed by 'anyone anywhere in the world' against humanity and its possible role in securing global peace and justice are commendable (Kastner, 2010, p.131). The ICC's instant impact made it an 'indispensable international player' in peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011, p.118). Issuing warrants of arrest to five leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army rebels on allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Northern Uganda on October 13, 2005 was commendable, partly because the conflict was one of Africa's longest and most brutal armed civil conflicts (Ssenyonjo, 2007). The initiative boosted the ICC human rights protection image.

Therefore, the advent of the ICC as the universal 'supreme court,' has allegedly added new impetus to global peace building endeavours (Ero and Khadiagla, 2013). Equally assuring are the three ways in which cases would be brought to it:

- referral by a member state, of any crime within its jurisdiction;

- referral by the United Nations' Security Council via the ICC's office of the Prosecutor; or,

- at the initiation of the latter, after some meticulous homework.

The ICC has however, been hamstrung by inherent structural and legal defects such as lack of the UN Security Council's unequivocal backing and the absence of subpoena powers in respect of signatories. As a result, fourteen years later, the ICC 'is still struggling to find its footing' (Kaye, 2011, p.118).

The UN Security Council's lukewarm backing of the ICC is a big setback to the Court's jurisdiction. The non-membership of USA, China and Russia, the three of the five UN Security Council permanent members, for whatever reasons, is conspicuous, especially at a time when Africa's call for the reform of the UN gains momentum. Arguably, USA, China, Russia and other countries have not ratified the ICC Statute for fear that they could be prosecuted for their past, present or future transgressions. China and Russia even vetoed a UN resolution to refer the brutal Syrian civil war to the ICC in May 2014. Other notable absentees are Israel and India. This lack of total and 'unequivocal backing' makes the ICC authority look inherently fragile. This is a big drawback to peacebuilding given that the effectiveness of the ICC depends on the funding and judicial cooperation of member states. This is equally important given that the ICC can only act when national courts are either 'unable' or 'unwilling' to preside over the cases (Kaye, 2011:122). Burundi, the first country to announce its intention to pull out of the ICC is a case in point. Yet, in Burundi, local democratic spaces have been closed. The embattled President Nkurunziza has since April 2015, killed at least a thousand people and displaced 300,000 who opposed his unlawful third term bid (McCann, 2016).

The continued absence of the USA, in particular has been described by Qualman (1999, p.16) as 'a very troubling fly in the ointment.' Ironically, the US signed the Rome Statute but never ratified it. America's 'cast-in-iron' demands that her service members and agents should 'never be hauled before the Court for crimes committed on official duty' exposes the ICC. Lip service support to the ICC is not an adequate resource in moulding it into a powerful 'vehicle for justice and deterrence' (Qualman, 1999, p.17).

In sum, the ICC has been accused of allowing 'non-member states to dictate and interfere with its work to suit their own imperialist agendas' (Trochia, 2016). Unity of purpose is, therefore, necessary in making the ICC permanent and capable of trying perpetrators where national courts are either unable or unwilling to deliver justice. According to Boven (2016 cited in *The Associated Press,* 2016), 'It would be helpful indeed if major powers…would join and contribute to the representative character of a judicial institution that is standing for universal values of an imperative nature.'

This structural defect frustrates the victims and 'feeds into African discontent' (*The Associated Press,* 2016). Peace and justice remain elusive, as perpetrators capitalise on these sustained structural defects. The ICC should learn from such mistakes and move on.

The permanent structural absence of subpoena powers in the ICC legal framework is another great threat to its effective functioning. Subpoena powers are imperative in fact-finding and rapport with witnesses. Lack of such an instrument implies that appearance is voluntary. This is problematic because the ICC has to literally beg witnesses to testify before it. Sluiter (2009:590) contends that since 'the absence of subpoena powers even entails under the Statute, a non-derogable right for witnesses not to appear at the Court,' both the quality of the administration of justice and the accused's right to a fair trial are seriously jeopardised. The concern here is that when the 'decision-maker is not directly confronted with a witness or when testimony becomes too much, the subject of negotiations,' the quality of fact-finding gets seriously compromised (Sluiter, 2009, p. 607).

Allegations of threats to witnesses, bribery and non-state co-operation forced the ICC to drop investigations in Kenya where the President and his deputy were indicted on charges of crimes against humanity in the post-2007 election. This example reveals how inadequate the ICC may be in actually prosecuting human rights' abuses according to its mandate. The allegations that the ICC has tended to focus on African human rights' abuses and ignored other countries' histories of abuse, whether America or Israel as examples, has implied that it is perceived as being biased in favour of condemning only African human rights' abuses. This is a huge weakness in the ICC which should have a global reach.

Global cooperation is a top priority in promoting world peace and security. The international community must support the ICC's enforcement of the international criminal law since it depends on State authorities for arresting and transferring suspects, witnesses, evidence and intelligence. As witnessed in the Omar al-Bashir case, relying on member states to arrest

fugitives is problematic because there is no enforcement mechanism (Safodien, 2016). This is a serious defect in the ability of the ICC to operate successfully.

Kaye (2011, p.122) bemoans a situation where the ICC has to prosecute 'international crimes in countries where conflict is ongoing or against sitting heads of state…' The task becomes difficult because it involves violation of the principle of non-interference in sovereign states. As mentioned previously, the Ugandan case study deserves mention. Upon President Museveni's request, the ICC issued warrants of arrest to the LRA rebel leadership on October 13, 2005. Although this was ostensibly a sign of the ICC's ability to succeed, regrettably, before the warrants were executed, Museveni withdrew the request and granted the rebels a 'total amnesty' in July 2006 (Ssenyonjo, 2007, p.686). The outcome did not only damage the image of the ICC, but also failed to abate the Ugandan hostilities. Interestingly, Museveni has since dismissed the ICC as 'useless' and is agitating for mass African exodus from the court (Safodien, 2016, p.2).

1.2.4.3 ICC-African Relations: Is Africa unfairly targeted?

As mentioned previously, the ICC has been criticised, mainly by African States, as 'a Western institution that can only offer one type of selective and retributive justice' (Kastner, 2010, pp.131-132). African leaders complain that at least 30 Western countries have committed crimes that warrant ICC prosecution, including crimes committed against African refugees and immigrants (Bojang, 2016 cited in *Reuters,* 2016). The former British Prime Minister, Blair, has been singled out as an ICC candidate due to his direct involvement in the Iraq atrocities. It seems obvious that a certain level of hypocrisy abounds if, of the 10 full-scale human rights violations investigations underway, 9 have been in Africa and only one in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. The Court has indicted 39 Africans since 2005. The ICC has so far convicted only four perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. One is from Mali and three from Congo (*The Associated Press,* 2016). This alleged bias has seriously compromised the ICC's legitimacy. Kastner (2010, p.132) recalls that, '…since the issuance of an arrest warrant against Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, in March 2009, the ICC has increasingly been perceived as a court for Africa.' The African Union has embraced this perception as evidenced by its Commissioner Jean Peang's remark that, '…there is a problem with the ICC targeting only Africans…' (Kastner, 2010, p.132). The victimhood card has regrettably become the African leadership's anti-ICC compliance trump card, yet most human rights violations in Africa have been referred to the ICC by Africans (Kaba, 2016 cited in

News24, 2016). In fact, Africa and the UNSC have referred six and two cases respectively to the ICC.

Rwanda's liberator-turned-dictator, President Kagame's denigration of the ICC as part of neo-colonialism, seems to be an argument that is gaining credibility amongst the African leaders (*Diplomat News Network,* 2015). The AU's official position on the ICC has been confirmed by its former Chairperson, President Mugabe's remarks that Africans are '… duly concerned about the activities of the International Court which seems to exist only for alleged offenders…the majority of them Africans…. (Eppel, 2013, p.216).

The possible mass exodus by the 34 African member-states to the ICC can be explained partly in terms of the ICC's perceived bias against Africans and partly as Africans' effort to cover up their 'lamentable human rights record' (Ofeibea, 2016 cited in Hersher, 2016). African states have, both as individuals and as the AU raised the 'undue victimisation' concerns by the ICC which they have labelled 'an International Caucasian Court for the persecution of people of colour, especially Africans' (Hersher, 2016).

The AU's unspecified strategy to collectively withdraw from the ICC in the wake of Burundi, South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Gambia's threats to leave the ICC in 2016 is regrettable (*Reuters,* 2017). The threats can trigger far-reaching effects on the ICC and global security. Fatou Bensouda the reigning ICC Chief Prosecutor and former Gambian justice minister, has, however, dismissed the withdrawal threats as mere gunboat diplomacy (*Reuters,* 2017). The new political dispensation in Gambia has reversed the threats while the ANC's notice of South Africa's intention has been nullified by the South African High Court.

It is easy to blame the withdrawal motives as part of the 'big brother syndrome,' which sees no evil, hears no evil and speaks no evil against a fellow African leader. The embattled Sudanese President Al-Bashir's controversial attendance and unceremonious exit from the 25th AU Ordinary Summit in Pretoria in 2015 is a case in point. The governing ANC's noncompliance on the basis of safeguarding its Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act demonstrates the claim that African leaders and the civil society organisations may agree on the need for accountability, but differ significantly on methodologies to achieve it (Wielenga, 2015).

The AU's solidarity with Al-Bashir indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur is indeed a big drawback in the pursuit of peace and justice (Masombuka and Savides, 2015, p.1-2). The AU position that Al-Bashir, the first person to be charged for genocide by the ICC, is 'innocent' after allegedly killing 300 000 and displacing 2, 5 million

in Sudan since 2003 is disturbing (UN). Justice should be sought regardless of the fact that many nations are guilty of human rights' abuses elsewhere.

The AU-ICC row has ostensibly dampened the prospects of constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa. President Zuma's double standards of unilaterally guaranteeing immunity to Al-Bashir coupled with Mugabe's (then AU Chair) indefensible claim that, '… we don't subject ourselves to justice outside our borders' has been condemned by Amnesty International as a shocking failure to abide by our own courts' order and 'a betrayal of the victims of the Darfur conflict' (Evans and du Plessis, 2015).

The call for the formation of Africa's 'own ICC' (Share, 2015), mandated to prosecute global human rights' violation cases backdating to the colonial era can be viewed as an alibi to embolden the AU's threats to pull out of the ICC and the UN. He has his own fears; his long reign has allegedly been tainted with gross human rights abuses ranging from the *Gukurahundi* Massacres to systematic political violence (Tshuma, 2015). These gross human rights violations warrant ICC indictment. In fact, the same African leaders calling for a wholesale ICC and UN pull out in favour of an African Court are also non-members of the SADC tribunal established in Burkina Faso in 1998. To date, 40 out of 54 AU member states including Zimbabwe are yet to ratify this hyped tribunal.

1.2.4.4 The ICC and the way forward

The relevance of the ICC is unquestionable, for 'Today more than ever, there is a huge need for universal justice' (Kaba, 2016 cited *News24,* 2016). In fact, 'If the world is to become a fairer, more compassionate, tolerant and peaceful place, it needs institutions such as the International Criminal Court to hold those who abuse power to account' (Desmond and Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation, 2015). Powerful nations may have erred by creating precedence that contempt of the ICC is an option, but this cannot license human rights' violations and impunity. An equitable and functioning ICC can never be achieved by joining or emulating its prime violators, but by abiding by its cause and objectives. Withdrawing from 'the court of last resort' is a big drawback. Without credible domestic structures to safeguard constitutionalism and the rule of law, the ICC remains the last line of defence. Dialogue must therefore, be given a chance; the UN must engage all ICC stakeholders and work on its inherent defects. I contend that since withdrawal would put premium on impunity, the AU must push for the ICC reform.

An examination of the ICC-African relations can necessitate reforms for the common good (Sharf, 2016 cited in *The Associated Press,* 2016). Africa's wholesale ICC withdrawal will

certainly threaten global peace. Withdrawal poses a threat to one of the greatest achievements in pursuit of justice and peace, at a time when genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and impunity have become so highly probable (*The Associated Press, 2016*). Despite its defects, the ICC is currently the better alternative. Appendix 3 shows the ICC inductees since 2005.

1.3 Conclusion

Transitional justice has become the all-encompassing processes that seek to deal with the wrongs of any post-conflict community. The main objective of transitional justice processes is to face legacies of abuse in a broad and holistic manner. These encompass retributive, restorative, social, and economic justice. Tracing the origins of the concept of transitional justice from the Vienna Settlement of 1814-15 to date shows that the concept has been refined over the years, but no single tool can assume the master status. It is the local context that must determine which tool, when and how to apply it. Even the post-World War II Nuremburg Trials which crystallised the term have been criticised as the 'Victor's justice.' Therefore, the issue of local context and local ownership of peace building process is a strong factor in transitional justice processes. While the UN has been conscious about the local inputs, the ICC has faced stiff resistance mainly from African leaders who feel targeted and victimised; the concept of transitional justice can no longer be re-invented but needs modifications, as determined by the context. The emergence of diverse transitional justice methodologies such as judicial and non-judicial trials bears testimony that the evolution of this contested concept is ongoing.

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'From Voting to Torture': Examining the pyscho-social effects of the 2008 political election processes in Zimbabwe.

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Abstract

This paper is an assessment of the psycho-social effects of the harmonised elections of 2008 in Zimbabwe. After the highly contentious election results in which the main opposition party, the MDC[3] defeated the then ruling ZANU-PF party, calculated violence broke out[4]. The general elections were held on the 29th of March 2008, but it took the ZEC[5] two months to release the election results. In the first round of the elections, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC was said to have won 47.9% of the vote and Robert Mugabe 43.2%, necessitating a run-off which was to be held on the 27th of June 2008. It is during this period after the announcement of the first round of results and the preparations for the second round of voting that extreme violence ensued, perpetrated mainly against the opposition MDC party supporters by the ZANU PF organs. This forced Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidature from the run-off. The 'political bases' created by ZANU PF members especially in the rural areas, but also in the high-density urban areas, opposition supporters were subjected to extreme torture, killings and sexual abuse. This led to the discreditation of the second round of results by the AU and the SADC, prompting the formation of an inclusive government. Despite the fact that there was the creation of an Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration after the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the paper argues that it did not do enough to 'heal' the victims of the post-election violence. Many people are still suffering from the psycho-social effects of the 2008 election violence; therefore, the paper makes some recommendations that would assist the victims and ensure a more effective national healing process.

Key words: Violence, Zimbabwe, Emotional well-being, Loss and Grief, National Healing

Introduction

Globally, violence consumes the lives of more than 1.5 million people annually, and for each single death due to violence, there are dozens of hospitalisations (Andrew et al. 1998).

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Moreover, violence often has lifelong effects on the victims' functioning and also hampers economic and social development. According to Wainryb and Pasupatht (2007), violence is the expression of physical or verbal force against self or others, compelling action against one's will or the pain of being hurt. It is the designed use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against a person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in physical injury, psychological harm, mal-development or some other deprivation or death (Ahmed, 2004).

According to Muchai et al. (2014), violence is one of the leading causes of human migration, mobility, and mortality around the world. Young people (adolescents) are the most affected, and disproportionately represent both the perpetrators and victims of violence. Violence can perpetuate itself over decades, long after a country has suffered an initial traumatic experience (CITK, 2002). This predisposes the victims of violence to be more impulsive, reactive and violent themselves. Thus, violence could breed more violence in the future.

In post war periods, political violence has occurred in many countries, especially in countries south of the Sahara. Notable examples are the 1994 Rwandan genocidal conflict between the Tutsis and the Hutus which some scholars such as Bernett (2003) say, claimed some 800 000 lives within a hundred days. In Somalia, the civil war claimed 21 000 people and led to a great exodus of people (Munene, 2011). The election disputes that brought about the post-election violence in Zimbabwe in 2008 are not a unique experience as similar turmoil was witnessed in Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and the 'walk to work' protests in Uganda in more recent times.

Violence has been woven through the intricate fabric of Zimbabwe's political history in various forms which include murder, rape, beatings, death threats, abductions, arbitrary arrests, torture, forced displacement, property damage, harassment, intimidation and terrorisation. It has been used as the weapon of choice by the governments in power since the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 through to post independence as a measure to ensure holding of power at all costs (Zimbabwe Independent, 2016). Zimbabwe has a continous history of violent conflict, dating back to the original occupation in the 1890s. The liberation war, while beginning in the aftermath of the UDI, reached a peak in the 1970s; with over 30 000 killed, maimed or injured, tens of thousands tortured or abused, and tens of thousands displaced, either to neighbouring countries or forced into protected villages (Reeler, 2004) (any direct statistics?). Following a brief period of peace, the country was once again wracked by violence

between 1982 and 1987, the so called *Gukurahundi*[6]. According to the CCJP and LRF 1997; Amani Trust, 1998), about 20 000 civilians were killed during this time, and once again torture was endemic? Outside these two very serious periods, violence, the Liberation War and the *Gukurahundi,* virtually all elections since 1980 have been marred by political violence (Makumbe and Compagnon*, 2000). Some were much more violent than others, especially since 2000 with the emergence of a strong opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Presidential elections seem particularly violent, as the stakes were high for retaining the presidency. The 2008 election was marred by the torture and tormenting of mainly opposition party supporters by the ZANU PF supporters; and it did not receive the usual support from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), ZANU PF was forced into a power sharing arrangement with the MDC resulting in the formation of an Inclusive Government

All of this violence had a marked effect on Zimbabwe leaving numerous victims in need of rehabilitation and assistance (Parsons et al. 2011).

The study assesses the impacts of the 2008 post-election violence (PEV) on the Zimbabwean general citizenry. The study examines the following questions: What is the influence of violence on emotional wellbeing? What are the effects of loss and grief on the citizenry? And what are the effects of the post-election violence on women's rights?

It uses the quotes from relevant sources and tries to be as objective as much as possible since the topic is very controversial.

Background: History of Political Violence in Zimbabwe

According to RAU (2011), in Zimbabwe, politically motivated violence dates back to the pre-colonial era. In the pre-colonial era, violence was mostly driven by the struggle for land, resources and chieftainships, while in the colonial era it was mostly centred on the struggle for land and ethnic recognition. In the post-colonial era, however, violence became much more pronounced and was mostly centred on the struggle for political ascendancy. This saw many being exposed to various forms of violence particularly before, during and after elections.

Inter-party violence and terror reached its climax between 2000 and 2008 when ZANU PF increasingly employed State agents, war veterans and militia during election campaigns

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[6]Gukurahundi is a Shona word which loosely translates to ''the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains.'' ZANU then defined it as an ideological strategy aimed at carrying the war into major settlements and individual homesteads.

(Sachikonye; 2011). Hundreds of opposition party activists, mainly from MDC-T were killed in the pre and post-election period. The ferocity of the violence resulted in the discrediting of the 2008 run-off presidential elections. Before the 2008 elections, the ZANU PF government had implemented the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), which was violent in nature to lure back the support of the War Veterans and the masses in general that was fast waning from its grip in favour of the MDC.

Mude (2011), postulates that the youth militias were seen as the major perpetrators of political violence. Politically sponsored violence has manifested as the major socio-political consequence of urban youth unemployment. Since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the youth, during election periods were used as tools to target opposition members. According to the Newsday newspaper (2012), power hungry politicians turned youths into political thugs for selfish political agendas. It was the decade of a long political and economic crisis that the urban youth unemployment sky-rocketed. It is the very same era that saw the unprecedented increase in political violence in Zimbabwe. Mude alludes to the fact that ZANU PF had never been strongly opposed since independence, so the emergence of the MDC was seen as a threat to its survival. Hence, the ZANU PF government resorted to the use of violence to supress the opposition parties as a survival strategy. In wider society, this had the effect of triggering terror and the revival of the 2008 trauma. In this scheme of things, the levels of human insecurity were high because the police and other security agencies were viewed as partisan and unreliable custodians of the safety, law and order.

Influence of violence on emotional wellbeing

According to Gitahi and Mwangi (2008), violence is the major cause of trauma. It does not matter whether trauma results from psychological, emotional or sexual abuse, war or hunger. The experience may change the way a person operates in life. Experiencing trauma can alter the human brain patterns in intense ways such as preventing individuals from placing boundaries on appropriate behaviours (Anderson and Bushman; 2002). Trauma may also cause negative emotions such as toxic shame, feelings of abandonment, prolonged fear, anxiety, rejection, loneliness and despair. On the other hand, trauma may be defined as bodily injury, shock, or an emotional shock having lasting psychic effects. According to Masters (2004) in Muchai et al. (2014), events perceived as traumatic can change brain chemistry and can result in behaviour such as violence, crime, depression, change in thinking patterns and other behaviours. It is a feeling of being very upset, afraid or shocked after a bad experience. The

post-election violence in Zimbabwe was a situation which caused trauma and affected the emotional well-being of the affected individuals.

According to Mckeown et al (1998), depression is an emotional state usually characterised by prolonged feelings of gloom, despair, futility, profound pessimism and a tendency towards excessive guilty and self-reproach. It may also include cognitive symptoms, motivational symptoms and somatic symptoms. Research has shown that experiencing the death of a loved one while young is associated with a great risk of later depression (Browlby; 2000). The children who lost parents and loved ones during the 2008 election violence in Zimbabwe are at great risk of developing depression.

Extreme experiences of violence may bring traumatic experiences for the individuals and families which may negatively affect the emotional wellbeing as noted by Ulberlher (2002). They may also directly influence the co-existence of the people and community. In Zimbabwe, a combination of violence and official neglect has created an endless cycle of grudges which can fuel more violence during the upcoming harmonised elections in 2018 if not checked. One situation that may produce psychological after effects involves experiencing interpersonal violence, according to the American Psychiatric Association (2000).

The post-election violence which was experienced in 2008 involved interpersonal violence which may give rise to trauma. This is a disability condition that may result from expiriencing an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury or from witnessing such an event happening to a family member or close friend.

Effects of loss and grief

Post-election violence in Zimbabwe resulted in the death of many people, especially amongst members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. Losing someone that one loves is very painful. According to Worden (1991), if loss is unacknowledged or unattended, it can result in disability. Grief refers to the emotions and sensations that accompany the loss of someone dear to a person (Aileen; 1999). People experience the cycle of grief differently. According to Milne (1999), some find that within a few weeks or months, the period between waves of distress lengthens and that they are able to feel peace, renewed hope, and enjoy life most of the time. Others may face fears of being hit with what feels like relentless waves of grief (Warden; 1991). This suggests the possibility of the loss and grief suffered by victims of violence to hold them back for years to come unless counselling services are made available.

According to Crandell and Crandell (2000), social support can be a source of healing and adjustment- people who receive the support and comfort of family and friends typically have a lower incidence of mental and physical disorders. The process of grieving is painful and may be experienced and resolved by most individuals. Three types of grief reactions are delayed reactions, distorted reactions and pathological mourning (Warden; 1991). It is important to establish whether the post-election victims went through the whole process of grieving in order to adjust to life.

Impact of post-election violence on women

In most patriarchal societies, Zimbabwe included, the role of women in the political discourse remains marginal, yet they are the most affected when election violence breaks out. In the 2008 election violence in Zimbabwe, many women suffered serious trauma due to beatings, rape, murder and verbal abuse. Shaba (2011) argues that women were the majority of victims in pre and post 2008 election violence in Zimbabwe. Throughout the world accounts of war tend to portray men as the conflict evolves and women as passive innocent victims. In conflict, women are much more disadvantaged compared to men. They suffer disproportionately from displacement and deprivation (Boulding, 1988). Women are, thus, trapped in a vicious paradox; while they are often powerless to prevent the conflicts, and negotiations. According to RAU (2011), the phenomenon of violations against women is a common phenomenon in the post-election period in Zimbabwe. Politically motivated sexual violence against women in Zimbabwe has taken many forms. These include extreme violence such as gang rape and the insertion of objects into women's private parts. RAU goes on to note that circumstances of extreme conflict unquestionably fuel the flames of politically motivated violence against women in any given conflict, as warring parties continue seeking to outmanoeuvre one another. This has largely been the case with Zimbabwean elections, particularly during the 2000-2010 election periods that saw many of the Zimbabwean women, young and old, rural and urban, being exposed to various kinds of politically motivated violence prior to, during and after these elections, particularly during the year 2008. Many women were victims of violence, regardless of whether one was directly or indirectly involved in politics. For instance, most women were left with permanent physical, psychological and emotional scars, which have caused life changing adverse effects to their health. Others, however, on top of being sexually abused, had

to live with constant reminders such as falling pregnant and/or contracting deadly HIV[7]/AIDS[8] virus and other STIs[9].

 In the 2008 election period, there was the creation of 'political bases' in the high-density areas by ZANU PF supporters. It is there, where women were subjected to torture and sexual harassment, and in most instances, the rape was committed at the instigation of a political leader, showing that it was a strategy to intimidate political opponents. Often used during election periods, it is quite evident that rape was used as a psychological weapon in order to humiliate the opposition and undermine their morale. According to RAU (2011), sexual harassment affects more than the survivors' physical wellbeing, but also impacts upon their psychological and political status. Rape is an extremely effective wartime weapon used by most revolutionary groups because by systematically raping women and girls, armed groups assert power and domination over not only women, but their husbands as well. The men whose women have been raped feel totally helpless and the rape to them can symbolise defeat. So, in essence, women are attacked to destroy their mental and physical integrity, and they were attacked publicly during the 2008 post-election violence to destroy their mental and physical integrity; and they were attacked publicly to demonstrate the powerlessness of the men to defend the community.

Politically motivated rape is often systematic and well thought out (RAU, 2011). ZANU PF cadres, especially the youths, used politically motivated rape to punish individuals, families and communities who held alternative political views, according to the Amnesty International's Report on Zimbabwe in 2010. This happened before the 2008 elections (RAU, 2011), and one woman quoted stated that the perpetrators said to her:

> You are the same people messing around with Tsvangirai[10] for the love of sugar. You are Tsvangirai's prostitute, a prostitute for sugar. So now we have found you, we are going to sleep with you.

This statement clearly shows that the rape was political. In 2008, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously in favour of a resolution classifying rape a weapon of war.

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[7] Human Immune Virus

[8] Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

[9] Sexually Transmitted Infections

[10] Tsvangirai is the leader of the main opposition party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T).

The resolution is a vital step towards the fight against sexual violence against women, and an addition to previous international legal instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (CEVAW) and the United Nations Council Resolution 1325 which ''calls on all parties to respect humanitarian law and to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape. According to the CCJP (2009), there have been increasing numbers of reports alleging politically motivated rape, but no specific examination of the issue. Women in RAU's study exhibited high levels of sleeplessness, nightmares, flashbacks, and helplessness. Traumatic memories may continue for extended periods of time.

Conclusions and Recommendations'

The study determined that the post-election violence in Zimbabwe in 2008 had negative impacts on the generality of the citizens, especially women. The paper has argued that despite the fact that it is now ten years since the 2008 election, the psycho-social effects are still being felt amongst the victims and there is need for an effective healing process to assist the victims.

The following recommendations were made:

1. The Government of Zimbabwe should invest more in the National Healing and Reconciliation Commission, and actively engage with the communities, survivors and victims of politically motivated violence, so as to ensure a peaceful environment in the future elections.
2. There is need to enhance counselling services to the victims of the post-election violence
3. There is need for outreach programmes to train Traditional Leaders on the negative effects of political violence, as they are the custodians of national values
4. There is need to de-politicise the security sectors so as to ensure that no one enjoys immunity and all citizens receive equal protection from the state.
5. Rape survivors need the cooperation of all sectors –government departments, civil society and development partners for proper healing processes to take place.
6. The government needs to ensure that national sexual violence laws are enforced and the culture of impunity is done away with in keeping with global standards and instruments, and also that crimes against women will be investigated and the perpetrators will be brought to justice so as to send the message to would be perpetrators.

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Conflicts and Forced Migration: Reflections and Recommendations

Paul.Z. Muchena

Abstract

Forced migration has become a challenge of our time. Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of people has been forced to leave their homes as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, and systematic violations of human rights. Africa in particular has seen a lot of its people displaced both internally and externally. Therefore, there is need to reflect on the causes and impact of forced migration. This essay seeks to reflect on the connection between conflict and forced migration particularly in Africa. The essay also suggests strategies for preventing further displacements.

1.0 Introduction

(Africa report on internal displacement, December 2017 p16)

Since the end of the Cold War, increasing numbers of people have been forced to leave their homes as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, and systematic violations of human rights. This presentation analyses the causes and consequences of conflicts and forced migration, including its devastating impact both within and beyond the borders of affected countries. It suggests strategies for preventing displacement, a special legal framework tailored to the needs of the displaced, more effective institutional arrangements at the national, regional, and international levels, and increased capacities to address the protection, human rights, and development needs of the displaced.

The Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre's (IDMC, 2017) Quarterly Update in Africa highlights the severity of the continent's continuing displacement crisis through conflicts. There were at least 12.6 million forced migrants in 2016, and 3.9 million new displacements were recorded during the same year. At least 37 of Africa's 55 countries across every region have been affected. The Kampala Convention calls for a new approach to displacement that addresses its causes and longer-term implications, as well as its more immediate humanitarian consequences. Conflict caused 70 per cent of Africa's new displacements in 2016. The continent also accounted for 40 per cent of conflict displacement globally, more than any other, and the scale and relentless nature of the phenomenon are beyond the scope of humanitarian action.

2.0 Defining forced migration

According to South (2007) one can broadly define three types of forced migration according to the causes of population movement: *Type 1*: Armed conflict-induced displacement: this is either as a direct consequence of fighting and counter-insurgency operations, or because armed conflict has directly undermined human and food security, and is linked to severe human rights abuses.

Type 2: Military occupation- and development-induced displacement: this is generally caused by a) confiscation of land – following armed conflict – by the army or other armed groups, including natural resource extraction and infrastructure construction, and b) forced labour and other abuses.

Both of the above two types of displacement are products of conflict. *Type 1* is directly caused by armed conflict; *Type 2* is caused by latent conflict or by the threat of use of force. As such, they constitute forced migration, and cause internal displacement.

Berger (1987), Adepoju (1989), Bolzman (1996), and Anthony (1999), refer to forced migrations as those caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, etc. In these cases, forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their physical security and to protect themselves from an imminent threat to their physical well-being. Nick Van Hear (1998) talks of voluntary as opposed to involuntary nature of the forces that lead to migration. Anthony Richmond (1994) distinguishes between 'proactive' and 'reactive' migration. He classifies migrants in two main categories of those with agency (choice) and those without agency, forced migrants being those with little or no agency.

3.0 Summary and key messages on conflicts and forced migration in Africa

Forced migration is a persistent and serious problem in Africa, despite strong commitments on the part of national governments to prevent, address and resolve it. More than 3.9 million new displacements were recorded in 2016 as a result of conflict and violence, leaving 12.6 million people living in displacement inside their own countries as at the end of the year (see **Figure 1**). Behind the figures are the blighted lives of millions of women, men, girls and boys who have fled their homes to escape atrocities, and who face the risk of long-term displacement and deprivation (see **Figure 2)**. These numbers show people being forced to leave their homes, often at a moment's notice and in the most traumatic of circumstances, and who receive little protection and assistance from their governments. In countries with low coping capacity and

weak governance, the majority of internally displaced people (IDPs) are extremely vulnerable and often at risk of further upheaval and long-term impoverishment.

Figure 1: Number of people displaced by conflict and violence in Africa in 2016.

Conflicts and displacements in Africa, 2016

New Dispalcements 2016 18%

Total Number of IDPS as of the end of 2016 82%

**Figure 2:** Girls and boys who have fled their homes to escape conflicts in Africa

(Africa report on internal displacement, December 2017 p45)

As the world focuses its attention on preventing irregular migration and protecting refugees fleeing Africa, forced migrations persists at an alarming rate but the plight of those affected goes largely unnoticed. Forced (or involuntary) migration includes a number of legal or

political categories. All involve people who have been forced to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere.

Forced migration is a result of and will impact on a range of social, political and economic processes that determine the well-being of individuals and communities, and the prosperity of nations. Local and national development actors need to lead the planning, implementation and monitoring of assistance to displaced populations, ensuring that emergency response is integrated into long-term support that creates opportunities and helps ensure sustainable solutions. Forced migrants face specific and often extreme vulnerabilities that short-term humanitarian measures alone are unable to address.

4.0 Conflict and forced migration: A persistent phenomenon in Africa

There were 12.6 million people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence in Africa as of the end of 2016, a third of the global total. This is despite the continent only accounting for 16 per cent of the world's population (Worldometers, World Population), see **Figure 3** below.

Figure 3: Displacements associated with conflicts in Africa, 2016

As **Figure 4** below shows, East Africa continues to host the highest number of IDPs, with 6.8 million or 54 per cent of the continent's total as of the end of 2016. The region has had the highest cumulative figures for seven of the last eight years, driven by protracted and cyclical conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

Figure 4: New conflict displacements in 2016 and total number in millions of IDPs by region as of the end of 2016

Conflict displacement in Central Africa is escalating at such a rate, with more than 1.3 million new incidents between January and June 2017 that the region may well overtake East Africa as the worst-affected region both in terms of new displacements and long-term IDPs.

5.0 The challenge of forced migrants in Africa

Literature traces the beginning of the problem of forced migrants in Africa back to the period of struggles for independence. As Milner (2004) points out, "while migration, both forced and voluntary, has been a defining feature of African history since pre-modern times, the emergence of the modern refugee phenomenon in Africa may be linked to the struggle for and attainment of independence by most African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s". The phenomenon of forced migration has characterized most African countries since the late pre-Independence period from the 1950s up until the 1980s. In many countries armed conflicts have characterized the post-Independence period and have been the main cause of population flights. Deng (1993) identifies civil and ethnic conflicts as the main causes of forced migrations in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Many political analysts argue that most of these post-independence armed conflicts are a result of colonial legacy, the introduction of new socio-economic and political structures and the changing nature of the State (Kraler 2005). In many African countries, colonial regimes practised a system of differential and preferential treatment of Africans based on regional, tribal, status and ethnic differences. Most African countries inherited these colonial practices of division and exclusion (Anthony, 1999). Violent armed conflict experienced in several African countries in the post-Independence period are thus often the direct result of exclusionary policies pursued by newly independent regimes that in important ways can be seen as a continuation of similar colonial policies. The conflicts often opposed ruling groups trying to maintain the status quo on the one hand and excluded group rallying for change, on the other. Thus, in general, struggles over the control of political and economic power and concomitant massive human rights abuse, including widespread violence are the main cause of population flights in Sub Saharan Africa. Anthony (1999) cites Chad, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi,

and Uganda as examples of major refugee producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but the list can undoubtedly be prolonged.

Moreover, armed conflicts that cause population displacement are, in many instances, a result of failure or unwillingness of certain governments to resolve long-standing ethnic tensions (Chazan et al. 1999) or the tendency of certain governments to oppress particular population groups (Adepoju, 1989). For many socio-economic and developmental analysts armed conflicts and the resulting mass flight of refugees constitute the greatest challenge for economic development and the greatest obstacle to economic take off (Nabudere 2002).

6.0 Causes of forced migration

The root cause of forced migration is armed conflicts whose causes include poverty, civil strife, arms trade, violations of human rights and lack of accountability and democracy on the part of leaders (Rutinwa 1999). The 1994 Addis Ababa Declaration points out that armed conflicts and civil strife are the principal causes of refugees' flights in Africa. The document also mentions other factors which play a significant role in forced population displacement in Africa such as ethnic and religious intolerance, the abuse of human rights on a massive scale; the monopolization of political and economic power; refusal to respect democracy or the results of free and fair elections; resistance to popular participation in governance; and poor management of public affairs (Rutinwa 1999). External causes are also worth mentioning, such as arming and sponsoring rebel movements by external forces in order to have easy access to minerals and to find markets for their products, especially weapons; the unfair trade deals and unfair international economic system which leave many African states too poor to adequately attend to the needs of the citizens (Rutinwa 1999).

Forced migration is associated with the threat and/or fear that force people to flee their place of residence in search for security and safety (Deng 1993). Forced migrations are also divided into two categories depending on the causes of displacement.

In that respect, UNHCR considers it essential to interpret the notion of development in a broad and rights-based manner, rather than using it as a synonym for increased productivity, output and economic growth. It is precisely because they have not been able to realize their human rights and fundamental freedoms that so many people have felt obliged to seek protection outside their country of origin.

Bosson (2007) says forced migration may be caused by a single event such as military attack or a relocation/eviction order from the military or civil authorities for military, infrastructure or commercial purposes. Typically, these events affect whole villages or communities or sections of towns, and are relatively sudden.

More commonly forced migration is caused by a series of events, including coercive measures imposed by the authorities such as forced labour, land confiscation, extortion and forced agricultural practices. These measures, which constitute serious violations of human rights, typically act cumulatively over time, reducing the family's resource base, and thus its income, until the household economy collapses and leaving home becomes the best or only option.

This process first affects the poorer families, though the whole community may gradually migrate over a period of years. This pattern of 'gradual displacement', in which people tend to leave as individuals or as family groups, may be recognised in regions of current conflict. The coercive measures operate in, are affected by and exacerbate a situation of widespread poverty, rising inflation and declining real incomes. Thus, people leave home due to a combination of interconnecting coercive and economic factors. One has to consider the whole process leading to displacement rather than a single, immediate cause.

According to Kunz (1973), refugees are different from voluntary migrants in that they have to leave their homeland against their will, with no positive motivation to settle anywhere else. Olson (1979) points out that refugees differ from other migrants in that refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere.

In Kunz's theoretical framework forced migrants are not pulled out but rather they are pushed out of their homelands. However, in African migration reality the push-pull factor as conceived in Kunz's theoretical framework is not easily demarcated with regard to the distinction between economic migrants and refugees. As Ricca (1990) argues, in Africa the majority of migrants are forced into exile in one way or another.

7.0 Case studies in Africa

Figure 5: Children forced to migrate in DRC

(Africa report on internal displacement, December 2017 p15)

Fighting between government forces and armed opposition groups led to the widespread displacement of civilians in Africa in 2016. Renewed clashes between South Sudanese security forces and those loyal to the country's former vice-president in the capital of Juba led to the displacement of about 34,000 people in July. In Somalia, fighting between armed groups from displaced between 50,000 and 70,000 people in October. More than 100,000 people fled fighting between DRC's military and armed groups between August and December. In Mozambique, conflict between government forces and the armed wing of the Mozambican National Resistance displaced more 15,000 people during the year (IDMC, Internal Displacement Update, 2016). The scale of conflict displacement in 2016 suggests that the deliberate targeting of civilians was pervasive. In South Sudan 30,000 people fled their homes in September to escape deadly attacks against civilians and the looting of private property. In

CAR, 13 villages were burned in the same month, causing the displacement of about 3,500 people, and 48 civilians were killed and more than 20,000 displaced in two separate attacks on displacement camps in October. Inter-communal violence also triggered displacement across the continent. In September 2016, violence between different armed groups in CAR displaced 1,300 people, and violence between armed groups in DRC's Tanganyika province displaced 2,000. These tensions escalated toward the end of 2016, swelling Tanganyika's displaced population from 370,000 in December 2016 to 543,000 as of the end of March 2017 – the steepest rise in the country (OCHA, Democratic Republic of Congo: Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees, March 2017).

Fighting between government and opposition forces can degenerate into attacks against civilians and prompt or aggravate inter-communal violence. Fighting that erupted between DRC's military and the militia in 2016 has since transformed into inter-communal conflict between the region's different ethnic groups. New militias have emerged, and civilians have been actively targeted. It can be difficult to determine whether displacement is a direct or indirect consequence of violence, and whether it was intentional or not. These issues need to be better understood if conflict displacement is to be prevented or reduced. The Geneva Conventions were designed to limit it and other effects of war on civilians, but armed conflict results in displacement in a number of ways.

The mass displacement of civilians can be a deliberate military strategy, which is a violation of international humanitarian law, or people may flee the indirect effects of war such as general insecurity and the destruction of civilian infrastructure and services. Conflict persists at the global level, with countries reporting IDP figures over a period of 23 years on average, often involving multiple movements and severe humanitarian and protection consequences. This is particularly relevant to displacement in Africa, given that many of the country's conflicts are fought over years, if not decades. There is also a strong correlation between persistent numbers of IDPs and political crises. State fragility and weak governance often lead to intermittent conflict, insecurity and repeated displacement.

Conflict caused 70 per cent of new displacement in Africa in 2016, and 75 per cent in the first half of 2017. DRC, Nigeria and South Sudan have featured repeatedly among the five countries worst affected by conflict displacement in Africa. This reflects the enduring nature of their conflicts and the growing number of IDPs living in protracted displacement as a result (see **Figure 6**).

Figure 6: The five countries worst affected by conflict displacement, Jan – June 2017

Country	Displacement
DRC	997,000
Ethiopia	213,000
CAR	206,000
South Sudan	163,000
The Gambia	162,000

Central Africa remains the region most affected by conflict displacement, accounting for up to 60 per cent of the continent's new conflict displacements and DRC remains the worst affected country in the world, ahead of Iraq and Syria. There were 997,000 new conflict displacements in DRC by the end of June, more than for the whole of 2016. There were also 206,000 in CAR, four times the country's figure for 2016. The Gambia experienced a major spike in

displacement in January for the first time on record, the result of a constitutional crisis and military intervention following a disputed presidential election. More than 162,000 people were displaced internally and 48,000 fled to neighbouring countries, though people apparently returned relatively quickly once the crisis had abated.

8.0 On the radar: 2016/2017 figures and trends on conflict and forced migration in Africa

The published figures are already alarming, but they undoubtedly underestimate the scale of the phenomenon. More than 3.9 million new internal displacements in the context of conflict, violence were recorded in Africa in 2016. This is the equivalent of 10,500 people being forced from their homes every day, and represents an 8.5 per cent increase on the 3.5 million new displacements recorded in 2015. Displacement is a continent-wide phenomenon. At least 37 of Africa's 55 countries across every region were affected. More than 70 per cent of new displacements were the result of conflict and violence, a total of 2.8 million across 23 countries. This compares with a global figure of 22 per cent, which clearly highlights the disproportionate impact of conflict on the continent. Africa also accounted for about 40 per cent of this type of displacement globally.

Figure 7: Incidence of conflict displacements in Africa, 2009 to 2016

Figure 7 depicts, the high incidence of conflict displacement in 2016 is in keeping with the trend seen in previous years in Africa. New conflict displacements have significantly outnumbered those associated with disasters every year since 2009, except for 2010 and 2011. The scale of new conflict displacements in 2016 and 2017 highlights the disproportionate impact of violence in driving the phenomenon in Africa. Having declined significantly following the end of the Cold War and particularly between 2000 and 2005, the number of conflicts in Africa now fluctuates more regularly. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) indicate that incidents in Africa declined between 2010 and 2014, but have inclined again since 2015.

Figure 8: Number of armed conflicts in Africa, 1950 to 2016

Number of conflicts in Africa, 1950 to 2010

The continent accounted for only 16 per cent of the global population in 2016, but more than a third of the world's conflict (see **Figure 8**).

A civil war that kills 2,500 people over the course of five years is estimated to increase the proportion of undernourished people in the population by more than three per cent, reduce life expectancy by around a year, increase infant mortality by about 10 per cent and raise the number of people without access to clean drinking water and adequate sanitary facilities by about two per cent. A single year of civil war is estimated to reduce a country's economic growth by about two per cent, while the doubling of per capita income in lower income countries would reduce the probability of conflict by an average of around 30 per cent (Peace Research Institute Oslo, Peace on Earth? The Future of Internal Armed Conflict, June 2014). A country that suffered major violence over 25 years has an average of 21 per cent more poverty than one that experienced relatively low levels of violence. The more intense the fighting, the longer the recovery time. Conflict in one country also has knock on effects in others. A country experiencing growth, such as Tanzania, loses about 0.7 per cent of its GDP for every neighbouring country in conflict.

9.0 The socio-economic and political impacts of forced migration in Africa

One of the main social problems today is the ever-increasing number of forced migrants on the continent and its negative impact on the social, economic, political and human development. As Cohen and Deng (1998) put it, "large numbers of persons are regularly turned into 'refugees' and forced into a life of destitution and indignity". Displacement is reversing current development gains and threatens the achievement of future development objectives in Africa. The figures produced by UNHCR in 2002 show that Africa produces and hosts 60% of the 17 million world's forced migrants. According to UNHCR (2005), the total population of concern to UNHCR, namely, refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless, and other people of concern, increased from 17 million persons at the end of 2003 to 19 million by the end of 2004. Africa has the biggest share of this number with nearly three million refugees, often concentrated in regions with considerably inadequate capacities to host them. The current points of concentration of refugees in Africa are the great lakes region which is home to nearly one and half million refugees, East and Horn of Africa which hosts an estimate of one million refugees and the West African block which hosts half a million refugees (UNHCR, 2005).

Today forced migrants flow from one African country to another in an uncontrolled manner. In some cases, the flow is too huge and fast to be adequately managed. For example, the influx of Rwandese refugees was at the rate of 250,000 forced migrants crossing into Tanzania within 24 hours and in two months the number of refugees fleeing from Rwanda to Tanzania rose to nearly a million people, with a further almost two million crossing to Zaire (Rutinwa 1999). These mass displacements of people constitute a serious threat of security. They also affect economic, environmental and political stability of the transit and final destination countries. In fact, countries which host a big number of forced migrants have complained of the latter's destruction of environment in terms of tree-cutting in search of fire wood, water pollution, deforestation for setting up camps (Mupedziswa 1993). These countries have also complained of spending considerable amounts of money over refugees which would have been used to improve the standard of living of their own citizens.

Moreover, the presence of forced migrants has caused unnecessary insecurity in the area of their settlement. The insecurity usually stems from the conflicts between refugees and local communities over the limited resources. More importantly, hosting forced migrants has been a source of political conflicts between the host country and their country of origin. For example, the presence of the Rwandan forced migrants in DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda created a political conflict between the two countries until today.

10.0 Recommendations

Addressing and solving the problem of forced migrations in Africa requires a good analysis of its root causes so as to address them and prevent the problem before it occurs. To address these root causes requires a commitment of all stakeholders locally and globally. Some of the concrete measures to be taken include the democratization of African states in a manner that associates every citizen in the major decisions of public administration and governance. It also includes banning and criminalizing illegal sales of weapons. The major solution is also and primarily the sustainable development which eradicates extreme poverty provides basic infrastructures and improves people's standard of living.

Africa's decades-long displacement crisis demands a different approach if its scale and impact are to be reversed. What is needed, first and foremost, is a renewal of the political will and leadership that was demonstrated by African governments when they agreed to the Kampala Convention in 2009. This requires an acknowledgement of the scale of the issue, and its impact across the continent. National and international partners must work collectively across mandates and institutional barriers to deal more systematically with the root causes, long-term impacts and immediate consequences of forced migration. Sustained efforts are required of a wide range of organisations and institutions to address its causes and consequences.

A better understanding of the triggers of violence and drivers of conflict, and how these change over time, is also required. A stronger focus on prevention and reduction of the risk of new displacement requires tackling the drivers of conflict, taking early action on conflict prevention and emerging crises, and reducing the impact on civilians by improving respect for the laws of war. Moreover, national and local development actors from all key sectors need to take the lead from the start and stay fully engaged in protracted crises. UNHCR encourages the Global Forum to take due account of the way in which failed and flawed development processes give rise to situations in which people are forced to abandon their homes, to leave their own countries and to seek refuge in other states.

Dedicated policies to address the phenomenon, targeted support for forced migrants and their hosts, and a focus on helping them to achieve durable solutions would contribute to the achievement of development goals. In countries where significant numbers of IDPs live in

long-term displacement, progress toward many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will depend to a significant extent on being able to bring their plight to a definitive conclusion. Effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures can prevent and mitigate internal displacement, and reduce its duration and impact. They can also lessen people's vulnerability to repeated displacement, particularly during slow-onset crises, which are set to become more frequent and intense as a result of climate change.

Urgent attention is required to address the scale and impact of internal displacement in Africa in order to make progress on sustainable development. The SDGs and the 2063 roadmap on socioeconomic development, which the AU has put forward, are related to forced displacement in a number of important ways. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development declaration recognises that forced migrants/IDPs are amongst the world's most vulnerable people (UN, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda 2015). To reach the "furthest behind first" and ensure that "no one is left behind", urgent efforts are required to slow the pace of new displacement, and reduce the persistently high numbers of people living uprooted lives across Africa. At the same time, truly sustainable development can only be achieved if forced displacement is addressed in an effective manner.

A number of SGD targets are of immediate relevance to forced migrants. For example, ensuring that all men and women "have access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property" is an essential step in IDP protection and reducing "exposure and vulnerability to climate related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters" would contribute to reducing the incidence and impact of disaster displacement (Goal 1 on reducing poverty). The SDG declaration acknowledges that internal displacement impedes development, and with it, African countries' ability to meet their SDG targets. Explicitly targeting IDPs in the AU's 2063 roadmap would help to overcome this challenge

Other recommendations to policymakers include:

a. Policymakers should adopt an evidence-based approach to policy, building policy frameworks from research findings and not vice versa. In the long term such policies, developed on firm research foundations, will be more likely to result in successful outcomes.

b. Development policymakers should seek to explicitly incorporate understanding of forced migration into already existing programmes focusing on migrant-led development

c. The current attention paid to the potential impact of environmental forced migration is important. However, such attention should not be used to divert attention away from shrinking asylum space or other political protection failures. Nor should policy interest in environmental forced migration focus solely on the science or geography of climate change migration. Instead, policymakers should focus on the political dimensions by considering what types of reform of the global governance regime might adequately protect these groups of forced migrants.

d. Fragile states are arguably the greatest policy challenge faced by the international community in relation to forced migration. However, policies addressing the relationship between fragile states and forced migration must not limit themselves to state strengthening or capacity-building programmes. A comprehensive approach must also consider the connections between state fragility and the behaviour of Northern states, particularly in terms of border securitisation discourses.

e. To redress a historic neglect of refugees' own agency in the international community's approach to forced migration, policymakers must look to use forced migrants' own political and economic capacities, placing human mobility, autonomy and dignity at the centre of international programmes for relief, protection and reconstructions.

11.0 Conclusion

This presentation highlighted the magnitude of the phenomenon of forced migration on the African continent. It traced its historical evolution and its different manifestations, intensity and atrocity in time and space across the continent. The presentation highlighted the negative effect of the phenomenon of forced migration on socio-cultural, economic, ecological, demographic and political settings of the communities across the continent. It was also pointed out that the presence of a big number of forced migrants presents a security threat within the host country and between the countries concerned, namely the host country and the country of origin of the forced migrants. It was also highlighted that the increasing number of forced migrants instils a sentiment of fatigue on the part of host communities and countries in terms of accepting, receiving and protecting refugees. All these problems contribute negatively to the continent's effort towards sustainable development. It was observed that to address the forced migration problem requires a good analysis and response to the root causes of the problem which are economic and political in nature. The presentation proposed preventive measures and solutions which include the democratization and practice of good governance of Sub Saharan African regimes. The presentation emphasizes the importance of popular participation in the decision-making process as means to limit and/or avoid divisions and internal conflicts. Finally, but not least, external forces which take advantage of the conflicts to make blood money must be adequately addressed.

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Comparative Analysis of Migration Trends in Africa within A Global Context: Case of Socio-economic Cultural Integration in Northern and Southern Africa in Agenda 2030 Phase.

G. Chikowore, Nhavira, J.M. Chinyanganya, Manasah Sibanda, P. Chikowore

Abstract

Africa and in particular some of its structural geographical regions are not spared from migration challenges and moreover, socioeconomic cultural and political setbacks emanating from the first decade after independence. This contribution analyzes the migration trends in Africa with specific reference to socioeconomic cultural integration of the Southern and Northern region in the new millennium. Theoretically, the contribution is grounded in the relevant classic works by Charles Kegley and Shannon Blanton (2011); W Magaya (2018); Andrew Heywood (2011); Kanyenze G., Timothy Kondo., Prosper Chitambara and Jos Martens (2011) and John Iliffe (1999) among many others. Methodologically the work is informed by the theory and practice of transformative integration; and migration which is supported by data from primary and secondary sources. Quantitative and qualitative data analyses make central instruments of investigation in this study. Some of the key issues considered herein are migration trends in Africa; essence of Agenda 2030; migration challenges in Southern and Northern Africa; resolving migration challenges and socioeconomic cultural and political transformation particularly in Southern and Northern Africa and Africa in general.

Ultimately, in conclusion and recommendations the contribution proposes a transformative Paradox Migration Model to inform an inclusive development migration policy for Southern and Northern Africa as well as Africa in general but certainly on the strength of exploiting fully the value in Agenda 2030.

Keywords

Introduction

Globally the challenge of migration in its local and intercontinental forms remains quite pronounced, meaning socioeconomic cultural and political factors are not adequately availed

to all nations and regions; and households across the world. More accurately dispensations are not as robust to guarantee enough security in what makes a decent livelihood for the majority of the population most of which is marginalized if not victimized in the rest of the developing world especially in Sub Saharan Africa. A very revealing argument has been laid bare in the 2016 World Population Data Sheet published by the Population Reference Bureau, Washington DC. Meant to inform, empower and advance communities worldwide, this bold quantitative argument depicts migration trends across regions of the world namely more developed; less developed and least developed regions. Positive net migration rates are quite noticeable in more developed regions deriving from the remarkable socioeconomic cultural and political advantage and advancement this region historically enjoys, on one hand, Table 1. Quite uncomfortable the less and least developed regions both register a pronounced negative net migration rate, meaning out of every 1000 population they lose with emigration surpassing immigration flows. Factors behind this negative scenario are revealed partly in Figure 1, below. Nevertheless, informed by recent thematically related publications among many by Charles W Kegley and Shannon Blanton (2011); Kanyenze Godfrey, Timothy Kondo, Propser Chitambara and Jos Martens (2011); Prophet W Magaya (2018), John Iliffe (1999), Pope Francis (2018) and Population Reference Bureau (2017), this submission pursues a brief debate on these migration trends especially in Northern and Southern Africa within the continental and global setting. Examining the factors and other related circumstances as to why migration follows mostly a process which has pronounced irregularities geographically worldwide, the paper finally proposes a Complementary Transformative Migration Model which considerably assists dispensations across developing regions of the world and especially sub-Saharan Africa in resolving meaningfully the migration challenges.

Literature Review

Direct and closely related insightful contributions which are quite theoretically relevant and better informing on migration policy do exist abundantly in national-international institutional libraries. Very educative and enlightening message relevant to the theme of this study was a special message by His Holiness Pope Francis (2018) delivered for the 104th World Day of Migrants and Refugees on 14 January 2018. The main message by His Holiness Pope Francis was a humble reminder to the Church or to Christians that is the God fearing of their unconditional obligation on welcoming, protecting, promoting and integrating migrants and refugees. As a premise for mobilization of stakeholders on development across the world, this

message well augments the mission of Agenda 2030 which is profoundly filled with determination to transform livelihoods of the marginalized across the developing nations and greater world.

A key contribution by Charles Kegley and Shannon (2011) entitled <u>World Politics: Trend and Transformations, an International Edition</u> published by Wadsworth Centage Learning does examine on a global perspective challenges facing communities across the world and proposes quite practical alternatives in which all, in a common humanitarian global responsibility approach should be part of global problem resolving community. Poverty, hunger and disease emanating more often from not very accommodating dispensations which keep holding on to rusty revolutionary, historical, tribal, cultural, racial and religious rigidities constitute in the main, one of the reasons behind irregular migration flows in Sub Saharan Africa and across the developing regions and nations of the world. A quite enlightening contribution through LEDRIZ, ANSA and ZCTU edited by Kanyenze Godfrey, Timothy Kondo, Prosper Chitambara and Jos Martens (2011) entitled <u>Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Pro – Poor and Inclusive Development Strategy</u> published by Weaver Press has insightful debate that goes a long way in reversing the migration challenges among many problems facing sub Saharan Africa. This quite scholarly contribution highlights the significance of pro-poor, inclusive growth and development approach for recovery of dispensations for Zimbabwe but has a universal application for nations confronting similar development crisis. Equally an enlightening contribution to the debate on resolving migration challenges by Prophet Walter Magaya (2017) entitled "7 Things That Africa Must Change," was published by Yadah Publishing House in Harare. Quite informative this book pursues in detail an engaging debate on seven factors that could potentially lead to a massive socioeconomic cultural transformation of Africa which are namely relevant educational system; good governance; adoption of new technology; preaching great news about Africa; dynamics of the decision making in Africa; amicable resolution of differences among the pan Africanists and finally beneficiation which presupposes industrialization driven by manufacturing. For progressive leadership and circles in communities across the world, this contribution is quite handy on policy formulation and constructive debates on transformation and development in general. Compiled with great enthusiasm and remarkable scholarship is the work by Iliffe John (1999) in which the much-celebrated liberation of Africa in the second half of the twentieth century turned to disillusionment with great socioeconomic cultural and political setbacks bedeviling and engulfing the whole continent. Indeed, migration is one but just part of the disillusionment

Africa has and continues to confront. This detailed argument presets a stage for a reconsideration of the new millennium strategies on reclamation of the wealthy African legacy in a fast advancing global village to whose civilization Africa has historically and continues to immensely contribute, Table 1 and 2.

Methodology

This discussion is informed by the theory of socioeconomic cultural transformation, integration and migration. The procedure involves the employment of descriptive and comparative analysis of essential directly and indirectly migration and transformation related data. Delivered in tabular and figure formats quantitative and qualitative data analysis on migration extensively informs this submission. Based on deduced models from the data sources highlighted above, policy relevant conclusion and recommendation on taming migration in sub Saharan Africa especially Northern and Southern Africa on a short, medium and long term are also drawn and proposed in this study.

Expected Outcome

An enhanced capacity on analyzing the socioeconomic trends of migration and its impact on deepening socioeconomic cultural integration on the African continent within UNSDGs/Agenda 2030 phase and the attendant prospects and alternatives for transformation, that process constitutes a critical output of this study. Equally and above all one of the major outcomes of this submission constitutes a "transformative paradox Migration Model," which is an all-time logical outcome of a culture of receptiveness, reciprocity and complementarity, well supported by consistent opportunities inherent in the SADC RSIDP 2030 and Africa Agenda 2063 as a critical element of Global Development Cooperation programs, Figure 1 and 2.

Discussion

- **Agenda 2030 and migration challenges in Africa**.

A continuum of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals, this global project, Agenda 2030 presents great opportunities for resolving of the not only migration challenges but the historical development and transformation problems confronting Africa in the new millennium. One of the prerequisites for the actuation of transformation and development in sub Saharan Africa as a strategy on curbing migration and socioeconomic cultural drawback is highlighted in Figure

2 where all parties should be in a complementary posture, for then reciprocity and receptiveness flourishes in a complimentary mode respectively by all parties. Significantly critical is adoption of comprehensive national development plans in order that Agenda 2030 brings maximum socioeconomic cultural and political value to sub Saharan Africa, notably the Southern and Northern regions. Agenda 2030 comprises key transformative principles for receptive and reciprocating nations and these principles are mainly:

Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere; Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries; Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development; Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels and last but not least, Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development, (UN Sustainable Development Committee 2015).

On their own these major principles do constitute a firm foundation for comprehensive national development plans that could well transform livelihoods not only in Southern and Northern Africa but in Africa as a whole and the rest of the developing world. Equally a considerable reversal of migration challenges due to an overally transforming socioeconomic cultural and political climate in Africa and across the globe does much obtain from the principles of this universally adopted framework.

- **Overall migration scenario in Africa in a global context.**

As highlighted in the introduction, Tables 1 and 2, Africa relates to the least developed region of the pronounced three world regions and inherently Southern and Northern Africa are geographical regions on subdivision of Africa as a continent.

The 2016 World Development Data Sheet published by the Population Reference Bureau, Washington DC [PRB 2016] is meant to inform, empower and advance that way effectively making migration better understood.

Table 1. Comparison of migration trends between Africa, the world and Americas.

Region	Popl mln	Birth per 1000	Death per 1000	Net Migration rate per 1000	Per Capita GNI ppp US$	Average Life Expectancy	Percent urban
World	**7418**	**20**	**8**	**---**	**15415**	**72**	**54**
More Developed	1254	11	10	**3**	39963	79	78
Less Developed	6164	22	7	-0	10214	70	49
Least Developed	962	33	9	-1	2424	62.5	47
Africa	**1203**	**36**	**10**	**-1**	**4802**	**61**	**41**
North Africa	229	29	6	-1	9798	71	51
West Africa	359	39	11	-1	4135	56	45
East Africa	394	36	9	-1	2019	62	26
Middle Africa	157	44	14	-0	2617	53	47
South Africa	64	23	10	**3**	12404	65	62
Americas	**998**	**15**	**7**	**1**	**30077**	**77**	**80**
North America	360	12	8	**4**	55179	79	81
Latin America and Caribbean	637	17	6	-1	14512	76	80
Central America	175	19	5	-1	14896	77	74
Caribbean	43	17	8	-4	-	74	70
South America	419	16	6	-0	14628	76	83

Source: 2016. Population Reference Bureau. World Development Data Sheet. Washington DC.

This publication gives data on key indices for population, health, environment and estimates for the countries and regions of the world. Within the global migration flow scenario Africa

has a negative net migration rate of minus one (-1). Figures 1 and 2 do considerably explain the factors influencing migration and the millennium strategies on its combating taking advantage of the immense transformative opportunities afforded by the UNSDGs/ Agenda 2030.

Of the five geographical regions on the African continent namely Northern Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Middle/ Central Africa do experience a negative net migration rate to the degree of minus one (-1). This scenario which has seen protracted socioeconomic cultural and political upheavals in the regions just after independence largely accounts for the departure of many Africans from homes of origin to other progressive and more peaceful regions of the continent and the world. Only Southern Africa on the continental southern tip has registered a positive net migration of 3 /1000 population due to prevalence in the region of a more accommodating peaceful environment. Generally, the socioeconomic cultural and political circumstances in Southern Africa make a promising platform for the adoption of the UNSDGs / Agenda 2030. A majority of the national economies are quite stable and show increasing averages across the nations relative the average global GNI per capita US$. These economies most probably having learnt from the failures registered by other regions in Africa and specific nations too which very much obsessed in rusty revolutionary, tribal, cultural, religious and racial rigidities have been more receptive and reciprocating to progressive global trends and development climate. They have continually remained stable and progressive since their independence being receptive and progressive oriented members of the continental and global community. These economies in Southern Africa region with their favorably high GNI per capita are Botswana (GNI per capita 15600 US$); Lesotho (3600 US$); Namibia (10830 US$); South Africa (12830 US$) and Swaziland (8040 US$), PRB (2016).

As it appears the transformative destiny of Africa including migration lies with Southern Africa with a net positive migration rate of 3/1000, and the world's more developed regions notably Europe [Western and Northern with a respective 8 and 3 positive net migration per 1000 population]; Oceania with a positive net migration 3/1000 population; European Union; Western Asia with a 3/1000 population net positive migration; North America with a positive net migration rate of 4/1000 population, within the opportunities afforded by Agenda 2030, Tables 1 and 2 ; PRB (2016).

Table 2. Comparing the migration trends between Africa, Asia, Europe and
the Oceania.

Region	Popl mln	Birth per 1000	Death per 1000	Net Migration rate per 1000	Per Capita GNI ppp US$	Average Life Expectancy	Percent urban
Asia	**4437**	**18**	**7**	**-0**	**11969**	**73**	**48**
Western Asia	261	22	5	**3**	25602	74	70
Central Asia	70	24	6	-1	14896	77	74
South Asia	1859	23	7	-0	6155	68	35
South East Asia	633	19	7	-0	11298	71	48
East Asia	1614	12	7	-0	17048	77	60
Africa	**1203**	**36**	**10**	**-1**	**4802**	**61**	**41**
North Africa	229	29	6	-1	9798	71	51
West Africa	359	39	11	-1	4135	56	45
East Africa	394	36	9	-1	2019	62	26
Middle Africa	157	44	14	-0	2617	53	47
South Africa	64	23	10	**3**	12404	65	62
Europe	**740**	**11**	**11**	**2**	**32614**	**78**	**74**
European Union	510	10	10	2	37646	81	75
Northern Europe	103	12	9	**3**	42265	81	81
Western Europe	193	10	10	**8**	46052	81	79
Eastern Europe	293	12	13	-1	21212	74	69
Southern Europe	150	9	10	0	30960	82	70
Oceania	**40**	**17**	**7**	**7**	**32456**	**73**	**62**

Source: 2016. Population Reference Bureau. World Development Data Sheet. Washington DC.

Figure 2 highlighted below does explain schematically why there are such high net positive migration rates in these regions, industrialized, peaceful as they are with greatly humanitarian –human centered dispensations which long graduated from the ranks governed by revolutionary, historical, religious, tribal, cultural and racial rigidities to ranks of remarkable good governance. Northern and Southern Africa do much benefit by the same token from these

developed regions as long as a culture of receptiveness and reciprocity dominates in their dispensations.

- **Overall migration scenario in Northern Africa and specifics**

Northern Africa as a geographical entity of Africa comprises of a community of nations as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara and currently with an overall 9798 US$ GNI per capita far below the global average GNI per capita of 15415 US$. Northern Africa has a negative net migration rate of minus one (-1). What this means is that the array of rigidities pronounced above are greatly concentrated in this region and for solutions needs to orientate more in more developed and advanced regions on the continent and in Europe and Asia and the Northern America and Western Asia. Figures 1 and 2 do explain the factors influencing migration flows and the historically guaranteed solutions to the migration plight and socioeconomic cultural and political transformation in particular. Not only does this region need to capitalize on the national development plans of individual member nations but they more than ever need to capitalize on the great multi-sector opportunities afforded by Agenda 2030 in the new millennium to graduate into ranks of national-global community from traditional tribal community ranks.

- **Overall migration scenario in Southern Africa and specifics**

Southern Africa as a geographical entity of Africa comprises of a community of considerably stable, peaceful and developing nations as Botswana; Lesotho; Namibia; South Africa and Swaziland and currently with an overall 12404 US$ GNI per capita slightly below the global average GNI per capita of 15415 US$. With a culture of receptiveness and reciprocity in their dispensations, Southern Africa as a region in a global village has great socioeconomic cultural promises for Africa and the world. Southern Africa a comparatively stable, developing region has a positive net migration rate of three (3) or 3/1000 population, Table 1. What this means is that the array of rigidities pronounced above are greatly neutralized in this region and for solutions Southern Africa needs to orientate towards more developed and advanced regions on the continent and in Europe and Asia and the Northern America and Western Asia, Tables 1 and 2. Quite logical quantitative arguments in Figures 1 and 2 do explain the factors influencing migration flows and the historically guaranteed solutions to the migration plight and socioeconomic cultural and political transformation in particular. Just as with the Northern region not only does the Southern region need to capitalize on the homegrown national socioeconomic cultural development plans of individual member nations but the regional member states more than ever need to capitalize on the great multi-sector opportunities

afforded by Agenda 2030 in the new millennium to graduate into ranks of national-global community from traditional - tribal community ranks.

- **Controlling migration and socioeconomic transformation in Agenda 2030 phase.**

Advancement characterized by progressive transformation should show increasing momentum not only in Southern and Northern Africa, but Africa and the rest of the developing nations and regions of the world. Figure 1, does in a picturesque fashion show the socioeconomic cultural circumstances that have led to migration flows not only in Southern and Northern Africa but across regions of the world. Due to prevalence of traumatic revolutionary, historical, tribal, cultural, religious and racial rigidities entrenched in most dispensations in Africa and other regions of the developing world, instability, disunity, deindustrialization; internal conflicts; hunger, poverty and diseases get deeply entrenched thus by great orders throwing nations two-three decades behind. Agenda 2030 has a great solution to these challenges as long as dispensations become receptive and reciprocal in circumstances of peace and stability, Prophet W Magaya (2017); Kanyenze G; Jos Martens., etal (2011).

Figure 1. Repulsive nature of setbacks and transformative potential of progressive forces.

Source: Chikowore G. 2018. UZ CASS. Migration Model Attraction and Repulsion Forces. Mt Pleasant. Harare.

Progressive regions, nations have proved to be peaceful and advanced industrially, that means in socioeconomic cultural and political terms they could much assist not only in resolving migration challenges but transforming Southern and Northern Africa, Africa as a whole through a more systematic exploitation of the immense transformative value locked up in Agenda 2030 and complementary homegrown socioeconomic cultural development plans.

"Southern Africa Today Vol 19 Number 5 August 2017" does carry an article by Kizito Sikuka (2017) entitled "Africa's largest integrated market closer to reality" highlighting the signing of a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement and Political Declaration by 20 out of 26 African nations. If confirmed the envisaged TFTA will serve a combined population of more than 600 million and Gross Domestic Product of about US$1 million. Equally the TFTA constituting the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) will serve solidly as one of the building blocks of the long envisaged African Economic Community. Effectively the envisaged TFTA feeds well from the opportunity offered by the Agenda 2030 on condition dispensations become very receptive and reciprocal.

"Equally, SADC Today Vol 17 Number 3 of April 2015" features an article by Joseph Ngwawi (2015) entitled "Regional Integration SADC develops industrial strategy." Consistent with the UNSDGs the envisaged industrialization strategy is to be implemented in three phases [2015-2020; 2021-2050 and 2051-2063] covering three main pillars of industrialization, competitiveness and regional integration (ibid: 2).

Going beyond Agenda 2030 phase but in its 30-year phase, the Southern Africa Development Community: Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC: RSIDP) well resonates the principles of the UNSDGs, yet its adoption remains hinged on the dispensational receptiveness and reciprocity of the nations, heads of state and government in the region.

Equally on a medium- and long-term plan, Prophet W Magaya (2017) has highlighted seven (7) principles Africa has to uphold to be guaranteed a breakthrough. Quite informative and well projected into the future of a transforming Africa these are namely: education systems sensitive to African priorities; good governance systems which celebrate talents; adoption of advancing technologies responsive to continental demands and future; preaching the greatness and integrity of Africa in global civilization; a duty-bound culture of resolving divisions among Pan Africanists; beneficiation and value addition which means industrialization. Even as we pronounce Agenda 2030 there is however deeper conceptual congruency in the seventeen (17)

principles of the Agenda and the principles articulated by Prophet W Magaya in His enlightening contribution on the contemporary debate on the new millennium transformation in Africa.

Much divorced from the socioeconomic cultural and political reality of the poor and heavily marginalized majority by entrenched dispensational rigidities, Kanyenze G., Kondo Timothy., Chitambara Prosper., Jos Martens (2011) remind about the need for inclusive (non-discriminative), participatory approach in national development which ultimately guarantees security of pro-poor, inclusive – shared growth and development. Quite strategic administrative oriented inputs by Alternatives to Neo liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA); Labour and Economic Development Research Institute, Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ); Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU); the historic contribution by this institution goes quite far in informing new progressively integral solutions not only to the migration but socioeconomic cultural and political challenges confronting not only Southern and Northern Africa but Africa, the developing and developed nations as they make concerted complementary efforts in resolving these same pronounced challenges.

Conclusion

The historical significance of Agenda 2030 for socioeconomic cultural and political transformation in Southern and Northern Africa as well as Africa on the whole is quite immense, but what is quite critical for a maximum taping on value in the instrument (Agenda) is receptiveness and reciprocity which amounts to Transformative Good Governance in most African States. There is need to categorically shift from and deny entrenched and institutionalized revolutionary, historical, religious, tribal, cultural and racial rigidities in most dispensations in Africa, especially Southern and Northern as these rigidities amount to incubation hideouts for anarchic tendencies in most member states. Figure 2 below makes a diagrammatic debate of the factors grounded in complementarities between Developed Advanced States or Regions; and Developing Complementing Regions or Nations.

Figure 2. Receptive, reciprocity nature of advancement and transformative potential of consistent complimentary forces.

Source: Chikowore G. 2018. UZ CASS. Receptive, reciprocity and complimenting transformative Paradox Migration Model. Harare.

The transformative Paradox Migration Model quite effectively operates in the medium of well synchronized comprehensive national socioeconomic cultural development plans, SADC RSIDP, Africa Agenda 2063 and the Agenda 2030 as such an approach enables massive stakeholder by-in across sectors from the local, region, continent and the global peace-loving progressive communities.

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Assessment-Based Training: A Drive Towards Enhancement of Assessment Quality in Universities.

Albert Mada

Abstract

This study aims to promote assessment – based training as one of the major factors influencing operations and practices in universities with regards to staff performance towards improved quality service delivery. A purely qualitative inquiry was used to collect and analyse data for this study. A semi-structured interview approach was used to collect data from the participants. Results were recorded verbatim and then analysed and discussed. The study established that many lecturers in the universities are not trained in formative and summative assessment. Most lecturers are drawing their practices from how they were assessed when they were students. According to results from this study it is therefore recommended that universities should provide lecturers with assessment-based training to equip and enhance them with competencies and (assessment) skills in assessing students, for example, assessment and teaching and learning, activities, and examinations setting, questioning techniques, grading.

Key words: Assessment-based training, University assessment, University teaching, quality, teaching.

INTRODUCTION

Assessment in Higher Education (H.E) has been subject to many developments. Nonetheless, student assessment in Universities has been given little attention except only to the level of the known classical studies of psychometrics. However, there has been convergence of attention on assessment from the public, calling for more accountability, transparency, and fairness (Greiff & Kyllonen, 2015). As a result, interesting studies have been witnessed placing assessment at a didactic crossroads (Matovu, 2014; Campell, 2015; Maki, 2015). It is argued in this paper that assessment-based training is an inevitable backbone of student assessment reform and success measure of any lecturer to be considered a successful assessor.

Student assessment occupies an important position in H.E. Therefore, it has the potential to impinge on policy, management, and cultural issues. In this paper, the following issues are unveiled: student assessment quality, assessment economic cost and current debates. There is compelling evidence internationally that student assessment in H.E is an area begging for attention and improvement as evidenced by different quality agencies around the world such

as Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), Zimbabwe Council for Higher Education (ZIMCHE), for example, a CE Query tool analysing student comments on assessment pointed to the following sub-domains: Relevance, Marking, Expectations, Feedback/return and Standards. As Campell (2015:12) states, "while students are equivocal about the relevance of assessment, they are more likely to be unhappy about the way their work is marked, unclear about the feedback they receive and unclear about the standards of assessment". It would not be long before students consider marks and grades as commodities of a particular purchase price and spending power and that they have committed their investment in the fees with the hope of a life-time return – grades and marks are worthy money, and therefore, a degree becomes a "commodity, bought to specification and with an expectation the supplier will without fail deliver" (Connolly et al, 2006:136).

As highlighted by Matovu (2014), there are various types of assessment which are: *assessment for learning, assessment of learning* and *assessment as learning*. Assessment for learning is formative assessment and helps student revisit their mistakes, learn from colleagues and past experiences (Black et al, 2004; Duncan and Noonan, 2007, Matovu, 2014). Assessment of learning is equal to summative assessment. It is a single shot appraisal used to entertain students' attainment of the required knowledge in totality (Swaffield, 2011). Assessment as learning is where students make self-assessment on themselves (McDowell et al, 2011). Assessment as learning helps students discover and learn from own mistakes. Duncan and Noonan (2007) and Matovu, (2014) contend that literature is deplete of other factors that influence assessment and these are assessment-based training, academic level, area of specialisation and class size.

Empirical literature on assessment

Effective assessment in any learning environment heavily depends on the quality of assessment training lecturers possess (Zhang and Burry-Stock, 2003; Matovu and Zubairi 2014). Training lecturers in assessment is just but the only sure way universities can staff develop their lecturers into good assessors. Assessing is more than just asking a question, it is not everyone who can assess and let alone assess well. Staff who are not trained in assessment certainly would need assessment-based training (Duncan and Noonan ,2007; Matovu and Zubairi ,2014; Sato *et al.,* 2011; Brookhart,2003; Masole, 2009). Training influences academic staff's assessment practices. Studies have also established that lecturers' possession of good assessment competencies and skills make them adequate in assessing students (Zhang and Burry-Stock, 2003).

Allowing academic staff who do not have good or proper assessment competencies and skills is academic suicide in the teaching-learning environment (Popham, 2009). It is during assessment that lecturers knowingly or unknowingly take decisions with far-reaching effects on the academic life of the student. From the many studies on assessment, it has since been established that most of the lecturers in universities have inadequate competencies and skills in assessment (Phamotse, 2011; Alkharusi, 2011, 2012; Duncan and Noonan,2007; Matovu and Zubairi, 2014; Sato *et al.,* 2011). On the other hand, research supports that those lecturers with assessment-based training have better competencies and skills in assessment than those who have not undertaken any assessment-based training, (Masole, 2011). For example, a study that undertook to analyse assessment and skills of academic staff in Universities reported that most of the lecturers were incompetent in assessing students and also that a few academics had undertaken assessment-based, training (Alkharusi 2011, 2012; Phamotse et al, 2011; Masole, 2011).

In universities, assessment-based training for majority of lecturers is largely optional, confirming that assessment-based training is not taken with the seriousness it deserves, (Phamotse, 2011) though the importance of assessment is inevitable in the learning – teaching process (in universities), (Ibid). Lecturers ought to be equipped with adequate and innovative competencies for assessing students in ways they design, administer, interpret and apply results obtained from the assessments (Koloi-Keaikitse, 2012). There is a wide-ranging advocacy for assessment-based training for lecturers in order to improve their assessment practices, as they administer their far-reaching decisions in a manner that does not maim, wound or kill the learner's present and subsequently the future (Matovu and Zubairi, 2014).

Other factors that seem to impact on assessment are:

a) Academic level or staff qualifications have an influence on how lecturers assess (Noordin and Fusoff, 2009). Progressing through academic level is linked to experience which in turn can influence lecturer's assessment practices (Safo et al, 2008). Continuous interaction with assessment gives advantage to a lecturer who has taught for a longer period, with more experience and high academic levels to have good assessment practices (Masole, 2011). While some studies have shown no correlation between academic levels of lecturers and their assessment practices (Ibid).

b) Class size – (Academic) lecturers assessment practices have been linked to the class size assessed (Koloi-Keaikitse, 2012). The nature of class size influences the practice

of assessment. Large class sizes in assessment are viewed as a threat to the quality of assessment.

Even though there has been advocacy on rethinking and reviewing assessment for the next decade and beyond, for example, 'Assessment 2020', very little could be achieved unless universities engage their lecturers in assessment – based training on the backdrop of the fact that assessment is a central feature of teaching and learning. Assessment is making of judgements about how students' work meets standards and assessment fosters learning and certification (Rowntree, 2015 Sato *et al.,*2008). Assessment therefore, does not only measure learning, but it also directs learning. So, one wonders what damage is made when an 'unlicensed assessor' is entrusted with the responsibility of student assessment.

Assessment effects on learning outcomes

Rowntree (1997), cited in Ramsden (2003, p.65) and Willis (2011), says, "if we wish to discover the truth about an educational system, we must consider its assessment procedures." The methods used to assess students are one of the most critical of all influences on their learning. Two aspects must be considered: the amount of assessed work and the quality of tasks. Unsuitable assessment methods impose irresistible pressure on a student to take the wrong approaches to learning tasks. It is assessment methods, not the student that is the cause of the problem. Researchers on assessment such as Morante (2003), Struyven, Dochy and Janssen (2005) found that excessive assessment has a negative effect on students' attitudes to studying and approaches to learning. The process of assessment influences the quality of student learning in two crucial ways: it affects their approach to assessment and, if it fails to test understanding, it simultaneously permits them to pass courses while retaining the conception of subject matter that lecturers may wish changed. Should the assessment of students' learning go no further than testing what can be unreflectively retained in their memories, misunderstandings will never be revealed.

Assessment must engage students into productive learning by focusing students on learning and by itself being a learning activity calling for engagement and appropriate tasks. Feedback is important to actively improve learning by being informative and supportive as well as facilitating future learning. Students seek and use timely feedback to improve quality of learning. It is not marking and grades, but how to improve the quality of students work that becomes important if assessment is directed well (Maki, 2015; Tourney-Purta *et al.,* 2015). Good assessment must make students and lecturers responsible partners in learning and assessment. Students take responsibility for assessment and feedback and develop

demonstrable ability to judge their own work and that of others. In this way dialogue and interaction about assessment and standards becomes common-place among lecturers and students.

Students must be inducted into the assessment culture of the university where assessment practices are carefully structured with assessment practices that respond to diverse expectations and experiences (Rowntree, 2015 Sato *et al.,*2008). Assessment for learning must be central. Course and program design must be organised holistically and with complementary integrated tasks. Lecturers need support in developing expertise required for program assessment responsibilities measured against consistent national and international standards. Evidence of overall achievement is to be based on assessment of integrated learning (Rowntree, 2015).

Purpose of the study

This study investigated the significant factor influencing student assessment practices by lecturers in universities. This study investigated how a factor such as assessment-based training influences assessment practice of lecturers in universities.

Research question

The following research question guided the study:

Does assessment-based training influence assessment practices among academic staff in universities?

Methodology

This section describes and justifies strategies used for this study, by addressing research design, sample and sampling technique, data collection, and data analysis.

Research design

The study adopts a purely qualitative study and a descriptive survey was adopted for the study. The qualitative method rooted in the interpretive philosophical paradigm supporting the view that there are many truths and multiple realities (Creswell, 2014). This paradigm focuses on holistic perspective of the person and environment which befits the assessment and/or analysis of methods, (Weaver & Olson, 2006). This paradigm provides an opportunity for the voice, concerns, and practices of participants to be heard (Creswell, 2014). Qualitative methods are more concerned about uncovering knowledge about how people feel and think in the circumstances in which they find themselves, rather than making judgments about whether those thoughts and feelings are valid (Cole, 2006).

Qualitative research 'relies' primarily on the collection of qualitative data (Creswell, 2014). While the descriptive aspect is regarded as a strength which enables a researcher to take as much detail as possible, for purposes of this study, the qualitative approach enabled an exploration of how assessment-based training influences assessment practices of lecturers in universities.

Sample and sampling technique

The sample size for this study had ten participants from two universities. Table 1 shows the participants of this study.

Table 1 – Participants, institution, role, and level.

Participant	Institution	Role and Level
Partic1	A	Lecturing – Lecturer
Partic2	A	Lecturing - Senior Lecturer
Parict3	A	Lecturing – Lecturer
Partic4	B	Lecturing - Senior Lecturer
Partic5	B	Lecturing – Lecturer
Partic6	B	Lecturing - Lecturer
Partic7	B	Lecturing – Lecturer
Partic8	B	Lecturing - Senior Lecturer
Partic9	A	Lecturing – Lecturer
Partic10	A	Lecturing – Lecturer

Data was collected through descriptive survey using semi-structured interviews. Purposive and convenience sampling were used in selection of study sites and participants respectively, from two universities.

Data Collection

The researcher personally collected data from purposively and conveniently selected participants from private universities in Zimbabwe. The identified participants were approached, briefed on the purpose of the interview and those who agreed were then interviewed and it took four days. There were no specific criteria on whether the participants had taken an assessment-based training or not. Somehow the study helped in ensuring some representativeness.

Data Analysis

Responses were coded, and themes were established, and verbatim quotes reported.

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

Research findings are presented in the order in which the five semi-structured interview schedules were carried out with the participants.

1. **What do you understand by Assessment? What about assessment-based training?**

Under these two questions, participants had a satisfactory understanding of what assessment is, judging from the responses they gave. For example,

 one said, "*Assessment is the process of measuring student progress*" and another said, "*It's a way to evaluate and make a decision on student progress.*" And yet another said*, "It is a process which requires one to weigh different propositions with no judgements*"

However, on the issue of assessment-based training the participants seem not to have any idea about it as all of them said they had never known what it is. It has not been talked about or popularised at least in the universities represented in the sample.

2. **Do you think training in assessment is valuable?**

On this question lecturers believed assessment is valuable, for example, one had this to say;

"*There is need for universities to train their staff on assessment as most of us are just thrown in the deep end and expected to be good assessors.*" Another said, "*assessment is valuable because it facilitates and promotes fairness, transparency.*" And yet another said, "*Not having it affects pedagogical approach of the lecturer.*"

Lecturers on training in assessment seem to suggest need for training, also expressing how inadequate they seem to be as they realise that they lack the prerequisite. Responses of the lecturers also show that they see the importance of training and the effects of lack of it as they discharge their duties.

3. **What would you consider as major benefits of assessment?**

On this question lecturers made the following observations, for example, one said:

"*One of the benefits is to map a way forward, facilitate judgement, self-introspection and ethical interaction.*"

Another said:

"Knowledge in assessment helps to bring the lecturer to the level of students, improve quality of assessment tools and questioning techniques."

Yet another said:

"Assessment helps me to be fair and transparent to my students."

There seems to be a clear understanding on the major benefits of assessment and chiefly from those who have been trained in assessment, who value its benefits. Assessment issues must be at the core of any teaching and learning to give a lasting and memorable experience to the learner.

4. Do you think assessment can improve the way you teach?

One of the participants had the following to say:

"Oh yes, yes, it does, both sides learn from each other as it determines what happens to both students and lecturer."

Another had this to say:

"It is Bi-dimensional and should facilitate growth as lecturer is not all knowing, we should learn more from students and that subsequently should improve our teaching and learning experience."

Another participant had this to say:

"Had I been trained in assessment, I would find an easy link between the two, casually I hope it does yes."

It can be deduced from the responses that views differ from one respondent to the other showing a clear line between those who are trained and those who are not. Certainly, assessment should improve anyone's teaching as it informs the approaches, methods and planned activities as the lecturer delivers his lecture to students. There is no successful teaching that can happen without successful assessment. Students' experiences are a culmination of the assessment methods they are or would have experienced during their studies. Assessment methods employed define the quality of the graduate any institution produces. One of the outstanding features of studies of assessment in recent years has been the shift in the focus of attention towards greater interest in the interactions between assessment and classroom learning and away from concentration on the properties of restricted forms of test which are only weakly linked to the learning experiences of students (Rowntree, 2015; Griffith, 2016). This shift has been coupled with many expressions of

hope that improvement in lecture-room assessment will make a strong contribution to the improvement of learning.

5. Are you trained in assessment?

Majority of the participants acknowledged that they are not trained in assessment, one had this to say:

"I am not trained at all, I draw from my experience as a student then use how I was assessed and that is how I have survived in this career, But, I think I would be more effective if I were trained."

Another said:

"It's not a requirement at university, so I am a specialist in the area I teach."

Yet another said:

"It's sad indeed, I have seen the importance of being trained, somewhat I feel inadequate, but you see no one has ever suggested such training and after passing interviews am on my own."

The majority of lecturers are not trained in assessment and even those who are trained might need re-training. It is a big disjoint with other educational levels, that assessment training has not been given priority in Higher Education. From the responses, one can infer that the need for training is however a welcome idea with most of the lecturers. With the fast pace of technology, certainly, there is need to embrace new ways of assessing, to make our students global citizens who can function in any part of the world.

DISCUSSION

The central role and primacy of assessment

Literature reviewed showed forcefully the central role of assessment in Higher Education, for example, that assessment shapes and influences students' experiences and behaviour more than the lecturing/teaching they receive. As Gibbs and Simpson (2004:22) state, "there is more leverage from the influence of assessment that teaching and learning can be improved through changing assessment than in changing anything else." To a very large extent, assessment activity in H.E is the learning activity. Students may be subjected to very good lectures and do all sorts of activities from excursions to seminars, from lecture notes to laboratory activities, but real learning for most of them is that time when now they would be forced or faced with assessment tasks. Only then do most of them engage with their collection of material, for

example, lecture notes, field activities, laboratory activities (Huges, 2014; Coates, 2015; Matovu & Ainol, 2015).

However, literature has also shown that university assessment practices lack effectiveness because they are guided by the unlicensed, the untrained in all respects of assessment training (Murphy, 2006). The problem is not mitigated by the 'amateur' status of many academics regarding assessment (Ramsden, 2004:177). The same lecturers who only might have learnt the craft of assessment informally engage in assessing through similar experiences they underwent themselves at university, but still lack scholarship regarding assessment (Price, 2005). There is therefore need for universities "to provide a reliable route for ensuring that research on assessment reaches those doing the assessing" (Bloxham and Boyd, 2007:12).

Literature also shows that contemporary demands of H.E influence and pressure how assessment should be done, thus, creating a force for change of assessment. The student body is also changing with 'reliance on part-time work and other commitments appear to be turning students into very strategic learners who are unwilling to devote effort to study which does not contribute to summative assessment (Kneale, 1997 in Bloxham and Boyd, 2007). Poor early experiences of assessment are associated with high student attrition rates (Ibid). Poorly administered assessment methods are academically punishing and disadvantaging students with punitive grading, assuming student should be shown how much they do not know lest they show they know more than the lecturer, meaningless comments, and even disrespectful remarks – all these discourage the student in the name of being assessed (Matovu & Ainol, 2015).

More so, now than ever, employability and graduate skills agenda is forcing and demanding lecturers to assess a range of activities in subject knowledge and other range of both intellectual and professional skills. It therefore means lecturers are expected – if not forced to modify assessment, to support students through student involvement in assessment, prompt feedback, flexible and formative approaches through use of a variety of assessment methods (Rowtree, 2015; Astin, 2012). However, not forgetting the influence of technological advancement that has created a breeding ground for plagiarism among students, while mediation of rules and regulations, assessment processes by departments, peers and individual lecturers may be influenced and obviously constrained by locally biased and taken for granted assumptions and myths that 'anyone can assess' that any 'holder of a degree qualifies to assess (Greiff & Kyllonen, 2016; Greffith *et al.*, 2016).' In this respect, policy environment/climate in relation to quality assurance and quality enhancement forces us to pose and think the direction of Assessment-Based Training for lecturers in universities. Assessment tips which abound show

that improvement of assessment is largely a representation of a 'Cottage industry' lacking a systematic theoretical basis for understanding judgement of achievement … thus attempts to enhance assessment practices are built on sand' and therefore lack a strong assessment foundation (Knight and Yorke, 2003:209).

As hinted above, it is also imperative for assessors to know that assessment purposes may be usefully categorised as: Assessment of learning, Assessment for learning, Assessment as learning (Coates, 2015; Ewell, 2009; Campbell, 2015).

a. Assessment of learning – how we may traditionally view assessment, that is, making judgements about students' summative achievement for selection and certification also used for university league table, that is, the good degrees awarded.

b. Assessment for learning – is formative and diagnostic, provides information about student achievement which allows teaching and learning to be activities to be changed or adjusted, in response to the learners' needs – need for feedbacking the learner.

c. Assessment as learning – a subset of assessment for learning encourages student's involvement in assessment – feedforward.

Literature shows evidence of negative 'backwash' effect (Biggs, 2003) on student learning and achievement because of poorly conceived assessment strategies. The importance of any university having assessment-based training for lecturers is that, lectures will then not neglect paying attention to their assessment practices and if they do, they will be ignoring an important opportunity to enhance students' effort, approach, and outcomes (Bloxham and Boyd (2007). According to Klenwski, 2002; Earl, 2003; Sadler, 1989 and as stated in Bloxham and Boyd (2007), students should be favoured with the following by their assessors:

- Students must know the standard or goal that they are trying to achieve (assessment guidance)
- They should know how their current achievement compares to those goals (feedback)
- They must act to reduce the gap between the first two (applying feedback to future assignment – feedforward).

Conclusion

It can be concluded that universities cannot think of re-engineering best practices in assessment with lecturers who lack formal training in assessment. Assessment-based training has been identified as a main predictor of the assessment practices of university academic staff,

supporting the finding which highlighted that assessment-based training improves assessment practices of academic staff (Masole 2011, Coates 2015, Phamoste et al, 2011, Alkharusi, 2012). As can be noted from the results of this study, assessment-based training undertaken by the lecturers is relevant for their practice, and if not undertaken, it affects the ways they assess students. According to Tindal and Haladyna (2002) as quoted by Coates (2015), academic staff who are lacking adequate assessment training and skills are not expected to effectively assess the students they teach. If they assess effectively, then, their major aim of assessing concentrates on the learning outcomes rather than on improving the learning process. It is concluded that if lecturers lack assessment-based training in various components such as designing, administering, interpreting, and applying results got from assessment, they end up engaging in poor assessment practices that will affect fairness, transparency, and accountability in the assessment process. Therefore, this research recommends that staff in universities should undergo assessment-based training.

Recommendations

From the conclusions of this study, it is recommended that universities should provide assessment-based training to their academic staff to ensure that they are equipped with proper assessment skills, confirming what researchers such as Duncan and Noonan (2007), Coates, (2015) Masole, (2009, 2011) found out. It is of no doubt that lecturers are often compelled by circumstances of job opportunities to do or learn on the job – Academic apprenticeship – as far as assessment is concerned, often guided by yet untrained assessment leaders in the department. Yet they are expected to assure and enhance quality – a proverbial academic parable of the blind assessor leading another assessment blind. There are strategic institutional rationales for improving assessment using trained assessors to assess student learning, which should signify non-trivial ways of what an institution delivers – which might imply variations in education and graduates (Coates and Richardson, 2012). Academics require professional training and development to improve competence in assessment which currently is spasmodic – therefore a call for assessment-based training and even re-training for lecturers teaching at Universities.

As has been discussed before, most academics learn their trade (Lectureship) through what could be termed 'an informal apprenticeship, while competence in assessment is no exception. This does not discount the need for creating more systematic forms of professional development (Coates, 2015). It is most likely then, that, if consideration is not given to expertise in assessment, student learning will not change given the low priority assessment-

based training by institutions. There is need to understand the 'assessment supply and value chain', and how it can be improved at universities.

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The Impact of Handicrafts on Economic Development: A Case Study of Bulawayo Kraal in Binga, 1990-2000.

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Abstract

The study examines how commercial basket weaving in Bulawayo Kraal Village in Binga District in Zimbabwe during the nineties contributed to the economic development of the community. Binga district is faced with a stagnant economy, poverty and lack of basic infrastructure. Governmental and humanitarian aid development strategies since independence have largely been ineffective in improving the economy of the region hence there is need to explore how indigenous knowledge systems such as the production of handicrafts can bring economic development. The paper shows key findings from qualitative data obtained from in-depth interviews with basket-makers of Bulawayo Kraal and traders who used to buy Tonga baskets for resale. The data gathered established that commercial basket weaving in Bulawayo Kraal as a local initiative generated income for the people and as a result improved the economy but the community remained largely underdeveloped. The research revealed major challenges faced by basket makers leading to the decline of the trade but identified the potential of handicrafts in the economic development of rural economies with low agricultural potential.

Introduction

At independence the government of Zimbabwe inherited a largely neglected peasant-based rural economy whereby most of the rural population lacked adequate and fertile land, infrastructure and basic social amenities because of inequitable distribution of resources during the colonial era. Soon after independence, the new government introduced economic policies that attempted to address the social and economic injustices inherited during the colonial era. According to Mashingaidze (2013:384), most of Binga District (Matebeleland North Province) was not considered for these social and economic developments and the region remained underdeveloped, marginalized and poorer than most rural areas in the country. *Basilwizi*'s report (2010:18) asserts that ninety per cent of the population in the Zambezi valley is chronically poor and Binga suffers from chronic food and water shortages as well as lack of

basic socio-economic services. Most of the socio-economic problems that the Tonga of Binga are facing can be traced back to the colonial era when they were forcibly displaced from the banks of Zambezi River between 1957 and 1958 into inhabitable areas when the Kariba Dam was constructed.

Many rural development projects such as provision of basic rural infrastructure and irrigation services have not been implemented in most parts of Binga by the government after independence. There was very little growth in the economy since resettlement and the district has been isolated by poor roads and communication networks (Financial Gazette 31-10-2013). The district lacks basic infrastructural development and hence has few employment opportunities for its inhabitants. Manyena (2008:310) analysed how development and humanitarian programmes implemented by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) after independence attempted to promote post-resettlement development in Binga but have failed to address the root of the problems facing the Tonga. These policies aimed to improve the economic and social life of the Tonga through a top-down approach. Even though NGOs in Binga claimed that they used a participatory approach, they failed to bring transformative economic empowerment and development (McGregor 2009). This widespread failure of a top-down approach to rural development planning has led to limited attention being paid to the indigenous knowledge systems of communities in an attempt to generate more effective development strategies. The concept of indigenous knowledge describes the inclusion of local voices and priorities, and guarantees empowerment at grassroots level (Limkriengkrai 2010:45). The local knowledge and wisdom of Binga communities are needed to inform and frame development projects which would consider the needs of the people as well as their environmental and technical knowledge in order to achieve sustainable food security and wealth creation. The Tonga handicrafts such as baskets, wood carvings, drums and pottery have a potential to develop and diversify the economy of the region if they are linked to the tourism industry for markets.

The study looked at commercial basket-weaving and trade during the nineties in a village known as Bulawayo Kraal in Binga district, Matebeleland North Province, as an initiative by the Tonga to circumvent deepening economic challenges and to develop as well as diversify their economy in an attempt to make a living in one of Zimbabwe's harshest environments. Basket-weaving is one of the oldest economic and social activities of the Tonga that has been carefully nurtured for centuries and has been renewed by each generation. Before displacement

from the Zambezi, basket-making was an integral part of their tradition and almost every woman was able to weave baskets because of the availability of the *mupokwe* (palm trees) and *mateete* (reeds) on the banks of the Zambezi. These resources grew in abundance in Bulawayo Kraal thus women continued to utilize them for making baskets mainly for local use after resettlement. The people used baskets (*nsangwa*) as utensils for carrying the harvest from the fields, carrying wild fruits and food gathered from the forest, winnowing sorghum, when grinding grain, as well as for storing food. The Tonga developed an independent identity to their basket making skills and styles, and today Tonga baskets are well known on the international market because of their artistic value (for example, Tonga baskets for sell are found on Mbare Contemporary Art, (http://www.mbare.com/800.684.5429/html).

Although subsistence agriculture is important to the people of Binga, the area itself usually receives low rainfall per year since it is under Region V of Zimbabwe and that makes it near impossible for the people of that area to succeed in communal subsistence farming. This paper discusses the contribution of a non-farming activity, basket-weaving, to the economy of the Tonga during a period of nationwide economic, social and political hardships due to economic reforms of 1990-1999. The people of Bulawayo Kraal village commercialized basket-weaving at a time when agriculture and food production were not functional to meet their economic and social needs. Basket-weaving diversified their economy and improved the quality of life of the people. Richard (2007:11) suggests that income generation, by itself, is not a synonym for development but it can become the key and catalyst for many other aspects of the development process such as independence, health, community building and women's emancipation. This paper examined how basket-making contributed to economic and social revitalization of women in Bulawayo Kraal during the time of economic hardships and hunger. This study unveiled the positive past of the Tonga after resettlement as they took initiatives to circumvent socio-economic challenges, with basket-weaving as a way of improving their lives. The study contributes to the role and potential of handicrafts in rural development and employment creation in areas where farming is difficult or impossible because of environmental and climatic challenges.

The research assumed that handicrafts can significantly contribute to the development of the economy of Binga District. In order to examine how basket-weaving in Bulawayo Kraal contributed to the economic development of the community during the years of economic restructuring in the 1990s, the study sought to firstly, identify the economic problems which

Bulawayo Kraal community faced during this period, and secondly, examine how basket-making affected the economic needs of the people during the 1990s, and lastly, identify the major challenges which led to the decline of basket weaving in the late 1990s.

The study used the qualitative research methodology in the gathering and analysis of data and depended more on oral history. Data collection was done using the interview method in order to get aspects of historical experience which are absent from written works. Six key informants were purposively selected for in-depth interviews; these included four adult women who were engaged in basket-weaving in the nineties, and two men whose wives were involved in basket making during the period under study. Semi-structured informal interviews were also conducted with two female informants from families who were well-known basket makers during the period under study but no longer reside in Binga. A woman from Harare who used to buy baskets from Binga and exporting them to South Africa was also interviewed, and pseudo names were given to the informants. The information obtained from these interviews was very rich and useful in revealing the potential of handicrafts to rural economic development.

Economic problems faced by the Tonga during the 1990s

Zimbabwe was colonized by the British in 1890 and the colonial regime expropriated land from Africans without compensation for farming, mining and urban development. Fifty-seven thousand Tonga-speaking people lost their land on both sides of the banks of the Zambezi River to pave way for the construction of the Kariba Dam's hydroelectric power project and were forcibly resettled on barren land (Colson 1971:20). Twenty-three thousand people on the southern bank in Southern Rhodesia were settled on the upper Zambezi plateau where the land was not good for crop cultivation and received erratic rainfall. Only between five and eight percent of the land in Binga region was considered suitable for agriculture by the colonial officials upon resettlement (NAZ file S3599/389). These people began suffering chronic food shortages after losing the fertile valley lands where they had been able to plant and harvest crops twice a year on the river banks (Scudder 1982:11). They had to adjust to largely unproductive extensive farming that depended on the unreliable rains on poor, sandy soils. Manyena (2009:121) studied the agricultural coping mechanisms of the Tonga of Siachilaba village (who are neighbours to Bulawayo Kraal village) in dealing with near-famine starvation and perennial food insecurity after resettlement. He discussed their initiatives in growing drought resistant millet varieties intercropped with drought resistant vegetables and other crops in order to increase the chances of having a good harvest even in a bad year, but farming and

food security remained a challenge to the people.

Although food production in Zimbabwe is the backbone of most rural economies, the Tonga remain unable to sustain themselves through agriculture. As mentioned above, Bulawayo Kraal is located in Natural Region V where the climate is arid; the soils are poor and the summer temperatures are very high. The sandy soil of the area was heavily leached and requires lots of fertilizer for subsistence farming to be successful. Nyathi (2012:133) observed that NGOs like Catholic Development Commission (CADEC) and *Kulima Mbobumi* Training Centre (KMTC) were involved in agriculture in many villages in Binga including Bulawayo Kraal with the aim of achieving long-term food security but their programmes were not sustainable and hunger remained a major problem in the village. Both NGOs distributed seeds and fertilizers to the people every year but the recipients of these valuable farming inputs could not produce significant yields. Instead of wasting the inputs on non-productive farming, the people ended up selling maize seed and fertilizer to Zambia for an income (Nyathi 2012:134. Interviews with some Tonga women revealed that sometimes they thoroughly washed and dried the maize seed before taking it to the grinding meal for immediate consumption because crop cultivation is risky business (personal communication, Bulawayo Kraal, May 20, 2017). Manyena (2003) argues that although NGOs did a commendable job in Binga they seemed to miss the needs of the people. What the people of Bulawayo Kraal needed most was an irrigation project that could harness water from the perennial Zambezi which was in close proximity to their village in order for them not to depend on erratic rains for farming. NGOs like Save the Children (UK) (SC (UK)) distributed food aid every year in the village instead of assisting the people to get water for irrigation in order for them to produce their own sufficient food. There is need for change in development strategies used by NGOs if the economy of Binga is going to be developed.

After resettlement, farming was also difficult in Bulawayo Kraal because of conflict between the government and the community over conservation of wild animals. Marauding elephants usually destroyed crops at night and affected the harvest of a good crop in a fair agricultural season. The villagers complained that Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) which was introduced in 1982 (Dzingirai 1996:21) theoretically gave them control over their wild animals but they could not kill the elephants which were destroying their crops and contributing to an unstable economy characterized by a critical shortage of food for family subsistence (personal communication, Bulawayo Kraal, May 20, 2017). Hunting was illegal in the area even though wildlife was the largest resource in Bulawayo Kraal. Monkeys and baboons also affected crop yields and made crop cultivation

time-consuming because people had to be in the fields day and night, chasing monkeys and baboons during the day and scaring elephants at night. Furthermore, when the sorghum crop was ripe but not yet dry for harvesting, women and children had to spend the whole day scaring birds. As a result, their farming was not productive enough to support families and the community at large; and people could not even have a surplus to sell for income generation that would lead to development of their region.

The problem of farming affected the economic base of Bulawayo Kraal and made it impossible for a capitalist form of development to take place in the community because it was difficult for the people to accumulate a surplus of food which could lead to the accumulation of wealth. According to Karl Marx's theory of classes, it is the accumulation of surplus which leads to development of a rich capitalist class (Mandel 2003). This capitalist class which owns the means of production in turn uses its surplus to develop a capitalist mode of production which creates jobs for the majority of the people. Bulawayo Kraal had a narrow economic base and was ranked as one of the poorest communities in Binga. During the nineties, there were few 'better-off' people who depended on migrant labour in mines and towns. Very few people owned cattle for draught power, milk, meat, and for exchange with grain during periods of drought. The community consisted basically of the poor class who owned less than five goats and less than five chickens, and the major assets owned by most people was the hand hoe while a handful owned a plough, a wheelbarrow or a scotch cart (SC (UK) 2003:10). This lack of a strong and vibrant economy constrained development of the community in a number of ways.

Binga in general and Bulawayo Kraal in particular suffered from lack of basic resources and access to basic social services because of political neglect and marginalization. Traditionally, the women made baskets all year round but they had no access to larger markets in urban centres because their village was inaccessible by road. The community valued baskets mainly for functional utility, and used to barter them locally for millet and sorghum. A woman would sell about twenty baskets within a year mainly to those who stayed in areas where materials for making baskets were scarce (Reynolds and Cousins 1993:117). External trade in basketry with other districts was not possible because Bulawayo Kraal was more than one hundred kilometres away from neighbouring districts like Hwange, Lupane, and Gokwe. There was no reliable transport to towns and cities because the roads were bad, and as a result, they had no access to information on income-making opportunities. This severely affected the potential of economic development of the region.

The expansion of health and education services during the first decade after the attainment of independence eluded Binga District and affected the social, economic and political development of the region (Mashingaidze 2013:381). The people could hardly access health services because there was no clinic or health service centre in or near Bulawayo Kraal to treat common ailments like malaria and diarrhoea, and the nearest centre was Binga District Hospital which was more than fifty kilometres away. The more vulnerable people were pregnant women and children who could not walk the distance when they needed health attention. The HIV/AIDS pandemic brought many health challenges during the nineties when there were no Anti-retroviral drugs to prevent common infections. Affected people could not walk to Binga Hospital but the authorities failed to establish a health service centre in or near the village. Simatelele Clinic had not yet been opened then. Health is a basic right for all Zimbabweans and a healthy population contributes significantly to the development of a community.

The government failed to develop better rural social services during the nineties largely because of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of 1991-1995 which removed subsidies in the economy and cut government expenditure. A retired primary school teacher in the village lamented about lack of development initiatives because of the problem of high illiteracy rates in the community. There was only one primary school in the nineties in Bulawayo Kraal which was mostly staffed by Ndebele and Shona-speaking teachers who could not communicate effectively with Tonga children (personal communication, Bulawayo Kraal, May 20, 2017). Very few people in the village had attained secondary education because the nearest school, Manjolo, was more than fifteen kilometres away, and walking to the school was dangerous because of wild animals, particularly elephants. Furthermore, Manjolo Secondary School could not produce good grades because it was staffed mostly by untrained Shona-speaking teachers. Trained teachers did not stay in most schools in Binga because the region was remote; therefore they chose to work in better developed districts. Lack of better education opportunities affected the development of the community because they could not compete with educated people from other districts in employment opportunities in the civil service and in NGOs in Binga. Owing to high illiteracy rates, the community had limited skills and knowledge to stimulate the development processes of their area that would address their needs.

Impact of basket-making on the economy of Bulawayo Kraal during the 1990s

Many traders (*babuzyi*) began coming to Binga in the nineties following the economic hardships introduced by the ESAP and also because of the growth of the informal sector in Zimbabwe. ESAP which was launched in 1990 introduced IMF mandated economic and social

reforms which led to an increase in rural and urban poverty because of massive retrenchment of workers, price controls and inflation (Mapondera 2014:3).The resultant decrease in standards of living in many parts of the country forced many people to venture into the informal sector as hawkers, small scale backyard producers and cross-border traders. Informal cross-border traders who sold a variety of crafts in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia started flocking to Binga to buy Tonga baskets and wooden carvings for resale in order to cope with the demands of a higher standard of living.

Growth of the informal sector economy led to some Zimbabweans venturing into the transport industry as they sought profitable routes that were not well-serviced with regular buses. These improvements in transport opened Binga district and allowed people from many parts of Zimbabwe to travel there looking for trading opportunities. Tarring of the Binga-Kamativi Road in 1990 made it possible for traders to travel from Bulawayo, Hwange and Victoria Falls to Mlibizi and Binga Centre. Furthermore, from 1991 there was a regular *Chawasarira* bus which came to Binga Centre on alternate days from Harare via Gokwe, which informal traders took advantage of (personal communication, Binga Centre, May 19, 2017). Most informal traders came to purchase fish from the Zambezi River in Mujele and Mlibizi for resale in urban centres, but they also bought handicrafts and even ivory tusks for resale out of the country. Tonga baskets soon became highly sought after when informal cross-border trade grew big in the mid-nineties and involved a large population of mainly Zimbabwean women travelling to South Africa for informal trade. Cross-border traders who bought Tonga baskets came mainly from Harare. These baskets were sold in South Africa because of their artistic beauty and excellent craftsmanship as a unique form of art. The most popularly bought were the small and medium-size decorative baskets (*nsangwa)* which were displayed as pieces of art in many homes of South African families who stayed in high density suburbs.

A cross-border trader who used to travel from Harare to Binga between 1993 and 1997 revealed that people who exported Tonga baskets usually bought them using a variety of goods in barter exchange and rarely paid cash for them (personal communication, Chitungwiza, January 2, 2017). Groups of informal-traders would travel from Binga Centre to Dongamuse or Bulawayo Kraal where baskets were mostly found at relatively lower prices than in areas such as Manjolo, Samende, or Siabuwa where there were fewer basket makers because of scarcity of reeds and palm fronds which are used in making baskets. One group which used to get baskets from Bulawayo Kraal would spend about a week moving around the village placing orders for various sizes of baskets and then collecting them after weaving was complete.

Although basket-making skills and knowledge were acquired through experience, the process of weaving one basket normally took two weeks. The women made baskets during their spare time after working in the fields and performing household chores (Reynolds and Cousins (1993:115). They had to cut down the *mateete* reeds, the fronds of the *mupokwe* palm tree and the bark of the berchemia tree and then strip the palm fronds into thin strips which were boiled and dried. The bark was pounded and boiled with the palm fronds to be dyed and dried for making weaving patterns called *maabala (*Muyambi 1980:139). Weaving was only possible during daylight because there was no electricity in Bulawayo Kraal and many families could not afford alternative lighting systems. The traders had to wait until the number of baskets they required was enough before going back to their towns. When demand for baskets increased, most women moved from small to medium scale, and to some extent large scale basket-weaving in order to satisfy the demand and generate income. Their traditional income generating projects which included beer brewing, agriculture and bartering livestock could not improve their lives as much as basket-weaving during the nineties. The women recognized the potential of the basket-weaving enterprise and reacted immediately to fully exploit it. Basket-weaving became sustainable for many years unlike most development programmes introduced by NGOs which lacked women's participation in the elaboration, designing and implementation of policies and programmes. One woman recalled how most women abandoned NGO-funded projects like candle-making and soap-making in favour of basket weaving. She explained how her husband helped her in cutting the palm fronds, the reeds and the bark for dye for her to meet deadlines for baskets to be collected by the traders (personal communication, Bulawayo Kraal, May 20, 2017). Basket-weaving contributed to economic development that was people-centred and participatory in Bulawayo Kraal therefore the women embraced this commercial basket-weaving and trade for almost a decade.

Binga has long been considered a chronic poverty area where the majority of the people lack basic needs such as food, clothing, healthcare, education and clean water but basket-making improved the lives of the Tonga in Bulawayo Kraal in a number of ways. The women who were part of the study revealed that cross-border traders usually did not buy Tonga baskets using money but exchanged them with a variety of goods which they brought from South Africa. The traders brought second-hand clothing and other consumer goods such as sugar, salt, petroleum jelly, soap and cooking oil. New clothes were so expensive that most people could not afford to buy a new set of clothes even once a year on the Christmas festival. Cross-border traders brought a variety of second-hand clothes which improved the lives of many women and children as they became better-dressed in the community than those who did not weave baskets.

The traders usually brought clothing for women and children; hence the people obtained clothes and shoes both for home use and for church, and even school uniforms for children. Although most children in Bulawayo Kraal during the nineties could live without clothes during the hot summer months, they needed uniforms for school and a set of clothes for church. A cross-border trader from Harare used to bring the much-demanded uniforms that were worn at Bulawayo Kraal Primary School in order to encourage the women to make as many baskets as possible and keep them in stock waiting for her return. Arrangements such as these benefited both the traders and the weavers, which made it possible for the trade to survive for a number of years.

Due to their needs for decent clothing and other consumer goods, the women in Bulawayo Kraal made as many baskets as they could in order to improve their standards of living. They were able to innovatively exploit the market opportunities presented by informal traders in order to satisfy their needs. The basket-weavers claimed that although the cross-border traders brought second hand clothes, these clothes were of better quality than the new ones sold in shops because they lasted longer. Basket-weaving also helped many people in Bulawayo Kraal to access some goods which they could not easily afford because of lack of money and unavailability of employment opportunities in the area. During the nineties, sugar, soap and cooking oil were regarded as luxurious goods in Bulawayo Kraal which could not be obtained or used by most families for months. One woman taught her two primary school-going daughters to make baskets in order to increase the number of goods she could get from trade (personal communication, Bulawayo Kraal, May 20, 2017). Many families got used to these basic goods and increased their basket weaving techniques and keep in stock many baskets waiting for traders to come.

The Danish NGO, MS Zimbabwe established Binga Craft Centre in 1990 as a community-based organisation to economically empower women producing crafts through sustainable use of natural resources. Although Bulawayo Kraal women joined as a *Nsangwa* Club and met once a month to share their experiences, they traded their baskets as individuals. The study revealed that sometimes the weavers entered into exploitative partnerships with the informal traders because most of the Tonga women were illiterate. A cross-border trader from Harare testified that she made a lot of money from selling Tonga baskets in South Africa. She would spend two weeks of every month moving door-to-door in Thokhoza and Thembisa suburbs in Nelspruit, Johannesburg, in South Africa, before coming back home. Most of her baskets were bought for cash but she also asked for second-hand clothes for some of her baskets. On her journey back to Zimbabwe, she used to buy at least five sewing machines, five bicycles as well

as television sets and radios for cash from South Africa for resale. She used the profits from basket trade among other things, for building a seven-roomed house in Chitungwiza between 1993 and 1996 (personal communication, Chitungwiza, January 2, 2017). This shows that cross-border traders sold the baskets at a greater profit in South Africa which could not match the value of the second-hand clothes and other goods which they exchanged for the baskets in Binga. They should have shared the profits with the producers by buying their baskets for cash instead of cheap goods.

As the basket trade grew, some women took the initiative of searching for markets outside of Binga after having experienced the economic value of basket trade. When traders took long to come for baskets in Bulawayo Kraal, some women could not passively wait with heaps of baskets at home and instead searched for alternative markets where they could sell their merchandise for cash. One woman who was a widow with four school-going children had at one time woven more than thirty baskets with the help of her daughters for a woman from Harare who did not come to collect her large order of baskets in May 1996. She had no mealie-meal at home because elephants had devastated her sorghum crop before it was ripe, and SC (UK) had not yet started giving food aid soon after the harvest. The woman decided to take a few baskets for sale at Binga Centre where four of them were bought for cash. She used the money to buy some mealie-meal and soap for her family and kept some for bus fare to Bulawayo where she hoped to get many customers for her baskets. She then visited her cousin in Mzilikazi Township in Bulawayo where she stayed for a week selling her baskets. She walked to Saurestown, Queenspark, Romney Park and Paddonhurst low density residential areas (*emayadini*) carrying baskets on her head and knocking on gates searching for customers. A few baskets were bought for cash but the rest were taken on credit. She then travelled back to Binga with fifty kilograms of mealie-meal and some groceries for her family where she devoted most of her time to weaving more baskets. Basket making and selling in Bulawayo increasingly became her source of income and food during the remainder of the year of 1996 (personal communication, Bulawayo Kraal, May 20, 2017).

The study established that although there were more customers in Bulawayo for baskets during the nineties, it was far away for most women to travel and conduct business on a regular basis. Some women who had relatives in Victoria Falls and Hwange travelled there to sell their baskets for cash to cross-border traders, and to middlemen who had contacts with tourists. However, because of high illiteracy rates amongst the Tonga women, most middlemen offered them very low prices for their baskets than what they would in turn charge tourists. They had no access to information on tourist trends in Hwange and Victoria Falls and this affected their

bargaining power on prices for bulk orders of baskets. Nevertheless, they managed to get some income and used it to buy assets. One woman who regularly sold baskets to middlemen in Victoria Falls managed to purchase three goats and a number of chickens for cash from her neighbours who needed school fees for their children. These goats increased over the years and she used to barter them for grain during years of bad harvests. Unfortunately, her goats got depleted during the 2008-2009 drought when she used to exchange a goat for ten kilogrammes of maize because no food aid was distributed that year (personal communication, Bulawayo, April 7, 2017). In addition to accumulation of a surplus, basket trade improved the social lives of the Tonga of Bulawayo Kraal. Those who sold baskets for cash were able to pay school fees for their children at the local primary school among other things. They were also able to access health care at Binga Hospital because they could pay for transport to Manjolo and then to Binga which was a total of about fifty kilometres. Basket-making indeed revitalized the lives of many families at Bulawayo Kraal for almost a decade.

Challenges faced by Tonga basket makers

Although demand for Tonga baskets boomed in the early nineties, it began to decline towards the turn of the new century because of many factors. The main reason for this decline was the problem of poor access to large markets. South Africa has been the main destination for Tonga decorative baskets, but demand for crafts depends on the overall economic climate of a country. The economic downturn after South Africa attained independence in 1994 affected the demand for baskets as the cost of living increased and there was less and less of disposable income for spending on works of art. By the end of the decade the unemployment rate was high in South Africa and this affected the people's s ability to buy decorative goods.

Furthermore, the new black government in South Africa pursued the UNESCO mandated Ten-Year Plan of Action (1990-1999) for Development of Crafts for economic development and poverty alleviation (Richard 2015). During the apartheid era, traditional crafts had been neglected from mainstream trade and industrial policy but the new government realized the potential of rural crafts for sustainable development. Government and non-governmental organisations invested in further training of craftspeople, crafts promotion and the funding of community projects and marketing of handicrafts (Joffe and Newton 2007:14). More cooperatives were established in most parts of South Africa and received grants from the government for production of handicrafts for both local and foreign markets. This policy saw an increase in the development of local talent which significantly reduced the demand for foreign crafts such as Tonga baskets. In Western Cape Province, there was increased emphasis for youths to participate full time in crafts industry as a solution to unemployment (Oyekunle

and Filies 2016:63). This meant that Tonga baskets had to compete for markets with locally made crafts that were heavily subsidized by the South African government.

Furthermore, cross-border traders revealed that the Department of Home Affairs increased tariffs for imports of crafts, which in turn increased the price of Tonga baskets in South Africa. The baskets were counted or weighed and then taxed at the South African border as a way of discouraging imports and encouraging the marketing of locally-made crafts. This increase in cost further affected the demand for Tonga basket in favour of locally made baskets which were affordable and becoming increasingly available. As the trade in crafts with South Africa declined, the Tonga failed to access new foreign markets because of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe after the controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 which gave a bad name for the country internationally. NGOs such Ntengwe for Community Development attempted to empower vulnerable Tonga women in sustainable development through small scale community based tourism and handicraft enterprises but this project was not successful in creating large markets for Tonga baskets.

It has also been difficult for Tonga baskets to access new bigger markets because of severe competition amongst producers of decorative products, mainly from Asia. When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, globalization increased trade between African countries and the rest of the world. The Asian countries which were on the path to industrialization flooded African nations with cheap goods which killed local industries and affected the survival and expansion of the Tonga basket industry. The influx of cheap and unique decorative products which were partly or fully mechanized from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan greatly affected the demand of crafts in general and the Tonga baskets in particular in South Africa.

The local market for baskets has also been affected by modernization which undermines the confidence of Africans in their cultures. Many people looked down upon hand-made crafts as archaic products from the past in favour of imported goods. The utilitarian value of baskets in Zimbabwe in general and Binga in particular has been steadily replaced by cheap mass-produced goods. Plastic products imported mainly from China are overtaking the daily use of baskets in most Tonga homes. Plastic dishes, bowls, buckets, plates and trays are favoured by the Tonga more than locally made baskets because they are cheap, easy to clean, colourful and waterproof, although most of them are of poor quality.

Although basket-weaving has been an integral part of women's economic empowerment in Bulawayo Kraal, very few young girls are still learning to make baskets because they are busy with school (Reynolds and Cousins 1993: 115). There is need for adults to continue passing on

the knowledge and skills of the trade to the younger generation as a way of fighting deindustrialization due to the influx of cheaper alternative goods. The production of handicrafts in general is no longer practiced by many people in Binga. Handicrafts played an important socio-cultural and economic role in development of societies like India, Thailand and Tunisia and can be an important tool for the development of the remote and arid Binga District where agricultural-based form of development is a challenge.

Conclusion

The discussion has revealed that commercial basket-weaving has great potential in the economic development of Binga. If fully developed, together with the production of other handicrafts, this industry can have great impact on the economy of the region. The boom in basket trade in the nineties helped to boost the economy through provision of basic needs, income generation and accumulation of a surplus by women in Bulawayo Kraal who had few other income generation opportunities. The study also identified that basket-making began to decline in the late 1990s mainly because of lack of markets and has not yet recovered because of general economic and political challenges facing the nation. This study will assist the government and NGOs to develop and reinforce handicraft production as a way of promoting employment and development for most marginalized populations such as the Tonga of Binga where farming is difficult.

Although basket weaving improved the socio-economic life of the people for a decade in the nineties, the community still remained underdeveloped and lacks food, infrastructure, basic social services, and employment opportunities mainly because of political and economic marginalization. A shift of focus from agricultural production as a vehicle for rural development to promotion of handicrafts production for trade can help to diversify and develop the economy of Binga. Improving direct links with the tourism sector could open new markets that could contribute to the viability and sustainability of basket-making in Bulawayo Kraal. There is need to improve communication networks in Binga in order to increase access to information on local and international trading opportunities. An expansion of both primary and secondary schools increases education opportunities in Binga for women that would enable them to get literacy skills necessary for them to be able to keep basic records of their trade. In line with UNESCO's global vision of the role of handicrafts in economic development (Richard 2007:15), there is need for the government and NGOs to develop formal training courses for women and the youths in Binga in handicrafts-making skills and quality control in order to commercialize their crafts on the international market. Handicrafts-making can become a full-

time career and business for unemployed women, men and youths hence there is need to increase awareness on their economic value and their role in development.

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Notes

The name *Bulawayo Kraal*, according to oral traditions, was derived from a headman called *Bbulayo* who had a big kraal for his of cattle. The whites used to call his village 'Bbulayo's Kraal' which changed with time to become 'Bulawayo Kraal.'

Speaking the Unspeakable: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of Tabooed Language in Shona Society.

Believe Mubonderi and Nomalanga Mpofu-Hamadziripi

Abstract

This article discusses tabooed language in Shona, a Bantu language spoken in Zimbabwe. The Shona society, like any other society, has an unwritten code of behavior which spells out acceptable and unacceptable behavior and speech, particularly in the public space so that one's behavior and speech does not cause discomfort to the listeners. Taboos are a linguistic universal; different cultures have categories of words which are not spoken in public but are known to exist. That goes to show that no culture uses language uninhibitedly (Wardhaugh 1998: 236). In the Shona society, there are some topics that are regarded as sacrosanct and are known to exist in the language but are not to be spoken about publicly. However, there are some individuals who may break the code of behavior and use tabooed language. Employing a qualitative approach, the study used interviews, observations and focus group discussions to solicit for information. This article undertakes a socio-cultural analysis of the categories of tabooed language in Shona within the paradigms of cognitive grammar. It is evident that in the Shona society taboo language still holds an important place in as far as everyday communication and interaction is concerned. Euphemisms still remain valid and they are a reflection of the change and dynamism characterizing the Shona society in this contemporary dispensation.

Keywords: taboo, Shona, culture, euphemism

Introduction

Taboos are prohibitions, bans or restrictions imposed by society on certain actions or speech forms which are said to be sacrosanct and not normally performed or uttered in the public space. The breaching of a taboo is believed to result in some misfortune to the doer or speaker. These prohibitions are communicated to children during their socialization process. Chabata and Mavhu (2005: 257) observe that words which fall under the label of taboo language refer to a variety of words which are viewed as obscene, vulgar, impolite, derogatory, and those which refer to the physically, mentally challenged. Chigidi (2009) analyses taboos in relation to the aspect of 'avoidance" rules meant to instill fear in children thereby deterring them from

performing unacceptable actions. What is important to note is that the concept of taboo cannot be restricted to acts and places but also to words which are viewed as unspeakable or sensitive in each situation. In the context of this paper, taboos will be regarded as a class of words and expressions which are considered inappropriate in certain circumstances because they would be sensitive and offensive in their use.

This analysis of taboos in the contemporary setting is very crucial insofar as it affirms the changing nature of society considering the factors that continue to influence the way societies behave. The taste, values, and attitudes of a people continue to change over time. Globalization has been the major driving force of change in most African societies, and the people's use of taboo language has not been spared. This is the reason why this study has been limited to the contemporary Shona society because we envisage that it continues to experience a lot of changes at the cultural level.

In the Shona culture most of the taboo words come from those which are obscene. Obscene words are those which refer to certain parts of the human anatomy as well as their functions. The parts of the body are usually the private parts of the body which must do with sex and excretion, whose exposure in public is also regarded as taboo. In other cultures, the world over, taboo words are also largely constituted by most of the areas mentioned above, with many of the words being those which are obscene and having to do with the subject of sex and certain body functions like excretion. In the Western culture for example as noted by Trudgill (1974:27) and Wardhaugh (1998: 234) that the most tabooed subjects have to do with sex, death, excretion, bodily functions, religious matters and politics.

Ullman (1962) gives typologies of the taboos that are found in language. The first type of taboo words as postulated by Ullman are what he refers to as taboos of fear. This group of words includes reference to the devil, God and certain animals such as lions, bears and tigers. In the Shona culture reference to snakes, bats and hyenas instills fear in people, particularly children. These animals are also associated with witchcraft. In some cultures, some people keep snakes in their homes as a hobby but to the Shona culture one would be immediately labeled a witch if one were to rear snakes. Ullman also notes that people avoid mentioning certain words or certain things directly as they may be offensive to some people. He refers to these as taboos of delicacy. For example, topics such as death, disease, disability, criminal acts. Instead of mentioning them directly, people resort to using euphemisms. Taboos of propriety are the other category that Ullman refers to. Propriety involves decency, decorum, appropriateness, hence one gauges what they say according to whether it is appropriate within a context. Taboos of

propriety include topics on sex, certain body parts, bodily functions and swearing. For these words too, speakers make use of euphemisms. These categories of taboos that this article will refer to are the taboos of delicacy and propriety.

Socialization of children plays a crucial role in society in that it is during the socialization process that children are taught the norms of society and culture. As such, children grow up knowing acceptable and unacceptable forms of behavior and speech. The failure to adhere to society's rules and expectations would lead elders to question whether "*munhu iyeye akazvarwa chembere dzaenda kudoro*" loosely translated: one's behavior is wayward and appears to be devoid of parental or adult guidance and counsel. Wardhaugh (ibid) observes that some people violate the taboos as a way of showing "their own freedom from such social constraints or to expose the taboos as irrational and unjustified".

In Zimbabwe's urban areas, and particularly in Harare, the capital city, commuter omnibus touts have come to be associated with the use of taboo language especially obscene and vulgar words largely because of their rowdy behavior and lack of respect towards other members of society. Touting is an illegal form of work which involves informal and unorthodox ways of convincing commuters to board public transport. The stiff competition between the touts normally leads to anger and frustration and rampant use of taboo language in the form of swearing. The other social group that is akin to use a lot of vulgar language are vendors, market women (*vakadzi vemusika*) and prostititutes. These uncomely behaviors at times surmount to the infringement of the rights of those within hearing range. While it is believed that in most societies men are likely to use taboo language more than women Jay (2000), it is important to stress that also in some circumstances women find themselves swearing and cursing quite a lot.

Discussions with peers revealed that people use tabooed language because of several social situations. One such scenario is uncontrolled anger and emotion especially in heated arguments. In such a situation the aggrieved party will use tabooed language to insult the other person.

Taboos and the Shona Cultural Space

The issue of taboos is very much guided and influenced by a people's culture. Ipso facto, it is a community or society which decides when a word is dirty or clean, even in a situation where two countries share the same language they are likely to have different tabooed words. Gao (2013:2311) notes that, "peoples of different countries do not agree totally on what taboos are. Acts of human excretion and sexual intercourse are to be avoided in polite conversation. Age

and salary should be avoided in English conversation. In China, acts of human excretion and sexual intercourse are also taboo, but the Chinese are more tolerant in talking about age and salary" Hence, Akmajian (2001) says what counts as taboo language is something defined by culture and not anything inherent in the culture, in other words, no word is inherently good or bad but it is a people's attitude, perception and meaning given to a certain word that creates the taboo nature in that word. It is also imperative to highlight that taboo terms are also affected from a language or linguistic point that is there may be the case of variations at the dialect level such that some words may be taboo in one dialect but not in others. For example, in the case of Shona the researchers discovered that in the Korekore variety the term *kunyenga* (to court a girl) is obscene because it explicitly refers to sexual intercourse whereas in the other varieties the term refers to the process of courtship. As a result, when people are discussing the subject of courtship in the presence of a Korekore speaker, they will make every effort to avoid the term *kunyenga* and use the more neutral term *kupfimba* or *kutsvetsva* (to court a girl).

It is evident from previous researches in ethnolinguistics that when it comes to language use, most cultures the world over have certain words in their vocabularies which they have tagged as taboo. This implies that these words are to be avoided or forbidden to be used in certain situations. The Shona people are no exception as they also have a long list of words which they regard as taboo. The exercise of placing certain words under the taboo tag arises from the fact that the Shona people do realize the potency of words and their capacity to cause harm and embarrassment in situations of interaction. As a realization of this, cultural restrictions enforce the Shona people to observe and note the words they use when they interact amongst themselves. Hence, Pfukwa (2001: 26-27) maintains that learning to speak in the Shona society like in any other community involves the recognition of the potency of the spoken word and linguistic avoidance in certain situations. This is the reason why in the Shona culture people who fail to observe taboo word restrictions are usually referred to as "*vanhu vasina ganda kumeso*" (lit. people with no skin on their face = people who do not respect or have no consideration for their way of talking or using language such that they tend to always cause shame or harm with their careless use of language). This observation implies that these people do not observe the cultural rules concerning the use of taboo words in the Shona culture and such acts lead to these people losing their self-image and tarnishing the communal image as a whole. Yankah (1998: 15) echoes similar sentiments when he says that, "Both in traditional and modern society compliance with verbal taboos is part of the ethnography of communication for society places certain words under strict verbal censorship".

It is also vital to stress the importance of situation and context when dealing with the issue of taboo language as it depends on these two. According to Mohsen (2011:16), speakers in a language realize the taboo level of a word mainly through its connotations and the appropriateness of a word to be uttered in a situation. This means that for a word to be deemed as offensive it will have been used in an inappropriate situation because people tend to associate certain words with certain situations. If a word or term is used in the appropriate situation then there is no taboo which has been breached. For example, in the Shona society, it is not proper for a son in-law to talk about sex-related matters with his mother in-law because of the cultural distance that must be observed between them. However, it would be appropriate to talk about the same topics with his wife or wife's sister because society allows it. Besides the issue of situation as a determinant of the level of offensiveness there are other factors which come into play such as the speaker and listener relationship and the purpose of the conversation. Tabooed topics in Shona include sex, sexual organs, illness, disability, death, and certain animals and reptiles.

The Penguin Dictionary of Languages defines euphemisms as the use of vague or indirect expressions in the place of one which is thought to be unpleasant, embarrassing or offensive. Euphemisms are typically used to replace expressions to do with death, sexual activity and other bodily functions. According to Wardhaugh (1986:234), "taboo words and expressions are less obvious in society than euphemisms which come about because of dressing up certain areas in life to make them more presentable". As elaborated by Wardhaugh, it is euphemism which most societies use in the place of taboo words. This is inspired by the fact that cultures have words which are unspeakable in some situations, so to talk about the unspeakable euphemism is employed. From the cultural perspective of the Shona, Mpofu and Mangoya (2005: 129) state that:

> Euphemism is the replacement of a term seen as less refined or too direct by a more refined or less direct term. This is mostly evident when it comes to the naming of private parts of the body and any biological functions associated with them. Mentioning them and describing their functions is considered to be highly obscene in Shona culture so that alternative descriptions for them have been created in an effort to diminish the obscenity which they are deemed to carry.

However, linguistic norms may change. For instance, many changes continue to take place in the African culture through rapid globalization and technological improvements starting from home and to all other aspects of life. New contexts like the school, college and the work place have arisen in the contemporary setup all these have a bearing on the nature and significance of taboo language. In the school setup for example, children continue to be exposed to taboo subjects through learning. They come across topics such as sex and death, because they are in a school setup they are obliged to talk about such topics openly. In such cases they cannot be charged for breaking verbal taboos because the situation and context permits them to talk about such taboo subjects. The electronic media at times talks about taboo subjects but these will be efforts to educate the people about HIV/AIDS and in this case the rules to be observed when it comes to the use of taboo words or topics will be overlooked because of the situation or context at hand. Because of these developments in society, issues that once belonged to the private space have now been brought into the public space.

Theoretical Foundation

The analysis of taboos in Shona will be informed by cognitive grammar as postulated by Langacker (1987, 2008). Langacker's premise is that, meaning is the central component and that meaning can be equated to the conceptualization of phenomena. According to the theory of cognition, one of the main purposes of language is to convey meaning and the meaning of a word can be conceptualized within more than one domain. A word or term can assume many different meanings depending on how it is construed and interpreted in the given situation. Closely related to this is that in the understanding of taboo language no word is inherently good or bad but it is the connotation which is given to the word by a people that makes it good or bad obviously through the way the people or the society have conceptualized the word. It is from this view that we can attempt to understand how the Shona people understand and implement the concept of taboo language in their society. From the cognitive grammar perspective, it is important to highlight that the very concept of taboo is also a result of cognition in the sense that though the idea of taboo language is a universal phenomenon it does not necessarily mean that in all these cultures they have the same taboo terminology but the terms differ because in different societies the people will also have different conceptualizations of the social environments in which they live. The taboo terms of the Shona people to be analysed in this paper are reflective of this view of meaning. This analysis will be made using some of the major underlying ideas in the theory of cognitive language such as meaning, perception, mental spaces and conceptualization.

Furthermore, meaning can be understood under two types, that is, conceptual and associative meaning. Conceptual meaning refers to the definition of a word; associative meaning is about the individual mental understanding of the speaker. It is this type of meaning which is of interest in this analysis because it comes about because of what are termed image schemas which according to Langacker (2008:32) are schematic patterns of activity abstracted from everyday experience. In line with these, individuals have the capacity to interpret social scenes differently because in their minds they have different image schemas.

Methodology

The research used the qualitative research methodology. The data collection tools were in the form of interviews, observations, focus group discussions. The study solicited for information from 25 participants, all who were drawn from Harare. The participants were purposively selected because they had the information which was important to the study. Respondents involved the elderly, kombi touts, high school and college students and commercial sex workers. All were drawn from Harare because the city is made up of people drawn from the diverse cultural backgrounds which make up the Shona people. Issues of confidentiality and informed consent were stressed on before, during and after data collection exercise since the subject at hand was sensitive.

Categories of taboo words in Shona

Since there are no universal norms guiding the categorizing and use of taboo words, it becomes imperative that we come up with a categorizing of taboo words from a Shona perspective. As mentioned earlier on, in the Shona culture tabooed words come from such subjects as sex, death, certain behavior, certain diseases and also conditions like physical and mental impairment. It is from these areas from which the following categories can be drawn. In the Shona society, taboo words can be categorized as follows: sex, obscenities, ethnic and racial insults, swear words, illness and death.

Obscenities

According to Chabata and Mavhu (2002) in Shona many of the taboo words are those that are obscene. Landau (1984:183) defines obscenity as, "Any reference to the bodily functions that gives anyone a certain emotional reaction, that of 'fearful thrill' in seeing, doing or speaking the forbidden. Thus, it is the existence of the ban or taboo that creates the obscenity". Obscene

words are those that refer to certain parts of the human body as well as their functions. The list of obscene words also includes words referring to bodily functions and processes like *mama* (defecate), *sura* (fart) and *tunda* (ejaculate/urinate).

The use of obscene words is strictly restricted according to Shona cultural norms. In normal situations of interaction, the words are not used. Mentioning of such words in public or polite company leads to public shame and ridicule on the part of the user. Jay (1996) argues that in the case of obscenity it is not only about restricting what people say but also protecting the listeners from harmful speech. Thus, the Shona people always insist on observing the rules concerning taboo word use in situations of verbal interaction. All words in this category are referred to as '*zvinyadzi*'. In practical situations these obscene words are substituted with their euphemistic equivalents to an extent that it is the euphemistic words which are very popular in use. In the Shona speech communities, you will hear people say for instance *ndichamboenda kunozvibatsira* (lit. I am going to help myself = meaning going to excrete). About sexual intercourse euphemistic expressions are used such as *vakarara vese* (they slept together); *vakasangana;* (they met)*,* both referring to the fact that the act of sexual intercourse was performed. In the case of the private parts depending on the age of the speaker indirect terms are applied for example genital parts are normally referred to as *nhengo dzemudzimai* (female genital organs) *or nhengo dzababa* (male genital organs). Both male and female organs are also referred to as *chinhu* (thing); while the male organ is referred to specifically as *chombo* (weapon). Mpofu and Mangoya (2005: 130) refer to the following euphemisms for the female and male genitalia: *sikarudzi* (creator of a tribe), *mukana* (passage = vagina), *kunzira* (way = vagina), *mhuka* (animal = penis), *chirombo* (a big thing = penis), *mbonausiku* (a thing that sees at night = penis). The youth coin their own terminology and refer to the female genitalia as *pakati* (in the middle).

Ethnic and Racial Insults

Insulting words are terms and expressions used by people with the intention of hurting the feelings of other people. Ethnic or racial slurs are mainly influenced by racism, Deng (1980:100) defines racism as, "the belief that some human races are inherently inferior to others, racist language is that which shows a bias against racial or ethnic groups; it is a language that degrades or belittles them". These terms are usually offensive and are meant to demean or degrade other people Montagu (1967). In other words, the insulting terms can also be derogatory in nature, the insults have impact because they denote real or created negative characteristics of the targeted victim and also that there is lack of respect for others on the part

of the speaker. The words vary in the impact they have on the intended target, some insulting words are mild in offense while others are very severe. This all depends on the context or situation and the intended target. For example, the term '*mabhoyi*' (boys) is an insulting term which owes its origin to the colonial days and was mostly used by whites as a term of reference for the Africans. Largely influenced by racism, Europeans viewed Africans as inferior physically and mentally that their mental capacity was the same as that of small children, small boys in other words. Gao (2013) also asserts that in the 17th century the British fought very much with the Dutch such that in English vocabulary the word Dutch had a derogatory sense in most of its usages. The term '*mabhoyi*' grew in prominence and was also absorbed into the Shona lexicon as an insulting term. What is important to note is that Africans can use the term amongst themselves without creating much offence or sensitivity against each other, no wonder why the statement **'*mabhoyi munonetsa'*** (Africans you are problem) is perceived as normal amongst the Shona people. However, if the term is used by a non-Shona about the Shona it becomes an open insult especially if the term is used by a European. The same applies to the term "nigger" which African Americans can use with no racial connotations amongst themselves but becomes highly offensive if uttered by a white person in whatever context.

The term Bantu as used in South Africa is also a good example to illustrate insults at a racial level. It was made popular during the apartheid era when Africans were socially and politically disadvantaged and were deemed as inferior by the whites the term had negative connotations in relation to the African people just like the term nigger in America with reference to the black people. As a result, Africans were offended to be referred to as the Bantu people because in their conceptualization of the social reality the term was intended for abuse so it was offensive even though the term is African in origin.

Hostility and stereotyping which is created amongst the ethnic groups are mostly the contributing factors since some societies look down upon others because of the failure to understand and appreciate the other group's culture. Mashiri (2005) observes that the exchange of ethnic labels is very much entrenched in the languages of the ethnic groups of Zimbabwe. The Zezuru, Karanga, Korekore and Manyika make up the ethnic groups which constitute the Shona people of Zimbabwe, amongst these groups are labels which clearly show the resentment and contempt for example the Karanga are referred to as '*MaVhitori*' (people from Fort Victoria) or '*vana wezhira* (Karanga people from Masvingo); those from the Manyika group are called or referred to as '*vanaWasu*' (people from Mutare). Mashiri (2005:3) also highlights that within the Zimbabwean context the different ethnic groups have created certain stereotypes

towards one another which portray the Manyika as hypocritical while the Karanga are said to be arrogant and pompous. The other ethnic group though outside the scope of this research is also a good example of ethnic slurs in the case of the Zimbabwean context. The Ndebele were referred to as *'madzviti'* (dissidents or ruthless people) because of their perceived ruthless nature way back in history as they moved into present day Zimbabwe led by their leader Mzilikazi. The Shona tribes could not match the Ndebele military prowess and they were subsequently conquered, thus the term *madzviti* was coined by the Shona to show their resentment of the Ndebele people. Similarly, the Ndebele also have insulting terms directed towards the Shona people like *'Amasvina'* (dirty people).

Ethnic slurs are also experienced between the Shona people and other ethnic groups from other countries especially from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. The civil war in Mozambique in the 1980s resulted in most of its citizens fleeing to seek refuge in Zimbabwe. The people of Zimbabwe created derogatory terms to refer to the Mozambicans whom they looked down upon and resented. Chabata and Mavhu (2002) cite the term *'mukarushu'* (person of Mozambican origin) for Mozambican immigrants. The other less formal term used to refer to a person of Mozambican origin is *muMosikeni*.

In the case of the people from Malawi and Zambia, the ethnic slurs are well documented arising from the time of colonialism and the federation of the then Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963). Large groups of people migrated to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in search of work on the farms and industries. Their desperate situation led them to take up work mostly in the mines and the farms, jobs which were resented by the locals. It is from these situations that demeaning terms were created to refer to the people from Malawi and Zambia, thus we have terms like *Mabhurandaya* (people from Blantyre)*, Mabwidi* (stupid, homeless people) and *Mabvakure* (people who came from faraway lands). These terms have become very much embedded in the lexicon of the Shona people and they always use them to insult the people originally from Malawi and Zambia. It is also important to note that amongst these ethnic slurs there are those which are very severe like *'mabwidi'* and *'mateeranjanji'* (those who followed the railway line when coming from Malawi) while the other terms are mild that the referents are not usually bothered, like *Machawa, Manyanja* and *Marudzi* or *Vanhu vechirudzi* (foreigners).

Swear Words

Swearing involves the use of obscene, rude and blasphemous language to show anger frustration emotion or even excitement. It has been revealed in practice that people do not only swear because they are angry or emotional but that they may be excited (Jay 2000). Montagu (1967) categorizes swearing into the following: abusive, durative, interjectional and objurgatory. This implies that swearing can be in different forms depending on the situation and context involved and the intention of the swearing because it is not always abusive but that swear terms can be used to add emphasis or in some cases as they assume the form of expletives. For instance, in Shona there are terms like "*wamama*" (serves you right). The term *kumama* (to excrete) is a tabooed word whose euphemistic equivalent is *kuita tsvina* (to excrete). The more sombre term would be *wakaura!* (serves you right!). According to McEnery in Jay (2009:156) swearing is determined by social rank and status. He argues that other social groups swear a lot than others, McEnery also notes that swearing is well documented in the lexicon of social groups like college students and soldiers while in people of higher status in society swearing is not very popular. In the Shona context, swearing using expletives denotes lack of social etiquette and decorum.

Some of the common swear words found in the Shona lexica include:

futseke   get away

mboko   stupid, idiot

hure   bitch, prostitute

nzenza   over-laughing idiot

rombe   good-for-nothing idiot, never do well

Apart   from the fact that in the Shona culture and other cultures taboo words are mostly associated with sex, it also important to note that there is a close correlation between the taboo concept and the taboo word used to describe the concept. In other words, when an act is considered taboo, the words describing the act become taboo. The words cited in this section fit into Ullman's category of taboos of delicacy. It is taboo to swear in public in Shona; let alone to refer to someone to their face and in public as *hure* (prostitute), *nzenza* (over laughing idiot) or *rombe* (never do well). Someone may think it and believe it but will not utter to the affected person. The Shona people also strongly believe in *munyama* (bad luck) and thus avoid insulting others because of the fear of bringing ill fortune upon themselves.

Cognitive grammar places emphasis on the interrelationship between the use of language and the social context and environment. As such, context dictates what is said or not said between people because if one says the wrong thing in the wrong context, he/she would be viewed with scorn.

New environments, contexts and cognitions have been created among the people largely because of new technology and processes like urbanization. This results in the construing of language differently amongst the people for example certain words mean different things to the same people while the word (*mutsetse*) seems normal to the elderly in the Shona society simply meaning a straight line, to the youth the word is unspeakable because to them it refers directly to the female sexual organ, the vagina. The word, according to the perception of the youth is obscene and its use should be restricted and controlled to save one's self image from public embarrassment and societal ridicule because of the use of taboo words in the wrong situations.

Illness and Death

In the Shona society, like in many other cultures, death is viewed as a very sensitive and emotional issue which people are not very comfortable to talk of. The Shona people as a result do not take or talk about matters of death lightly. Certain illnesses in the Shona society are also viewed as unspeakable especially if one has succumbed to the HIV/AIDS virus or is mentally challenged. The people find it very difficult to talk about such illnesses in situations of normal interaction because the words naming the diseases or the illnesses are labeled as taboo words which must be avoided when making conversations with other members of the society. Hence Mashiri, Mawomo and Tom (2002:221) say that, "Shona people consider matters relating to sex, death, illness or other misfortune as taboo or unspeakable". Examples of euphemisms referring to death are the following:

atisiya	he/she has left us
apfuura	he/she has passed on
aenda	he/she has gone
ashayika	he/she cannot be found or is lost
nhingi hakusisina	so and so is no more

When it comes to matters of illness the Shona people also take heed not to talk openly or directly about certain diseases like HIV/AIDS, they realize the need to protect the self-image of the sick and other members of the society who may be affected directly or indirectly. This

move stems from the Shona people's worldview which puts emphasis on the need to promote harmony amongst members of the Shona society, hence Mashiri, Mawomo and Tom (2002:221) stress that, "The Shona create and use numerous euphemism, metaphors, colloquial expressions and slang for naming HIV/AIDS or referring to its consequences since they perceive the acronym HIV/AIDS as too direct, unsettling and face threatening". The other strategy used in language to avoid unpleasant topics is the use of metonymy as propounded by cognitive grammar which entails the use of another word or concept associated in meaning to the word or concept being avoided. The Shona lexicon as a result carries a lot of terms and expressions which refer to the illness in a more indirect way such words include the following those which refer to the actual symptoms and also directly to the disease:

chirwere   the disease (in this case referring to HIV/AIDS)

zvamazuva ano   a disease which has become common these days

shuramatongo   a devastating illness which has destroyed families

chakapedzambudzi   a pandemic which wipes out people in large numbers

mukondombera   a pandemic which wipes out people in large numbers

The examples above are examples of metonymy in that the terms used to refer to the HIV pandemic are words that are associated with the phenomenon with some being metaphorical in meaning.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to discuss taboos in Shona and has shown the categories of words that are socially avoided in conversation by the society. Such tabooed topics as has been shown, if they need to be spoken about, are only referred to by means of euphemisms which lighten the burden of using the more direct and offensive term. Chigidi (2009: 184) laments the demise of taboos in society brought about by changes in culture, education and the socialization of children. The education system nowadays teaches young people to have a questioning and critical mind, whereas the social education system of past generations did not encourage children to question their elders. The study also noted the continued centrality of euphemisms in taboo language even though culture and language continue to change new euphemisms also being created to keep in line with the change which the Shona society is undergoing. The youths for instance are also creating their own euphemisms with reference to tabooed subjects and words.

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The Myth-Reality Nexus In Shona Oral Traditions In Zimbabwe: Mediating Contradictions And Sustaining Societal Values.

Aaron Rwodzi

Abstract

The Karanga and the Kalanga, due to language similarities between them, morphed into one ethnic grouping known as the Shona during the 19th and 20th century ethnic creation during the colonization process. Common among the Shona people is the identification of a particular clan with a myth or totem of origin, and other specific myths that are there to ensure political, physiological, economic, religious and social equilibrium. Some legends are portrayed as mythical, yet they remain very relevant to the contemporary societies as if they represent significant episodes of past lived reality. The Shona epistemological and ontological presumptions built and generationally sustained around the philosophy of 'ubuntu' are predicated on a system of myth transmission, validation and modification to ensure societal acceptance and group identity and cohesion. This article analyses selected myths that are universal to the Shona people so that contemporary societies develop an understanding and appreciation of how and why values in different myths have managed to survive through generations. Focus is on the inextricable link between myth and reality in social phenomena to determine the extent to which they have influenced Shona oral traditions over time and space. Most, if not all oral traditions, are replete with ambiguities that arise from the different interpretations of myths that specific groups of people give to them in their attempt to reconstruct the past as it really happened. The connection between myth, reality and oral tradition is discussed and historical probabilities that have become fact from a transcendentalist perspective are highlighted through this interpretive study. The position of this study is that myth and reality can often and contextually be used interchangeably to describe original traditions of the Shona people and that variations within the different oral narratives can be resolved and contradictions reconciled.

Key words

Myth, reality, oral tradition, reminiscences, cosmology, contradictions

Background of myth analysis

'Myth' is derived from a Greek word 'mythos' which originally meant "speech" or "discourse" but later came to mean "fable" or "legend"(Kyeyune, 2012). In this article, the word "myth," which is also formed from 'myo' to mean to teach or to initiate onto mysteries, is defined as a story of forgotten or vague origin, basically religious or supernatural in nature, which seeks to explain or rationalize one or more aspects of the world or a society (Doyle, 2004). Myth analysis is said to have begun in the 19th century. The Iliad, an epic poem by the ancient Greek poet *Homer*, recounts significant events of the Trojan War and the Greek siege of the city of Troy between the 7th and the 8th century BC (Black, 2012). The compilation was meant to convey the truth. The modern usage of the word "myths" connotes lack of authenticity and reliability as some people believe whilst others discount them. The structural theorist, Strauss, emerged not only to challenge interpretations, but also to question the validity of the methods used. Structure is an underlying pattern of symbols and the interaction of those symbols makes a myth a coherent unit susceptible for analysis (Miller, 1976). In most cases, these symbols must be treated as dependent variables so that any contradictions, divergences and relationships can be synthesized and reconciled. The social, political religious and economic significance of any such myth becomes apparent to a group of people- clan, family, tribe, ethnic group or country- as long as the values it represents can only be modified to meet changing needs and circumstances but without radically altering its essential meaning and purpose. Strauss further argues that oral traditions are composed of collections of universal symbols that are constructed in terms of set patterns of thought and that genealogies were, and still are, telescoped. This is so in order that people's names of ancestors who did not represent significant nodes in a system are forgotten. In this regard, structuralists view oral traditions as functional in reflecting social relations at a practical level. Arguably, they consider most historical narratives as mere cosmological speculations phrased in historical form and so have no bearing on events in the past.

Based on the structuralist perspective above, it is important to highlight the fact that they wanted interpretations of myths to be based on empirical logic in the spirit of positivism. That was the reason Strauss (1955) adopted the Hegelian (1831) approach (the law of didactics) in his structural analysis (De George, 1972). The approach involves formulating a thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The structure of a myth is a dialectical structure (Strauss, 1955) in which opposed logical positions are stated, oppositions mediated by a restatement, thus giving rise to another kind of opposition, which in turn is mediated. Strauss concludes that the value of any myth, even if it sounds like primitive poetry, is preserved even through the worst

translations (Clarke, 1981). However, it has to be pointed out that structuralism sought real underlying meanings of myths, yet reality in myths is contradictory due to various interpretations. For this reason, social and cultural anthropologists overtly criticize oral traditions as history and classify them as stereotypes, fiction or clichés.

Having up to this point discussed the link between myth, reality, history and oral tradition, I must hasten to pick on a few selected Shona myths to show how they are interpreted and interconnected. My aims are firstly, to compare and isolate the various levels on which myths evolve- whether geographically, cosmologically, sociologically or economically. Secondly, a comparison of the different versions of these myths will be made in order to look for meanings and discrepancies between them. Finally, an attempt will be made to illustrate the inextricable link between myth and reality in so far as they relate to narrative traditions

Theoretical/Conceptual framework

The paper evaluates the debate about myths and adopts the structuralist analytical framework to interpret Shona myths since the beginning of the 19th century. From an anthropologist perspective, myths are viewed as reservoirs of articulate thought on the level of the collective (or group) phenomenon and have an objective existence (Leach, 1961). They are not just stories, but tales with a logic of their own (Detienne, 1981; Edelstein, 2003). Muller, in his studies on myth and mythologies, identifies the precosmic, unhistorical primordiality and the cosmogonic or historical primordiality as two primitive types of myths (Jenson, 2014:178). For purposes of this study, the latter type-the cosmogonic or historical primordiality-was used to buttress the structuralist perspective deployed in the paper to analyse selected Shona myths. Detienne (1995) in his works '*The myth of the honeyed Orpheus'* concurs with classical scholars in anthropology and mythology led by Max Muller, in their comparative linguistic studies when they concluded that a myth is an unexpected product of verbal misunderstanding, a sort of a disease of language (Jenson, 2014:276). Myth is a contemplation of the unsuccessful compromises which compose social life (Clarke, 1981; Lévi-Strauss, 1981). To them, people's experiences of the contradictoriness of reality are made explicit. Unlike anthropologists, structuralists such as Pyysiainen (1998) view God as a conceptual postulate and argue that a myth is a symbolic construct which, like culture, is a particular form of communication that provides a logical model that can overcome or resolve a real contradiction. It can be discerned from this perspective that a myth mediates contradictions on the basic premise of culture. This work seeks to situate myths at the heart of culture, anthropology.

In his structural analysis of the Bushi myths, Sigwalt concluded that a myth is a reconstruction of an original tradition and that it is composed of mental units that transcend political and cultural institutions in time and space (Sigwalt, 1975). For purposes of this discussion, a myth is an account of a people's origin in the form of a legend, folklore, cliché, stereotype or tradition on one hand. On the other, it is explanatory and representative, dealing of course with historical, moral, economic, cultural and social discourses of diverse societies to which it relates.

Reality as a concept is both mythical and philosophical, and at times can mean the same thing as myth especially if looked at in the context of Kalanga mythology. Precisely put, the two are the same in meaning in a contradictory juxtaposition. Whereas a myth relies more on the abstract by expressing past or distant emotions through words, reality has much more to do with the real life experiences. Reality is viewed as social life of a people as influenced by a particular set of myths (Spear, 1978). He stresses the fact that the symbolic relevance of mythical stories is so much linked to experienced reality. In other words, reality refers to what actually happened and therefore serves as the harmony that exists between myth interpretation and social life as experienced by the people to which the myth refers. From all this, it can be safe to describe reality as something definable such as culture, population movement, common values, interaction and even self-identity.

Oral traditions are verbal messages which are reported statements from the past beyond the present generations (Vansina, 1985). Since myths and traditions are transmitted through generations by word of mouth, there is very little scope for us to doubt the glaring misinterpretations and misrepresentations of values and symbols by both oral recounters and oral historians in their attempt to re-live the past as it really was. Oral traditions have different levels or typologies of myths. Myths of origin are known as genesis myths. They are original stories that explain people's origins, state, clan or lineage and dynastic formation (Vansina, 1985). These stories are related to history as it really happened. Origin traditions are essentially mythical and not historical, but remain oral traditions. Because genesis myths refer to the earliest period, they have a symbolic meaning. For example, the birth of a child can be transformed in time to the miraculous creation of a mythical folk hero. However, these origin myths make it impossible for one to place events in a logical sequence, let alone in chronological order, due to lack of a calendar.

 To give credence to the above, a few but very important biblical phenomena will suffice. The opening chapter of the Old Testament is referred to as the 'Genesis'. It is pregnant with origin

accounts of the Hebrews, and the trials and tribulations they went through up until the determined and resilient few, after so many years of suffering, succeeded in reaching the land of milk and honey. Although through the aid of Christian historiographical traditions the Israelites are portrayed as having had a proud history as a nation, the myth has found international validation not at all as a kind of history, but as a sacred tradition that one cannot dare reinterpret in any meaningful and scientific way without sounding heretical. Similarly, the birth of our Lord Jesus Christ falls squarely into the same mysticism when the Virgin Mary gives birth to a son who was predestined to be the heavenly as opposed to an earthly king. Scientists and historians alike have certainly not been eager to challenge the conventional interpretation. Some have even chosen to align their thinking along established Christian doctrines despite all scientific evidence to the contrary.

Charter myths characterize the middle period (Henige, 1982). These myths are applied in the present-day social situations to justify facts (Malinowski, 1926). Events are seen as repetitive or cyclical in order that the values are maintained as they should be. The last level of historical narratives which in time perspective is viewed as linear, deals with events or things as they are. This takes the form of personal reminiscences which in most cases are erroneously confusedly reported in oral testimonies and written accounts as historical reality.

From the above, charter myths assume the character of a drama, evolving as they do episodically. They therefore represent major clans and show how linear genealogies were established. They are transferal myths in the sense that they represent a complexity of cross-cultural and socio-economic relations that were established over time immemorial. Both professional and community historians interpret the various types of myths differently in their attempt to come closer to reality and that is usually presented in literal form. What these historians come up with is not historical reality, although the values implied or symbolized are almost always retained.

The sexual intercourse myth

Shona mythology in Zimbabwe was analysed at a representative level by Aschwanden (1989). In this case the question of chronology or episodes is immaterial. Reference is made to allegorical myths of creation, myths of the symbols of life and death, myths as experienced reality and the Shona Welt bird [dreams]. According to him, one reality that permeates myth collection is the cosmological dimension and the psychological and biological expressions it portents to represent (Aschwanden, 1989).

The sexual intercourse myth about the snake is one of the myths of life and death. A happily married couple had one child when one day the sister of the wife came to assist her in the field. Whilst in the field, the wife realized that she had forgotten the child's porridge and sent her sister home to collect it. Her husband, too, realized that he had forgotten his tobacco and he hurried back home using the shortest route possible. When the girl entered the hut, she found a large snake which began to wind itself around her legs. This myth sounds like a folktale, but it represents the wisdom which is still very relevant today.

Snake symbolism is applicable in many Shona myths to represent evil intentions and good ones alike. The legless snake reminds us of the penis so that young girls know the bad side of a man. The snake's poison stands for the perforation of the vagina's hymen during sexual intercourse. It is equaled to a man who impregnates a girl without intending to marry her. The winding snake around the girl's legs symbolizes the act itself after the girl fails to resist the man's sexual advances. This myth, indeed, even if repeatedly told among the Shona typifies experienced reality. The biblical Adam and Eve myth is easily remembered as having the same symbolic significance of life and death.

In its broader symbolism, the snake represents its capacity to give life. It, in witchcraft, becomes the child of the witch, or a village symbol of an ancestor. The Shona today put it as 'the snake cannot permit' (*nyoka yaramba*) as a fertility symbol to refer to the uterus of a woman who cannot fall pregnant despite having regular sexual intercourse with her husband. Even when hungry and the intestines produce incredibly audible sounds, people say 'the snakes are crying' (*nyoka dzarira*) to symbolize the importance attached to food that gives life. Religiously for example, there are mystic snakes as those said to have made the pool at Matobo caves their natural habitat. People still regard the caves with sacral value at '*mutoro* or *mukwerera*' rain- making ceremonies. In some cases, when metaphorically or realistically the snake is used as a genuine transformation of a dead person, the presence of a particular snake at a specific hidden location is linked to locally remembered fallen personality so that killing it would be regarded as doing harm to the ancestor the snake represents. Given the interpretation above, myth and reality among the Shona are inseparable in that myth becomes experienced reality. It can also be deduced from this explanation that Shona history is but mythical, yet it is their myths that largely inform the present Karanga cosmological thinking. Their cultural, political, economic, religious and social values that derive from myths, of necessity, permeate and dominate Shona oral traditions in every way possible.

Forbidden sex myth

The forbidden sexual intercourse myth among the Shona has become a tradition in itself. It is represented by a hyena-man. A man who could change into a hyena had a wife and two children. No rain had fallen and people were starving to death. For that reason, the man decided to eat the son but the wife told him to go hunting. The wife opted to go to her parents' home to meet her relatives once her husband had disappeared into the forest. In her basket were calabashes filled to the brim with flies. One of the children was still too young to walk the long distance and she decided to carry it on her back. The woman heard the hyena howl because it wanted the son as food as it was hungry. In response, the woman emptied one of the calabashes that was full of flies for the hyena. After eating, the hyena had a brief sleep after which it rose again, hungrier and followed. On this occasion, the hyena remarked that 'if I eat this child (the one on the woman's back) it is not yours but mine, so I eat myself.' The woman emptied another calabash and she arrived on the sixth day, tired, and with the hyena in hot pursuit. She recounted the whole story to her people and the relatives decided to kill the hyena-man. Before killing the hyena, the people decided first to put him in a room where he was happy with younger sisters of his wife (*varamu*). A goat and a sheep were slaughtered and to the son-in-law was given the sheep's tail. People broke into song and dance and suddenly, hair filled the man's body and he quickly changed into a hyena. The girls cried for help and people came to kill the hyena.

The above myth relates to a taboo among the Shona which restricts sexual intercourse immediately after the birth of a baby in order to preserve the purity of the mother's milk which the baby needs to survive. It relates to men who fail to control their sexual drive as shown by the symbolic hyena that is not easily satisfied with meat. A woman from a far-away country symbolizes a woman who was not easily aroused in love play, or who could not violate the norm not to perform the sexual act with her husband before the baby was old enough to be weaned. The absence of rain represents absence of a monthly period after the woman's second birth. It is the husband alone who nearly starved in order to show men's unsatisfied sex drive when they are not permitted to resume sexual intercourse with their wives before they have had their first period after giving birth. The man's demand to have sex is equated with, or is as bad as, eating his own child in the sense that even today, the Shona are convinced that doing so results in untimely pregnancies that come too soon as to risk the baby's life if it continues to suck contaminated or spoilt milk from the mother's swollen breasts. The advice that the wife gave to her husband to 'go hunting' can be interpreted to mean that she was telling the man to

look for a prostitute (wild animal) so that he would get sexual gratification under the circumstances.

The visit by the woman to her relatives represents the tricks women up to now in Shona traditions use to evade husbands who are sexually restless. This strategy has been modified so that the woman does not have to move her sleeping place to the vicinity of the altar (*chikuva*) regarded as sleeping places for the ancestors where the husband had no right to force her. Instead, the wife would have to share the same sleeping hut with elderly women who also during the day keep watchful eyes on the man's movements, until the monthly period appears again, (arrival home). The taboo implied by the child walking too slowly signifies a very important tradition . The child was too young to let the couple perform the ceremony popularly known as 'placing the child in between them' (*kuisa mwana pakati*). The husband, in terms of this practice, is not allowed to ejaculate into the woman's vagina, but has to spread his sperm across the baby as sign to show that the couple can meet and mate after the ritual. The killing of the goat signifies the re-union of the couple, and the sheep's tail given to the husband represents the richest part of the female's body as the pleasure awaiting the man after what seems to be a long time of sexual inactivity.

The hyena-man taboo together with many others in the Shona society, are still much embedded in the traditions and belief systems of contemporary generations, albeit with inconsequential variations and modifications. In the process of preserving such mythical values that are reality in themselves, a new set of myths is created, modeled on the previous ones in a manner that suits in with present-day perceptions. In order for me not to become too Freudian, relating every interpretation to sex, for now let me briefly look at the myth of the bull that talked as signifying the cycle of life and death in Shona mythology.

The bull myth

A rich married couple prematurely died the same day they had been bewitched by the husband's relatives, leaving behind a son and many cattle. Before his death, the father told the boy that the black bull would take care of him: it would be father, mother, brother and sister to him. As advised by the father, the boy sold all the cattle save the black bull. Strangely enough, he later killed the bull by simply removing the intestines. He then put all his belongings inside the bull and decided to migrate. To make the bull walk, the boy had to sing a song and thus, a long journey led him to a foreign country where he spent most of the time inside the bull. The bull later asked if the people could give the boy a place to stay, but, at the sight of a talking bull,

they were frightened and regarded the talking of the bull as a sign of bad omen. At last, the bull approached a receptive old woman whom it praised and promised great wealth in return.

The bull led cattle to the pastures. One day the boy opened the bull's belly, started singing and heavy rains fell. That season that year, there were a lot of pumpkins and maize in the old woman's field alone to the effect that the chief was impressed and called the boy to his court. The boy argued that they had not treated him well on arrival, and that he could not promise him what he had done to the old woman. In the end, people made him king and he became the founder of a great people. It is from this that the concept of '*gono*' meaning a bull that serves as a host for the family's or clan's ancestors, among the Shona started and constitutes up to this day, a greater segment of people's social life.

The promise by the boy's father to remain closely connected with him, though mythical, almost reveals the strong Shona belief in ancestral worship. This myth is very real in that inherited wealth, it is believed, and ancestral spirits, are intertwined. As such, the wealth ought to be managed in accordance with instructions people give on the eve of their death. To the contemporary Shona societies, a bull is a sacrificial animal offered to God and ancestors as a fertility symbolism and as protection against all forms of vice. Being male, the bull symbolizes men's, not women's, role in society as that of family and lineage protection. As a fertility representation, in real life the bull produces the cattle (father, mother, brother and sister) that bring wives and children for the clan or lineage. The fertility from the ancestors suggests that the youth would beget children, become name bearers and genuine symbols of the deceased through special rituals.

In the above myth, it is reality that the dead are actualized and reunited with the living as evidenced by the continuation of the '*bira*' (beer which is occasionally brewed to honour ancestors) and '*kurova guva*' (home bringing ceremony done for the dead) ceremonies. For example, the slaughter of the bull at the '*bira*' ceremony represents the death of a family member which does not mean separation, but continued communication with the deceased. That is why in this myth, because the dead do not want to be separated from the living, the head and limbs are left intact. That is why also, it is a commonly held belief that the deceased, if aggrieved before burial, retains a second white shadow which should have disappeared with his death. In this myth therefore, the removal of the contents of the abdomen symbolizes the separation of the white and black shadows by death and the child becomes the symbol of the ancestor. The belly symbolizes the house in which the children are protected by the ancestors.

Aschwanden (1989) concludes that one is almost dressing in the ancestor's clothes, is within their protective wall and nothing can hurt him.

In line with the previously mentioned interpretation are the life connotations that the myth carries. The boy's song that brought the rains represents praise totem poems that help to link the living with the dead.' The song can also be used to refer to praise and totem songs sung during sexual intercourse and at the creation of a new life. Falling rains represent the semen and the woman's fluids both of which are necessary for the creation of a new life. The cooking and eating that characterize the period after the heavy rains symbolize sexual intercourse and a happy wait for the coming child. The growth of new plants symbolizes pregnancy and birth. When the boy moved to a foreign country, it symbolizes the belief among the Shona that a boy must find a woman of alien blood to marry as a safeguard against incest. It is the ordinary view that incestuous marriages among other traditional taboos bring shame to the people as a sign to show disapproval of the practice from the ancestors who are holding back rain leading to famine. Totems are seen as playing a very significant role. Before a boy proposes marriage to a girl, it is traditional practice that he first asks to know the girl's totem in order to avoid marrying his 'sister.' If that happened-which was quite rare- the son-in-law would be compelled to first annul the relationship by paying a cow (*mombe yecheka ukama*) to confirm the new estranged relationship. Religiously, begging for a place in a manner biblical beggars did symbolizes God as appearing among the rich people in the guise of a beggar. The myth is calculated to take cognizance of societal differentiation and to nurture the virtues of tolerance, respect and egalitarianism. The old woman represents a girl who is not attractive but has a golden heart. From this emerged the belief that beautiful girls are inherently wicked, or are witches, and so must be thoroughly scrutinized before they are to be considered for wives.

The Shona are not alone in their beliefs in mythological aspects such as taboos, folklore, legends, clichés and weltbird as they relate to witches, spirits, young children and the birth of twins. All these are still anchored in their ideology as living reality since they are found and experienced in everyday life. However, some myths have lost their ideological content. But the reality of witchcraft elsewhere in Africa is not symbolical at all either: it is experienced, so are the consequences of bad or dirty spirit influences and the problems of twins and abnormal births. It therefore makes sense to talk about mythological reality than to present myth and reality as oppositions with regard to Shona myths that are representative of their life view. To dismiss all oral traditions as mythical speculation would be to render the Shona a society without cultural values because it is these myths upon which they draw their history from, and

around which their traditions revolve as experienced reality. Myths have shaped their thinking, their beliefs and their history.

The weltbird (dreams)

The weltbird is part of the Shona experienced reality. A fictitious girl character in a dream refused to be host to a mermaid water spirit (*njuzu)* that wanted to possess her. Because of that refusal, she had problems in finding a man to marry. It was only after she had accepted that the recurring dream stopped. Still then, she was not allowed to visit town. She was torn between two worlds- ancestral and alien. She was not allowed to have sexual intercourse with her husband since sexual abstinence was, and still is, part of the pool spirit's virginity. It has to be pointed out that some of the alien water spirits such as *jukwa* and *nyusa* are part of the people's living memory. Most telling dreams do not need *n'angas* (diviners) for psychoanalysis because they only confirm, and in most cases modify, the dream with already known possibilities of interpretation. Having said that, the Shona weltbird shows the extent to which reality and mythology can become one in everyday life, as Aschwanden (1989) submits that reality of everyday life, recorded in symbols, is translated into mythological spheres so as to create a reality which always has actual validity as long as the myths are believed.

Dreams take place in the subconscious mind. Nobody is responsible for what they dream, and yet the same dream can frequently recur. Most of these dreams can be interpreted from an economic, social and religious point of view. The influence that water spirits have on marriages, and in particular, on girls who subsequently fail to marry because certain rituals must be performed first, is reality in itself. Pentecostal organisations in Zimbabwe's cities claim to proffer spiritual healing and are now host to victims of childless families and mermaid spirits. Public testimonies on television about the spiritual power of healing are still shrouded in mystery and therefore essentially mythical, but the reality of people having their lives restored is a reality society is experiencing.

Conclusion

The structural approach to the study of myths still remains the basis upon which the change in people's life perspectives, beliefs and traditions are shaped over time. Myths, through their transmission from generation to generation, coalesce into a people's tradition. For that society to keep remembering, the tradition is kept alive orally. This then forms part of a people's oral history. History researchers usually interview individual characters representing lineages that have made history and so regard their testimonies as applicable to all and sundry even if they

are terribly embellished. That explains why historical reality is difficult to fathom since history by and large derives from myths. Yet some myths are a direct product of individual imagination. Consequently, some very important cultural values are misrepresented, and others might never have been part of a past reality.

Some myths appeal to different levels of people in the society to which they apply. For example, there are totemic myths that suggest in most cases, the great feats attributable, say, to the Njanja clan, justifying their right to land, women and political power. These are artistically narrated to portray the impression they want even in the presence of data to the contrary. Some rumours, if repeatedly told whether orally or in written narratives, become myths from which traditions are generated. Tales therefore, are not historical chronicles, but symbolic dramas which, as they unfold, express fundamental values in the form of traditional historiography. Such was, and is, the manner in which mythical heroes who qualify for burial at the National Heroes Acre in Zimbabwe and at other lesser important shrines throughout the country have become not only historical, but also liberation personages.

We have in contemporary society different sets of myths that are totalizing in that a single myth can either be universally applicable or it can within the same social setting play different functions. In cases, it depends on the reality of lived experiences that the myth mirrors on the contemporary societies. Behind every myth is reality, and vice-versa. Origin traditions in Africa, based as they are on myths, are the sources from which oral accounts and oral traditions have become history. The relationship is but dialectical. For as long as history continues to be revised in an attempt to come closer to the truth of what in the past really happened, it is then safe to conclude that historical reality is non-existent and a façade. But for as long as the cosmological significance attached to myths by successive generations before us still guides and shapes our experienced values today, then there is ample proof that myths are the true sources of history, without which there would be little known about society's past. Oral traditions, albeit largely inaccurate, certainly assist in replenishing our scanty understanding of the lived past, and how different societies came to cherish their values as they do today. By and large, myth is the reality in oral traditions from which societies derive their history. It is, too, a social representation for all kinds of relationship such as respect, loyalty, religion, fear and pride.

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